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36.1 (June 2014) 36.1 (Junio 2014)

Table of Contents • Índice

Articles • Artículos

Reviews • Reseñas

ARTICLES

ARTÍCULOS

ATLANTIS
Journal of the Spanish Association of Anglo-American Studies
36.1 (June 2014): 11-30
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Interactional Aspects of Language-based Humour in Shakespeare's Comedies: The Dynamics of Punning by Ladies-in-Waiting

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What makes Shakespeare a man of his time is, among other things, his infatuation with punning, understood as playful fiddling with (identical/similar) forms and (distinct) meanings of words. While heavy use of puns in his plays is very much in keeping with the spirit of the day, the phenomenon enjoying a remarkably high status in Elizabethan low- and highbrow literature and culture, Shakespeare's brand of linguistic humour is surely one of a kind. The present study focuses on the dynamics of punning practiced by ladies-in-waiting in three Shakespearean comedies, i.e., Lucetta in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Maria in *Twelfth Night* and Margaret in *Much Ado About Nothing*, and is designed to afford insight into intricate context-sensitive punning processes. It leads to the conclusion that even though the characters examined do not come into the category of highly prolific punsters, their playing with words is fully conscious and carefully tailored to individual contextual settings, principally to the type of interacting parties. Accordingly, rather than for ornamental purposes, punning proves to be used calculatedly as a powerful discourse management strategy aimed at asserting interactive dominance in order to mock the pretentiousness of interlocutors.

Keywords: pun; wordplay; Shakespeare's comedy; strategic punning; interaction; context

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Aspectos interactivos del humor basado en el lenguaje en las comedias de Shakespeare: la dinámica de los juegos de palabras de las damas de compañía

Lo que convierte a Shakespeare en un hombre de su tiempo es, entre otras cosas, su pasión por los juegos de palabras, entendidos como un jugueteo entre formas (idénticas/similares) y los significados (distintos) de las palabras. Mientras que el uso intensivo de los juegos de palabras en sus obras está en clara consonancia con el espíritu de su tiempo, ya que este fenómeno gozaba de un altísimo estatus en la literatura y la cultura isabelina popular y culta, el estilo de humor lingüístico de Shakespeare es sin duda único. El presente estudio se centra en la dinámica de los juegos de palabras practicada por las damas de compañía en tres comedias shakespearianas: Lucetta, en *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Maria en *Twelfth Night* y Margaret en *Much Ado*

About Nothing, y pretende arrojar luz sobre los intricados procesos de los juegos de palabras dependientes del contexto. Llega a la conclusión de que, aunque los personajes examinados no encajan en la categoría de expertos en los juegos de palabras sumamente prolíficos, su manera de jugar con las palabras es completamente consciente y está diseñada cuidadosamente para unos escenarios contextuales individuales, principalmente para la interacción con otras personas. De este modo, en vez de para propósitos ornamentales, se demuestra que los juegos de palabras se usan calculadamente como una poderosa estrategia discursiva destinada a establecer una dominación interactiva para reírse de la pretenciosidad de los interlocutores.

Palabras clave: juegos de palabras; comedias de Shakespeare; juegos de palabras estratégicos; interacción; contexto

1. Introductory Notes

Due to lack of terminological homogeneity and typological transparency in the voluminous critical literature on playful fiddling with forms and meanings of words,[1] a rich variety of more or less capacious labels are used, often indiscriminately, to refer to this practice, such as those mentioned by Szczerbowski (1998, 34), i.e., "play on words," "wordplay," "word games," "pun," "play with words," "language game," "play of language," to which one may add "verbal play/humour," "play on/with language," "linguistic /language-based humour" or "quibble."[2]

The common denominator of all these terms seems to be the recognition that, linguistically, the phenomenon is a composite of identical/like forms (orthography-pronunciation interface) and discrete meanings. Formally, then, humour-generating mechanisms include the processes of homonymy, homophony, paronymy and homography,[3] whereas the semantic requirement for triggering language-dependent humour is satisfied by a safe distance between the meaning constituents at play.[4]

At the same time, it should be highlighted that, depending on the approach, the terminology is used more or less rigorously. A straightforward example of the former case may be Cazden's (1976, 607) differentiation between "word games" as artificial formations (such as palindromes, pangrams or word squares) and "wordplay" as instances of spontaneous, unique inventions (similarly Dressler 1985, 99). The more relaxed approach, in turn, is immediately evident, for instance, from Chiaro's (1992, 5) definition of wordplay as "the use of language with intent to amuse" or from dictionary entries such as that given in the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* (2006), where it is defined as "making jokes by using words in a clever way."

In critical literature the names most commonly employed to describe Shakespeare's witty experimenting with words include "wordplay" and "pun" (see, for instance, such leading researchers in the field as Muir [1950], Mahood [1968], Spevack [1953, 1969] or Delabastita [1993] for their personal preferences). While the two are often used interchangeably, in the present paper a conceptual distinction is drawn between them, which lies in regarding "wordplay" as a more capacious term, subsuming "pun"

[1] The author is deeply indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable insights and constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper, which contributed substantially to enhancing its quality.

[2] The same holds true for other languages, like German ("Wortspiel," "Sprachspiel," "Spiel mit der Sprache"), French ("jeux de mots," "jeux avec les mots," "jeux sur les mots," "jeux de langage") or Russian ("igra słow," "jazykowaja igra") (Szczerbowski 1998, 34). What adds to the complexity of the nomenclature is the fact that some of these terms, barely congruent intralingually, tend to soak through language borders, mixing freely with each other (e.g., "jeux de mots" or "double entendre," which pass as currency in scholarly publications on linguistic humour in English).

[3] Of the four mechanisms, homography, contingent on identity between sound and spelling, and thus technically unfeasible in the disorderly sixteenth-century orthographic system, is absent from the present study.

[4] Using Cruse's (1995, 2000) specialist terminology, sufficient semantic distance is possible only where "senses" (genuine meanings) rather than "facets" (fake meanings) operate. Unlike facets, which can be simultaneously activated in a single, qualifying (non-ambiguous) context, senses are characterised by "mutual antagonism" in that a context of this type will always disambiguate them.

as a lower-order category. More specifically, "wordplay" is understood as a blanket term for all sorts of playful experiments with words, whereas "pun" is taken to refer to those instances of verbal humour which rest on the above-mentioned linguistic mechanisms of homonymy, homophony and paronymy (to the exclusion of homography for reasons set out in footnote 3). Since Shakespeare's wordplay is for the most part pun-dependent and his non-punning wordplay (such as alliterative or rhyme-based play) is outside the remit of the present research, the label "pun" is used throughout the paper in preference to "wordplay," which, it is hoped, will tighten terminological discipline and facilitate argumentation. In order to stress the interactional, process- rather than product-oriented edge of the study focused on the dynamics of exchanging wits, the name "punning" is alternatively put to use as well.

Even to the untrained eye, it is immediately noticeable that Shakespeare belongs to the category of highly prolific punsters, producing copious amounts of linguistic humour in his plays, irrespective of the genre they represent. It is little wonder, then, that the phenomenon has kindled much academic interest. Already in 1765 Johnson accentuated Shakespeare's punning proclivities with the following words:

> A quibble is to *Shakespeare* what luminous vapours are to the traveller! He follows it at all adventures; it is sure to lead him out of his way, sure to engulf him in the mire. It has some malignant power over his mind, and its fascinations are irresistible . . . . A quibble, poor and barren as it is, gave him such delight, that he was content to purchase it by the sacrifice of reason, propriety, and truth. A quibble was to him the fatal Cleopatra for which he lost the world, and was content to lose it. (qtd. in Evans 1959, 4; emphasis added)

Undoubtedly, Shakespeare's indulgence (or overindulgence, as some might put it) in punning should be interpreted against a broader historical background that enables the correlation of his liberal use of this linguistic instrument with sixteenth-century literary practices, where it enjoyed great favour. Ellis speaks of the Elizabethan pro-punning sentiments in the following way: "By Shakespeare's day, the national interest in witty language had reached such a pitch that wordplay was almost *de rigueur* in the conversation of English courtly society, in the jest-books, ballads, and broadsides of popular literature, and even, according to Addison, in much more serious language" (1973, 12). What is more, it began to successfully penetrate into more canonical literary writing and was soon to become the stock-in-trade of numerous esteemed Elizabethan authors, such as Lyly (1554-1606), Spenser (1552-1599), Green (1558-1592) and Nash (1567-1601), among others.

Shakespeare's use of verbal play is customarily said to have undergone a massive change from an essentially carefree, aesthetically pleasing experimentation with words at the incipient stage of his development as a playwright, i.e., in comedies and histories composed in the 1590s, to a more reflexive, calculated and dramatically salient deployment of puns in tragedies (e.g., Kohl 1966, 233). Yet Parker (1996, 1), for instance, warns firmly against interpreting Shakespeare's play on words, both comic and serious, merely as

a decorative device, highlighting that it allows a deeper insight into relationships both between and within his plays, as well as into the entire Elizabethan reality, including the lifestyles, preoccupations and concerns of sixteenth-century society at large. The present paper hopes to demonstrate that the phenomenon was also used strategically as a powerful discourse coordinating device and that, as such, it plays a constructive role even as early as in the comedies.

2. The Data Retrieval and the Research Method

The empirical data for the present research come from three Shakespearean comedies, namely *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* (henceforth *TGV*), *Twelfth Night* (*TN*) and *Much Ado About Nothing* (*MAN*), and the focus of attention is the punning practiced by ladies-in-waiting, i.e., Lucetta in *TGV*, Maria in *TN* and Margaret in *MAN*. The choice of comedy as a genre is the corollary of the assumption that, when compared to tragedy, it is more amenable to playful manipulation of words (even though punning in tragic plays is also highly successful in Shakespeare). In turn, the decision to concentrate on ladies-in-waiting has been influenced by the rather counter-intuitive observation that, while they may not be expected to pun as vigorously as other stock figures (like jesters, whose profession is to entertain, verbally as well as physically, or quick-witted and linguistically dexterous pages), their discourse is proportionately more punning than that of the seemingly more heavyweight punsters.

Understandably, where puns are involved, the data retrieval process is rarely, if ever, smooth and unimpeded, due to a number of independent factors. These include, among others: (a) the phenomenon's hugely elusive character (especially in the case of paradigmatic / vertical alignment of meaning components subsumed under a single form); (b) (with historical texts, such as the comedies under study) an appreciable temporal distance separating Shakespeare's plays from their modern recipients, which affects language materially, blurring the true picture of the playwright's punning practices; and (c) the fact that the Shakespearean brand of verbal humour tends to fall into intricate patterns, forming a mosaic of tightly interlaced puns, which often precludes the possibility of forcing one's way through a complex interplay of meanings. In an attempt to streamline the process of deciphering the, often obsolete, nuances of meaning, a number of dictionaries and lexicons of Shakespeare's language in general, and verbal play in particular, were consulted prior to the study proper, namely those of Onions (1919), Partridge (1961, 1973), Rubinstein (1989) and West (1998). Equally helpful, especially in providing definitions of the words at play, were dictionaries of contemporary general English, such as *The New Oxford Dictionary of English* (1998), *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (1995) and *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* (2006).

The study sets out to identify the hallmarks of the punning styles adopted by Shakespeare's ladies-in-waiting, who prove to constitute, as occupants of this social role, a largely homogeneous category of punsters. While the common denominator here

is, therefore, the static notion of "social role" (professional rather than private),[5] the investigation homes in on the dynamics of punning, arguably informed by a number of contextual variables, principally participant configuration (including the gender and social standing of interlocutors), which are capable of accounting for the punster's diverse strategic moves, such as the choice of dominant imagery (e.g., musical, sexual), the measure of bawdiness and sophistication in verbal play or the degree of the forcefulness of the punning technique employed (e.g., frontal attack vs. gentle teasing with puns).

The characters of Shakespeare's plays are widely acknowledged to represent social types rather than individuals, and as such to share a large number of distinctive characteristics, linguistic or otherwise, which tend to reappear across different plays. Accordingly, making broader generalisations about the uniqueness of verbal humour practiced by Shakespeare's ladies-in-waiting could be considered in keeping with the rules of methodological rigour. Yet, since it is only three female figures that come under close examination in the present paper, one of the central methodological assumptions underpinning the study is that its findings should not be automatically translated into larger patterns. It is believed that such sweeping generalisations, tempting though they might be, should be based on far more extensive research, and even then they would have to be made with extra care.

Yet another basic premise of the study is that it is lengthier pun-based interactions rather than isolated instances of verbal humour that, due to providing a solid contextualisation, are better suited for illuminating the inner workings of intricate context-sensitive punning processes and for identifying recurring patterns in playful experimenting with language. Whilst the interactions examined are, in a sense, artificial exchanges, being the corollary of Shakespeare's careful deliberation and informed choices, they are considered to be fettered by the same rules as real-world impromptu speech, and investigated as such. As Herman puts it, "the principles, norms and conventions of use which underlie spontaneous communication in everyday life are precisely those which are exploited and manipulated by dramatists in their constructions of speech types and forms in plays. Thus, 'ordinary speech' or, more accurately, the 'rules' underlying the orderly and meaningful exchange of speech in everyday contexts are the *resource* that dramatists use to construct dialogue in plays" (1995, 6; emphasis in original).[6] As examples of the written-to-be-spoken mode of communication, the interactions under scrutiny are taken to have undergone a fundamental transformation from an essentially static to a fully dynamic form of dramatic

[5] See Fabiszak (1997, 32-48) for a comprehensive account of competing role theories, principally the structural-functionalist approach in sociology (strongly represented by Knowles [1982], Davis [1948], Parsons [1951], Banton [1965] and Secord [1982]); symbolic interactionism in social psychology (championed vigorously by Turner [1966, 1976, 1978], Kuhn [1964], Goffman [1969], Cicourel [1973] and Heiss [1981]); and linguistic studies (including Lyons [1977], Levy [1979] and Morgan [1975]).

[6] However, see Herman's (1995, 3-13) fuller discussion, where a number of valid counterarguments to a direct correlation between dramatic speech and naturally occurring conversations (deployed, inter alia, by Nicoll [1968] and Beckerman [1970]) are illustrated.

dialogue (see Herman 1995, 13). It is the product of this transformation that the present study attempts to investigate.

3. Punning by Ladies-in-Waiting: Presentation and Discussion of the Findings

The present set of data comprises puns produced by the three female characters identified above, who prove to belong to a distinct category of punsters. The aggregate number of puns they generate amounts to 130 instances of clever verbal manipulations, Lucetta contributing 47, Maria 43 and Margaret 40.[7] Admittedly, these quantities look relatively modest when compared to the overall punning output of such stock figures as clowns (e.g., Lance's in *TGV*, amounting to 70 puns), pages (e.g., Speed's in *TGV*, consisting of 63 instances of verbal play) or jesters (e.g., Feste's in *TN*, made up of 65 examples). Yet, a more thorough examination, based on calculating the ratio of puns generated by the individual characters to their entire dramatic discourse measured in words (to the exclusion of essentially pun-resistant articles), reveals the ratio to be higher for ladies-in-waiting (or comparable, in Maria's case) than for the other social types. The proportion of punning to non-punning text of the individual *dramatis personae* can be represented in tabular form as follows:

Table 1. Distribution of punning and non-punning discourse of ladies-in-waiting and selected other stock figures

	LADIES-IN-WAITING			*CLOWN*	*PAGE*	*JESTER*
	Lucetta	*Margaret*	*Maria*	*Lance*	*Speed*	*Feste*
WORDS	559	548	1226	1852	1474	2470
PUNS	47	40	43	70	63	65
PUN-TO-WORD RATIO	8.4%	7.3%	3.5%	3.8%	4.3%	2.6%

Interestingly enough, the ladies-in-waiting do not seem to be fixated on maximising their opportunities for playing with words and, accordingly, they produce extended stretches of discourse, where not a single instance of punning is traceable. By no means, however, does it make them less colourful or idiosyncratic punsters, which, it is hoped, will be conclusively demonstrated in a number of interactions below.

A close investigation of the entire punning discourse of these female figures makes it possible to conclude that the only category of punning partners they share are ladies (their own, in the case of Lucetta and Maria), which renders this configuration of interlocutors particularly intriguing. Yet, a basic difference can be noticed between the

[7] Despite conflicting opinions as to the merits of the numerical representation of verbal play, it brings the definite advantage of affording a bird's-eye view of punning practices, as it helps to map the frequency distribution of humorous discourse among individual characters, allowing basic insight into their approach to jocular tampering with words (see also Adamczyk 2010, 186-87).

individual waiting maids with respect to the proportion of punning encounters they have with ladies compared to those with other characters. More specifically, Lucetta puns solely with her lady, Julia, Margaret is engaged in verbal battles with her lady's cousin, Beatrice, and Beatrice's suitor, Benedick (producing a comparable amount of punning output, distributed evenly between two lengthier interactions, in these participant combinations), whereas Maria's punning partners include her lady, Olivia (with whom she in fact rarely practices verbal play, generating but a handful of puns) as well as a kinsman, Sir Toby, his companion, Sir Andrew, and a jester, Feste (who prove to be far more vigorous collaborators in verbal experiments of all sorts).

Referring back to the most prevalent participant composition, it may come as a surprise that waiting women get involved in punning games with (their) ladies, given the appreciable social distance between the two categories of females. It should be remembered, however, that in Elizabethan times puns enjoyed their highest status ever and were regarded as unwelcome only in the narrow circles of language purists. Accordingly, the practice of low characters punning with socially high-ranking figures was not necessarily considered an outward indication of gross impertinence.

As regards the commonest context for practicing verbal play in this composition of female participants in the material examined, it is essentially concerned with the love lives of the ladies, and the most resonant imagery exploited through ambiguity inherent in puns to develop love-related themes is music. On the evidence of the entire punning discourse in the three plays under scrutiny, the strong presence of music in verbal humour is highly gender-specific, it being fairly frequent among females and absent from all-male exchanges. This observation may run counter to intuition, as in Shakespeare's times music was indeed the province of men. Part of the explanation of this curious paradox may lie in the close correlation the females discover between music and love, the former functioning as the source and the latter as the target domain, to use the cognitivist nomenclature. What is more, music can also be very appealing imagery to draw on when dealing with matters of love, as it is strongly related to dancing, often triggering associations with physical love.

The following exchange from *TGV* is intended to illustrate the discussed socially asymmetric all-female participant framework along with the two heavily and skillfully exploited cognitive domains of love and music peculiar to it. The dialogue regards Proteus' love letter to Julia, which her waiting woman, Lucetta, is supposed to deliver to her personally.

(1) *Julia*: What is't that you
Took up so gingerly?
Lucetta: Nothing.
Julia: Why didst thou stoop then?
Lucetta: To take a paper up that I let fall.
Julia: And is that paper nothing?
Lucetta: Nothing concerning me.

Julia: Then let it *LIE* for those that it concerns.
Lucetta: Madam, it will not *LIE* where it concerns
Unless it have a false interpreter.
Julia: Some love of yours hath writ to you in rhyme.
Lucetta: That I might sing it, madam, to a tune.
Give me a *NOTE*, your ladyship can *SET* –
Julia: As little by such toys as may be possible.
Best sing it to the tune of '*LIGHT* o'Love'.
Lucetta: It is too *HEAVY* for so *LIGHT* a tune.
Julia: *HEAVY*? Belike it has some *BURDEN* then?
Lucetta: *AY*, and melodious were it, would you sing it.
Julia: And why not you?
Lucetta: *I* cannot reach so *HIGH*.
Julia: Let's see your song.
[*Lucetta withholds the letter*]

How now, minion!
[*Threatens her*]
Lucetta: Keep *TUNE* there still, so you will sing it out.
And yet methinks I do not like this *TUNE*.
Julia: You do not?
Lucetta: No, madam, 'tis too *SHARP*.
Julia: You, minion, are too saucy.
Lucetta: Nay, now you are too *FLAT*.
And mar the concord with too harsh a descant.
There wanteth but a *MEAN* to fill your song.
[*Lucetta yields the letter*]
Julia: The *MEAN* is drowned with your unruly *BASS*.
Lucetta: Indeed, I bid the *BASE* for Proteus.
Julia: This babble shall not henceforth trouble me.

(1990, I.II.68-96)

[The meanings brought to the fore in the above interaction are as follows: *LIE* (S1 = remain, stay, S2 = tell a lie),[8] *NOTE* (S1 = tune, melody, S2 = short informal letter), *SET* (S1 = compose music for words, S2 = instruct sb to do sth, S3 = esteem, value), *LIGHT* (S1 = as in *light o'love*, the name of a popular dance-tune, S2 = insignificant, trivial, S3 = not heavy), *HEAVY* (S1 = serious, profound, S2 = weighty, difficult to lift), *BURDEN* (S1 = heavy load, S2 = bass part or undersong), *AY/I* (S1 = form of expressing

[8] The present method of elucidating the meanings at play, where "S1" and "S2 (3, 4, ...)" stand for "sense 1" (primary meaning component) and "sense 2 (3, 4, ...)" (secondary [tertiary, quaternary, ...] meaning component) respectively, follows Delabastita's (1993) convention.

assent/s2 = personal pronoun), *HIGH* (s1 = [of a note] having a frequency at the upper end of the auditory range, s2 = tall, towering), *TUNE* (s1 = melody, tone; correct musical pitch, s2 = temper, mood), *SHARP* (s1 = [of musical sound] above true or normal pitch, s2 = brusque, biting), *FLAT* (s1 = [of musical sound] below true or normal pitch, s2 = downright, outspoken), *MEAN* (s1 = tenor or alto [intermediate between treble and bass], s2 = mid-point, middle course, average), *MEAN/(MAN)* (s1 = s1 in the previous entry/s2 = male), *BASS/(BASE)* (s1 = voice or sound of the lowest range/s2 = corrupt, depraved), *BASS/BASE* (s1 = s1 in the previous entry/s2 = as in *bid the base* "challenge to run" a [phrase from the boys' game of prisoner's base]).]

While Julia is intensely curious about the contents of the letter, as a young, unmarried woman, she has to feign total indifference to it, which she makes crystal clear in the following statement, immediately preceding the above passage: "I am a maid / And would not force the letter to my view, / Since maids, in modesty, say 'no' to that / Which they would have the profferer construe 'ay'" (I.II.53-56). Quite predictably, Lucetta is well aware that Julia's initial indifference to and later irritation at having received the letter are both studied, which she reveals in her aside: "She makes it strange, but she would be best / pleased / To be so angered with another letter" (I.II.100-01). In effect, she decides to softly mock her lady's pretentiousness by virtue of teasing her with puns and, therefore, delaying the moment of yielding the letter.

Although the above passage is studded with puns directed straight at Julia, Lucetta's attack is carried out in a humorous vein so as not to offend the lady. It is, however, not only the careful selection of punning strategy but also of the puns themselves which is apparently necessary, if verbal play between the lady-in-waiting and her social superior is to be possible. Indeed, Lucetta's play on words is, all things considered, fairly subtle and innocuous, chiefly because it draws on powerful musical imagery, almost every pun having one of its meaning constituents more or less closely related to music.

The remarkable consistency in developing single imagery step-by-step with the help of puns alone, which involves skilful juggling of meanings, points to Lucetta's lively mind. At the same time, Julia's quick-thinking cannot be doubted either, given that she does not remain passive in light of the way Lucetta pits her wits against her, but rather makes an attempt to repulse the attack. In effect, despite a vastly disproportionate quantitative distribution of puns in this interaction (Julia making only 3 [*HEAVY*, *BURDEN*, *BASS/(BASE)*] against Lucetta's 12 examples [*LIE*, *NOTE*, *SET*, *LIGHT*, *AY/I*, *HIGH*, *TUNE*, *SHARP*, *FLAT*, *MEAN*, *MEAN/MAN*, *BASS/BASE*]), Julia is certainly not totally outwitted, as there is some punning dialogue between her and her lady-in-waiting.

The following excerpt from *MAN* acts to demonstrate punning in a similar contextual setting to that in example 1 above, yet employing a different technique. It is an interaction between Hero (a lady), Margaret (her waiting gentlewoman) and Beatrice (Hero's cousin), where Hero utters two sequences only (inadvertently providing input for Margaret's pun on *STUFFED* with her second turn) and is practically a non-participatory discourse party.

(2) *Hero*: Good morrow, coz.
Beatrice: Good morrow, sweet Hero.
Margaret: Why how now? Do you speak in the sick *TUNE*?
Beatrice: I am out of all other *TUNE*, methinks.
Margaret: Clap's into *LIGHT* o'Love: that goes without a *BURDEN*: do you sing it and I'll dance it.
Beatrice: Ye light o'love with your heels, then if your husband have stables enough, you'll see he shall lack no *BARNS*.
Margaret: Oh illegitimate construction! I scorn that with my heels.
Beatrice: 'Tis almost five o'clock, cousin, 'tis time you were ready: by my troth I am exceeding ill, heigh ho.
Margaret: For a hawk, a horse, or a husband?
Beatrice: For the letter that begins them all, *H*.
Margaret: Well, and you be not turned Turk, there's no more sailing by the star.
Beatrice: What means the fool, trow?
Margaret: Nothing I, but God send everyone their heart's desire.
Hero: These gloves the count sent me, they are an excellent perfume.
Beatrice: I am *STUFFED*, cousin, I cannot smell.
Margaret: A maid and *STUFFED*! There's goodly catching of cold.
Beatrice: Oh God help me, God help me, how long have you professed apprehension?
Margaret: Ever since you left it: doth not my wit become me rarely?
Beatrice: It is not seen enough, you should wear it in your cap: by my troth I am sick.
Margaret: Get you some of this distilled *Carduus BENEDICTUS*, and lay it to your heart, it is the only thing for a qualm.

(1988a, III.IV.29-55)

[The above exchange pivots on the following meaning components: *TUNE* (s1 = melody, tone; correct musical pitch, s2 = temper, mood), *LIGHT* (s1 = as in *light o'love*, the name of a popular dance-tune, s2 = not heavy, s3 = wanton, promiscuous), *BURDEN* (s1 = bass part or undersong, s2 = heavy load), *BARNS* (s1 = large farm buildings, s2 = children), *H/(ACHE)* (s1 = letter of the alphabet/s2 = pain, soreness), *STUFFED* (s1 = having a heavy cold, s2 = having had sexual intercourse resulting in impregnation), *BENEDICTUS/(BENEDICK)* (s1 = [in full *carduus benedictus* (*Eng*. Holy Thistle)] downy, yellow-flowered annual, s2 = [etymologically (Late Latin)] blessed, well spoken of/s3 = proper name [of a character in *MAN*]).]

The contextual setting for the verbal play here bears a close resemblance to that in example 1 in terms of the social distance between the interacting partners, the focus of the entire exchange (and its puns) on male-female relationships and, most obviously,

the resonant musical imagery of the copied puns on *TUNE*, *LIGHT* and *BURDEN*. Nevertheless, even a brief glimpse at a quantitative juxtaposition of the females' puns (Margaret punning four and Beatrice three times) makes it possible to conclude tentatively that punning here is highly interactional and much more an instance of discourse partners trading their verbal wits in a "ping-pong" fashion than of one party being teased by another.[9]

Interestingly, it is Beatrice's initiative to open the whole punning match, which she does with the play on *TUNE*. This attack is resolutely resisted by Margaret with the puns on *LIGHT* and *BURDEN*, which are soon after reciprocated with the lady's playful use of *BARNS*. Provoked again, Beatrice responds with a brilliant homophonic pun on *H/(ACHE)*, which harmonises nicely with the alliterative style of Margaret's previous sequence. In effect, as soon as the opportunity offers itself, Beatrice is again assaulted with a fairly uncomplimentary pun on *STUFFED* and a moment later with a caustic one on *BENEDICTUS/(BENEDICK)*, alluding to her beloved.

The examination of all interactions in which the two ladies-in-waiting are actively involved points to the fact that they represent a highly homogeneous category of characters in that no major differences can be noticed between them. Accordingly, the reason why the exchange in example 2 is, unlike the preceding one, an instance of ping-pong punning seems to lie in the essentially distinct personalities of the discourse partners of the two waiting maids. These, in turn, appear to be developed principally according to the type of roles the ladies assume in the plays, Beatrice being (next to Benedick) the funniest character in *MAN* (albeit predominantly involved in practicing the wit of ideas rather than of words) and Julia, conversely, the most serious figure in *TGV*. This seems also to account for the fact that puns as pointed as that on *STUFFED* are entirely absent from all interactions with Julia. Interestingly, Hero, a serious character in *MAN*, is not addressed by her waiting gentlewoman in a punning mode at all. This, however, might be largely attributable to the fact that the play is a late comedy, where Shakespeare's infatuation with play on words is no longer as overwhelming as in his earlier pieces and its use is, accordingly, considerably more strategic.

The following two exchanges are quoted to illustrate yet another facet of a playful use of words by ladies-in-waiting, namely dirty punning.[10] At the same time, it will be argued (convincingly, we hope) that the strategies chosen to communicate bawdry in these examples differ sharply according to the type of interlocutors and, strictly speaking, their gender.

[9] Under Chiaro's (1992, 114) definition, "ping-pong punning" is a label "used to describe what happens when the participants of a conversation begin punning on every possible item in each other's speech which may contain the slightest ambiguity."

[10] A single instance of a smutty pun (namely *STUFFED*) has been presented already in example 2, yet, unlike here, lewdness was not the organising principle of the interaction quoted there. This is what is believed to make the use of the pun different from that of the puns in the present passage, which work in tandem, rather than in isolation, to build vivid sexual imagery.

(3) *Lucetta*: What fashion, madam, shall I make your breeches?
Julia: (...) why, ev'n what fashion thou best likes, Lucetta.
Lucetta: You must needs have them with a *CODPIECE*, madam.
Julia: Out, out, Lucetta, that will be ill-favoured.
Lucetta: A round hose, madam, now's not worth a *PIN*
Unless you have a *CODPIECE* to *STICK PINS* on.
Julia: Lucetta, as thou lov'st me, let me have
What thou think'st meet and is most *MANNERLY*.

(1990, II.VII.49, 52-58)

[The following meanings form the basis for the above punning: *CODPIECE* (S1 = [indelicately conspicuous] decorative pouch attached to man's breeches to cover the genitals, S2 = phallus), *PIN(S)* (S1 = sth insignificant, trivial, S2 = small piece[s] of metal used for fastening and decorating pieces of clothes, S3 = phallus [phalli]), *STICK* (S1 = stab with a sharp or pointed object, S2 = have sexual intercourse), *MANNERLY/(MANLY)* (S1 = well-mannered, cultivated/S2 = befitting a male; masculine, virile).]

While it may be arguable that Lucetta intends a pun on each word emphasised above (especially that the play on *STICK* would be asyntactic,[11] i.e., impaired in a sense), the overall sexual imagery is rather powerful. Indeed, it seems barely coincidental that words carrying heavily sexual overtones are so densely packed in a passage as short as this one, especially in view of Julia's fairly telling pun *MANNERLY/(MANLY)*, which seems to indicate that they have been successfully decoded by her. At the same time, it is perfectly possible to interpret this interaction as being innocent, devoid of any indecent undercurrents. Apparently, Lucetta's punning strategy was based on making the context (linguistic or otherwise) for the under-the-surface meanings less forceful than that for the primary meanings, which produced the effect of covert play on words.

While in the interactions examined explicit sexual punning between the waiting maids and the ladies is non-existent, most probably due to its inappropriateness in such a socially asymmetric composition of interlocutors, it proves to be perfectly possible in a different participant configuration, as demonstrated in the following exchange:

(4) *Margaret*: Will you then write me a sonnet in praise of my beauty?
Benedick: In so high a *STYLE*, Margaret, that no man living shall *COME OVER* it, for in most *COMELY* truth thou deservest it.
Margaret: To have no man *COME OVER* me, why, shall I always keep below stairs?

[11] The term has been coined by Leech, for whom it denotes a playful use of words, where "one of the meanings does not actually fit into the syntactic context" (1969, 211). Commenting on the following words of Mercutio from *Romeo and Juliet*: "Ask for me to-morrow, and you shall find me a *GRAVE* man" (*RJ*, III.I.95-96), Leech observes that "the sinister meaning of grave hinted at here is that of *grave* as a noun, although in the given construction 'a grave man', it can only be an adjective" (1969, 211).

Benedick: Thy wit is as quick as the greyhound's mouth, it catches.
Margaret: And yours, as blunt as the fencers' foils, which hit, but hurt not.
Benedick: A most manly wit, Margaret, it will not hurt a woman: and so I pray thee call Beatrice, I give thee the *BUCKLERS*.
Margaret: Give us the *SWORDS*, we have *BUCKLERS* of our own.
Benedick: If you use them, Margaret, you must put in the *PIKES* with a vice, and they are dangerous weapons for maids.

(1988a, v.ii.3-15)

[The semantic composition of the above puns is the following: *STYLE/(STILE)* (s1 = mode of expression, wording/s2 = arrangement of steps to climb over a fence), *COME/COMELY* (s1 = as in *come over* "cross, step over"/s2 = agreeable; suitable), *COME OVER* (s1 = s1 in the above entry, s2 = have sexual intercourse with a woman), *BUCKLERS* (s1 = as in *give the bucklers* "yield, admit defeat," s2 = small round shields, s3 = pudenda), *SWORDS* (s1 = weapon, s2 = phalli), *PIKES* (s1 = short spikes screwed into the centre of bucklers, s2 = phalli).]

In the above interaction, the gentlewoman's discourse partner is for the first time a male, which seems to be the key factor in the fact that punning is, all things considered, carried out more blatantly here. While it is Benedick who initiates the whole game with his two puns *STYLE/(STILE)* and *COME/COMELY*, the first smutty pun is Margaret's. The forcefulness of the play on *COME OVER* is surely the effect of the success in providing equally powerful contexts for primary and secondary meanings of the phrasal verb, which is, in turn, achieved by virtue of the syntagmatic / horizontal arrangement of the pun components at play, where contexts for s1 and s2 are developed individually, i.e., in separate sequences and by different characters. In consequence, there is no doubt that the meaning attributed to *COME OVER* by Benedick is neutral, whereas Margaret's intention behind using it is to communicate bawdry.

In contrast, the constituent parts of the sexual pun on *BUCKLERS* are aligned paradigmatically/vertically (q.v. section 2), which is somewhat counter-intuitive, given that the word is uttered twice. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency emerges from the fact that it is actually a double pun, involving altogether three meanings of the word *bucklers*, *viz*. idiomatic (as in *to give the bucklers* "admit defeat"), literal ("small round shields"), both of which are neutral, and sexual ("pudenda"). Whereas the interplay between the first two meanings is, beyond a shadow of doubt, arranged syntagmatically, the risqué undertones are hinted at in a paradigmatic fashion.

Margaret's final bawdy play, that on *SWORDS*, is likewise an instance of vertical punning. Although the strategy of communicating indecent meanings by virtue of paradigmatic puns (where contexts for neutral and sexual meanings are tightly entwined) proves less effective than employing a syntagmatic play to this end, the forcefulness of Margaret's initial pun on *COME OVER* leaves no doubt as to her later intention in *SWORDS* and *BUCKLERS*.

A closer look at the exchanges in examples 3 and 4 points to the conclusion that the techniques implemented by the ladies-in-waiting to develop contexts for sexual meanings in puns are fairly distinct, Lucetta's verbal play being, all in all, less readily accessible and, thus, more doubtful than Margaret's. These techniques seem to echo Hausmann's (1974, 81-93) contradistinction between the *Text-Text* and *Text-Metatext* types of accessing double/multiple meanings in puns. In the former case surface-level and underlying meanings are claimed to occur to recipients simultaneously (which resembles Margaret's punning style), whereas in the latter there is some time lag between them, the primary meaning understandably being anterior to the secondary/tertiary/quaternary (as in Lucetta's strategy).[12]

The final example is provided as an illustration of yet another typical context for the playful use of language by the ladies-in-waiting, that is, the bitter mockery of their interlocutors' pompous style of speech, hardly conducive to spontaneous and unpretentious juggling with words. It is a dialogue from *TN* between Maria and her lady's wooer, Sir Andrew, witnessed by Sir Toby, Maria's suitor, who remains a mute party until the final turn of the interaction.

(5) 1. *Sir Andrew*: And you part so, mistress, I would I might never draw sword again. Fair lady, do you think you have fools in *HAND*?
2. *Maria*: Sir, I have not you by th'*HAND*.
3. *Sir Andrew*: Marry, but you shall have, and here's my *HAND*.
4. *Maria*: Now, sir, thought is free. I pray you bring your *HAND* to th'buttery-bar and let it drink.
5. *Sir Andrew*: Wherefore, sweetheart? What's your metaphor?
6. *Maria*: It's *DRY*, sir.
7. *Sir Andrew*: Why, I think so: I am not such an ass but I can keep my hand *DRY*. But what's your jest?
8. *Maria*: A *DRY* jest, sir.
9. *Sir Andrew*: Are you full of them?
10. *Maria*: *AY*, sir, *I* have them at my fingers' ends; marry, now *I* let go your hand, *I* am barren.
11. *Sir Toby*: O knight, thou lack'st a cup of canary.

(1988b, I.III.53-68)

[The meanings at play above include: *HAND* (s1 = as in *in hand* "being done or dealt with," s2 = the end part of an arm), *DRY* (s1 = thirsty or thirst-making, s2 = free from moisture or liquid, s3 = lacking sexual vigour, s4 = [of a jest] dull, flat, s5 = caustic, biting), *AY/I* (s1 = form of expressing assent/s2 = personal pronoun).]

[12] Importantly, Hausmann's (1974) differentiation is not valid in instances of horizontal homophony and paronymy.

Although carried out in a humorous mode, the above exchange is a frontal punning assault against Sir Andrew who, failing to make a single pun throughout, is easily outwitted by the waiting maid, which he honestly admits in the following commentary on his own performance: "Methinks sometimes I have no more wit than a Christian / or an ordinary man has, but I am a great eater of beef, and I believe / that does harm to my wit" (I.III.70-72). Launching the attack, Maria is well aware that his wits are blunt ("He's a very fool / and a prodigal" [I.III.19-20]), yet, in her opinion, they have not dulled as a result of eating habits, but rather of a peculiar approach to language which leaves little room for lively experimentation with words. Some picture of this approach emerges already from the following observation made by Sir Toby, Sir Andrew's admirer, for a change: "He . . . speaks three or four languages *word for word* without a book" (I.III.21-22; emphasis added). Worse than that, his English is heavily overburdened with sophisticated words of Latin and French provenance, which produces the effect of stilted style, highly unfavourable to spontaneous linguistic phenomena, such as puns.

Despite a considerable social distance between the two interactants, Maria, deeply irritated by Sir Andrew's pretentiousness, undertakes to outmanoeuvre him with a series of puns, at least some of which he does not seem to follow. Initially, then, the gentleman is attacked with the play on the word *HAND*, whose idiomatic meaning intended by him is cleverly turned into a literal one, and subsequently with an elaborate, and much more pointed, pun on *DRY*, which rests on no fewer than five meanings of the word. In turn six the semantic interplay in *DRY* occurs between the senses "thirsty" and "lacking sexual vigour," which Sir Andrew, though suspecting a jest, apparently fails to decode, interpreting the word still differently as "free from moisture." What is more, he also seems to miss the play on *DRY* in turn eight, where the surface-level meaning ("caustic," "biting") is a fitting description of Maria's style of jesting and the underlying one ("dull," "flat") alludes to her discourse partner's intellectual weakness.

4. Concluding Remarks

Hopefully this article has demonstrated that punning practiced by the female figures investigated here represents a unique brand of verbal play, not only in terms of the selection of puns but also of the contexts in which they are embedded. The key markers of the waiting women's playful use of language are provided in summary form below:

a) The three ladies-in-waiting examined do not fit into the category of immensely prolific punsters and produce lengthy stretches of discourse devoid of puns. However, their play on language, involving highly skilful twisting of meanings, points to the fact that they were meant by Shakespeare to be perceived as sharp-witted and verbally dexterous figures.
b) With the exception of Feste, a clown, all the punning partners of the discussed ladies-in-waiting are their social superiors. What is more, all the waiting maids in the works

scrutinised are involved in playing verbal games with ladies, who accordingly become their most characteristic punning partners.

c) Punning strategies in the examples discussed are, by and large, carefully tailored to the type of interacting parties (whereas gentlemen are frontally attacked with puns, ladies are only gently teased with them; likewise, indecent meanings are communicated much more subtly in exchanges with socially superior females than with males).

d) Two cognitive domains extensively and cleverly exploited by the ladies-in-waiting include music and love/sex, the former being the source and the latter the target domain.

e) Playing with words in the material examined is principally calculated to mock the pretentiousness of the discourse partners of the waiting maids, i.e., affected behaviour towards males in the case of ladies and mannered use of language in the case of gentlemen. Despite the fact that punning is, accordingly, mostly assaultive, and the attacked parties are usually outmanoeuvred, spectacular trading of wit occasionally takes place as well.

f) The use of the puns *TUNE*, *LIGHT* and *BURDEN* by both Lucetta in *TGV* and Margaret in *MAN* may point to Shakespeare's predilection for copying puns and their contextual settings from one play to another. While most interesting in itself, the practice would require a separate, systematic treatment, if any emerging patterns of its use were to be observed and a broader picture of the phenomenon built up.

g) The very fact of low characters punning with socially high-ranking figures may be regarded as fairly tangible evidence of a high status of verbal play in Elizabethan times. Otherwise, playing language games in such a socially asymmetric configuration of interlocutors would be most probably considered a breach of etiquette.

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Anti-French Discourse in the Nineteenth-century British Antivivisection Movement

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Antivivisection literature has for some time now been the corpus of research of scholars of cultural studies, particularly since Richard Ryder's revealing publications in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Although it is well-known and accepted that it was the rise of experimental physiology as a discipline in continental Europe (particularly France and Germany) that launched the establishment of vivisection as the absolute means for medical research, further explorations as to the type of discursive constructs used by British antivivisectionists to construe French medical culture aids us in the comprehension of how animal protection groups explored and tested their strategies. In this paper, I focus exclusively on the image of France in the nineteenth-century activist writing of British animal protectionists to analyse how their discourse emerged and evolved in response to legal regulations on vivisection.

Keywords: (anti)vivisection writing; Britain; France; Frances Power Cobbe; experimental physiology; nineteenth century

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El discurso antifrancés en el movimiento británico decimonónico de la anti-vivisección

Desde que Richard Ryder publicase sobre la historia de la vivisección a mediados de los setenta y en los ochenta, la literatura de anti-vivisección ha crecido como objeto de análisis en los estudios culturales. Es bien conocido que fue el desarrollo de la fisiología experimental en la Europa continental (especialmente Francia y Alemania) lo que condujo a la proclamación de la vivisección como método absoluto de investigación médica. Sin embargo, es necesaria una mayor profundización en el tipo de discurso empleado en Gran Bretaña por los activistas en contra de la práctica para caracterizar la comunidad médica francesa. Dicha profundización permite comprender cómo los grupos de protección animal y sus miembros más destacados exploraron y pusieron a prueba sus estrategias. En este artículo se analiza exclusivamente la imagen de Francia en los escritos de los activistas de la Gran Bretaña del siglo XIX con el fin de examinar la génesis de su discurso y la evolución del mismo al quedar la práctica regulada legalmente.

Palabras clave: escritos sobre (anti)vivisección; Gran Bretaña; Francia; Frances Power Cobbe; fisiología experimental; siglo XIX

Vivisection is a practice that has existed since ancient times, but it was during the nineteenth century that it became institutionalized as an experimental method, altering the traditional approach to, and object of, medicine itself. Although other nations of continental Europe were also advancing towards standardizing animal experimentation, it was France that, because of its post-revolutionary cultural and ideological innovations and its proximity, particularly provoked the British antivivisection movement, unleashing a wave of unprecedented social activism in relation to animal protection in the name of mercy. In this paper, I examine the discursive tendencies employed by British antivivisectionists during the greater part of the nineteenth century to bring French experimental physiology into disrepute. Through a compendium of addresses, essays, journalistic pieces and pamphlets, I aim to raise awareness of how their arguments and tactics shifted as vivisection became increasingly incorporated and regulated in the British medical community, and to show some of the formulae involved in the transnational characterization of the French physiologist.

1. The Emergence of Experimental Physiology in France

The Revolution and its aftermath marked a turning point in French medicine, opening a new era of physiological, clinical, pharmaceutical and biological sciences. The intellectual climate, which led to the establishment of a network of relationships between scientific, academic and reformist circles, certainly contributed to establishing Paris as the most progressive city in continental Europe, and its ambitious advances in medical research would soon acquire an (in)famous reputation abroad. As Weiner and Sauter (2003) point out, it was indeed at the turn of the nineteenth century that new developments in the field of clinical medicine overturned the methods of the old regime, bringing not only new administrative regulations regarding the centralization of medical institutions, but also adopting an entirely new approach through which to diagnose and treat patients. Among other innovations, Napoleon and Jean Antoine Chaptal, minister of internal affairs, facilitated the modernization of clinical medicine through "the creation of the Hospital Council to oversee all aspects of Paris hospital life," the centralization of city admissions, and the "regulation of dissection with the establishment of central amphitheaters" (Weiner and Sauter 2003, 31).

This rearrangement was indispensable for the success of what was slowly becoming a new method of instruction, one which broke with the traditional mode of learning through the reading and revision of texts in the lecture hall and instead sought the bedside as the empirical space in which to deepen knowledge, and the amphitheatre as the arena in which to acquire surgical skills. The new medical schools that emerged in the 1790s became the training ground for a new generation of doctors who would gain their experience in the clinic and autopsy rooms of Parisian hospitals. Pierre Desault (1738-1795), who trained Xavier Bichat (1771-1802), ensured that the course he taught at the Hôtel-Dieu would, in the words of Lesch, immerse students "in the routine of clinical observation and

treatment . . . . Instruction and examination were oral and practical, rather than written and theoretical." He also allowed his students access to "an amphitheater doubling as a classroom and as operating room separate from the wards, and the ready availability of rooms for dissection" (1984, 53).

By focusing on the mastery of surgical and clinical competences, Desault's approach, in a way, encouraged students' aspirations towards individuality as physicians. Driven by his research on tissues, Bichat would steer medicine farther away from observation and theory in order to stress the need to not necessarily acquire surgical skills, but to have a strong practical grounding in physiological knowledge itself. His *Discourse on the Study of Physiology* (1798) was to be instrumental in securing vivisection and autopsy as the appropriate paths through which to truly comprehend the inner functioning of the body. A live organism contained the hidden truths of physiology as much as it could unleash a chain reaction of further questions that the researcher could explore through careful experimentation. Bichat's experiments had brought him to the conclusion that beyond the organs were the "simpler" and more fundamental tissues, which were to be regarded as the analytical units of the principle of life. To achieve optimal results, Bichat delineated a series of guidelines to best obtain empirical evidence, which included comparative analyses, the avoidance of environmental changes during the experiment that may interfere with the natural function of the body, the need for the repetition of procedures, and the thorough observation of the subject before and during the procedure (Guerrini 2003, 72). Bichat's studies on anatomy and histology and his doctrine of vital properties set the referential departure point for future research. As John Cross wrote in 1820, Bichat's contribution to science was coupled with an emphasis on vivisection as the means of research: "The taste of Bichat for experiments has produced the mania of vivisection, and an unlimited confidence in this manner of studying physiology" (qtd. in Lesch 1984, 80).

This infatuation with vivisection had a ripple effect across generations. Some well-known nineteenth-century practitioners active in France include Julien Legallois (1770-1814), Pierre-Hubert Nysten (1771-1818), Guillaume Dupuytren (1777-1835), Nicola Blondlot (1808-1877), Achille Longet (1811-1871), François Magendie (1783-1855), Jean Pierre Flourens (1794-1867), Claude Bernard (1813-1878), Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), Paul Bert (1833-1886) and the Russian-French Elias von Cyon (1843-1912). Though some of these names reached more international fame than others on account of their research and / or discoveries, all of them appeared, at one point or another, immersed within the transnational vivisection controversy. Whether complying with Bichat's doctrine of vital properties or supporting an antithetical position, the overall direction of medical, biological and veterinary sciences was towards the full consolidation of vivisection as the chief method of research. Magendie, who began his formal medical training in 1801 at the École de Médecine in Paris, and would go on to become full professor at the Collège de France, as well as a distinguished member of the Académie des Sciences, was the first to gain a reputation in Britain as a ruthless vivisectionist. He criticized Bichat in the journal of the Société Médicale d'Émulation, but nonetheless adopted his routine of deliberately

injuring the experimental subject for his research on the nervous and digestive systems. He distanced himself from the methods of autopsy and dissection as much as from the principle of vital properties: the basic distinction was to be made between the living and the dead, and it was in the former state that the function of the vital elements could be exposed. Ryder contends that, unfortunately, Magendie was "an experimenter in the hit-and-miss sense of the word and entirely lacked the modern concern for precision and the control of variables" (1983, 122). In 1821 he founded the *Journal de Physiologie Expérimentale*, not long before his procedures were first presented in London, causing, as we will shortly see, unprecedented public outrage.

Magendie's pupil, Claude Bernard, who succeeded him in the chair at the Collège de France, would be no less a provoker of anti-French sentiment on the part of the antivivisectionists. Heir to the legacy of Magendie, Bernard subjected animals (he was particularly fond of frogology and of using the more accessible domestic species) to operations on the pancreas, the liver and other digestive organs, among other experiments. His declarations in *Introduction à l'Étude de la Médicine Expérimentale* (1865) stood as a clear defense of the physiologist and his laboratory, and were to be repeatedly used by both French and English antivivisectionists to give shape to the profile of the men who prioritized cruel science over morals:

> A physiologist is not a man of fashion, he is a man of science, absorbed by the scientific idea which he pursues: he no longer hears the cry of animals, he no longer sees the blood that flows, he sees only his idea and perceives only organisms concealing problems which he intends to solve. Similarly, no surgeon is stopped by the most moving cries and sobs, because he sees only his idea and the purpose of his operation. (Bernard 1957, 103)

To build a case for vivisection, Bernard echoed earlier defenders of the practice when he pointed to the incongruity of eating and using animals for sport but not for scientific purpose, which after all was the only medium through which to make further advancements in the physical wellbeing and health of society. Since experimentation was imperative (as man could only benefit from its results after due empirical trials), one was left to weigh the moral implications attached to using human or animal subjects. Immersed within the logic that experimentation on humans was essentially immoral, he opted for an equation based on ontological opposites, as opposed to an extension of rights: "If it is immoral, then, to make an experiment on man when it is dangerous to him, even though the result may be useful to others, it is essentially moral to make experiments on an animal, even though painful and dangerous to him, if they may be useful to man" (Bernard 1957, 102).

2. Early Responses to French Physiology: Richard Martin and Magendie

The strong aversion to French experimental physiology which developed in neighbouring Britain was in great measure the result of a clash between medical traditions. During

the first half of the nineteenth century, natural theology was still prevalent over other disciplines, and although it encouraged research, it also "tended to subordinate scientific to moral or theological ends" (Lesch 1984, 10). Meanwhile, by the 1820s, France was well under way in institutionalizing physiology as a respected field, and by the 1870s "only in France did physiologists both train in and practice new forms of hospital medicine within firmly institutionalized research traditions" (Miller 2009, 341). In contrast, British (and American) clinical medicine "tended to draw ideas from continental physiology [as opposed to developing their own experimental traditions], being less successful in producing new research in this period" (341). In addition, in Britain, teaching continued to prevail over research, and physiology was providing few immediate solutions to the health hazards brought on by the Industrial Revolution. It was not uncommon, therefore, for many of those medical students who rejected their country's general disdain for the new scientific discipline to opt for training in Paris. Those who did acquire their medical skills within Britain, such as Charles Bell (1774-1842) or Marshall Hall (1790-1857), who studied at the University of Edinburgh, were quick to express their admiration of the French.

Insights into the vivisection developments in France reached Britain not only through eye-witness reports of the atrocities that were being produced and condoned within Parisian faculties and private laboratories, but also through demonstrations by Frenchmen before the English public. It was on account of the scandal resulting from Magendie's public demonstrations in London in 1824 that the Irish Member of Parliament, Richard Martin, raised his voice in the House of Commons on February 24 and March 11, 1825. Martin, who had only three years previously succeeded in passing a bill (eventually to be known as "Martin's Act") to condemn the ill treatment and abuse of horses and cattle, now shifted his attention to the brutality concomitant to this new field of science that threatened to spread from the continent to Britain. Martin reportedly referred in these outbursts to a scientist whom he labeled as "a fellow, a disgrace to man, a Frenchman of the name of Magendie, who had come over [to London] to perform experiments in the most atrocious and cruel manner" (qtd. in *John Bull*, 6 February 1825, 66). Martin reportedly went on to describe the Frenchman's public demonstration before the appalled English audience as follows:

> He took a greyhound which had belonged to a lady, and for which he paid ten guineas; he nailed the animal down to a table by the feet and ears, using long iron spikes; he then proceeded to cut out the nerves, for the purpose of showing the effect of the nervous system; he cut out the nerves of the eyes; then the nerves of the taste and the hearing. He gave the animal some bitter drink, which he rejected. After these cruel experiments had been made, he said to the persons present, "Gentlemen, as the animal cost me so much I must make it the subject of another operation. If my servants take care of the animal to-night, and keep it alive, I shall be able to perform further operations on the other side of the jaw to-morrow. If it should not die I should be able to cut it up alive." (qtd. in *John Bull*, 6 February 1825, 66)

Martin's description and his strategically persuasive remarks taking a stand against vivisection foreshadowed the pamphlets, essays and addresses that flourished in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century, at the peak of the international controversy. His tactic was apparently simple: the detailed description of the cruelty involved was informative as much as an instrument through which to arouse the sensibilities of the other Members of Parliament. At a time when an ethos of domesticity was seeping into a gendered division of private and public spheres, Martin was conjuring up the image of a dog, the quintessential symbol of faithfulness and loyalty whose only knowledge of the world had been that available to him through his companionship with a woman. That same creature had become a victim of the despicable ruthlessness of male-dominated French physiology. Suffering and pain came in the form of cold, hard man-made objects whose function was reversed: rather than "construct" or "conjoin," the nails and iron spikes are used to assist in the dismemberment, amputation and crippling of another being. The step-by-step sequence of the process is used in a significant way: one by one, the dog's senses are destroyed; little by little, the helpless creature is detached from the world. Death is imminent, but its invasive conquest of the body is unmercifully dilatory. There is a sense of patience and procrastination elicited by Magendie, a patience associated with the cold, calculating nature of a physician blinded by an excess of ambition, purposely inflicting pain, as opposed to alleviating it.

Furthermore, the very format of a public demonstration threatened to blur the boundaries between science and entertainment. As Martin would reportedly also declare in the March sessions of parliament, Magendie's experiments "were only exhibited here [in London] to produce a dramatic effect" (qtd. in *Morning Chronicle*, 12 March 1825, n.p.). The indignant and banal attempt to "theatricalize" the torture of animals was further evidence of the degeneracy of the vivisector, for insensitiveness to suffering could not take a more disquieting shape than an arrogant exhibitionist desire to entertain and induce awe in audiences. In the view of Martin, the Frenchman's self-gratifying remarks during the operations were evidence that Magendie was looking to pepper his experiments with comments that would add entertainment value to the demonstrations. Martin reportedly alleged that Magendie had "placed his ear close to the mouth of the suffering animal, and said, patting it with his hand, *restez tranquille*; then turning to the spectators, he added, *Il serait plus tranquille s'il entendait Francais*" (qtd. in *Morning Chronicle*, 12 March 1825, n.p.). The anecdote was what Martin used to close his comments on Magendie, for it best illustrated what could potentially perturb other members enough to publicly condemn the act: that not only were science and entertainment not being held as monolithic categories, but that there was no design to the experiments other than to show and display. In other words, French physiology represented a form of research that did not strive for utility, thus perverting the pivotal responsibility of the physician. Martin was not opposed to animal experimentation if such procedures were to be aimed at "the discovery of any latent point of science that would materially benefit man by being discovered" (qtd. in *Morning Chronicle*, 12 March 1825, n.p.); but the Frenchman's apparent zeal in carrying

out a demonstration for mere exhibitionist purposes and with no epistemological agenda was unreasonable and disturbingly immoral. This was a key issue in the 1820s. As Bonner writes, "unlike the British and the Americans, the continental researchers were not held back by the 'yoke of utility' . . . and did not worry so much about the lack of useful applications of the new physiology" (2000, 153).[1] Unsurprisingly, and probably as a reaction to Magendie's London demonstrations, "twenty-nine doctors at Newcastle and another thirty-eight at Bath signed protests against vivisection" (Turner 1980, 84).

3. The Alfort Veterinary School Controversy

By the second half of the nineteenth century, vivisection was a highly publicized controversy in Britain, and criticism against vivisectors within national borders continued, enmeshed within the discursive aversion towards French practitioners. In the 1840s, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, SPCA, founded in 1824, having been granted the Queen's patronage in 1840, thus becoming the RSPCA) had received reports of the experiments practiced at the Alfort Veterinary School near Paris, causing a stream of protests in the French and British press. In the mid-1840s, the reverend David Davis unsuccessfully petitioned King Louis Philippe I to stop vivisection at the School. These reports were poignantly revived in the late 1850s, along with new testimonies, to strengthen the humane advocates' abhorrence of French physiology. In 1860, the English physician Alfred Perry, who had visited the School, recalled for *The Lancet* the daily tortures to which horses and mules were subjected and his complaints against the professor, who argued that the vivisection practices "accustomed the students to the shrinking of the animal when touched by the instruments; and made them cool at operating" (qtd. in Orlans 1993, 17). The Alfort Veterinary School had been founded in 1764, and although veterinary sciences operated independently from the medical schools, vivisection was also regularly practiced there. Elliot contends that "the professors of veterinary medicine had free access to almost limitless supplies of animals and horses in particular" (1987, 52). Indeed, there seemed to have been an ulterior motive for this preference for equines: "In the nineteenth century the horse was still an essential weapon of war and so governments were always willing to allow scientists to carry out research that was intended to improve their effectiveness" (1987, 52). The controversy, clearly magnified by the affronted responses and criticism coming from England, particularly from the Society for the Protection of Animals, an organization based in London, resulted in the French Academy's creation of a committee to evaluate the issue in the early 1860s. As Orlans suggests, the Academy's contempt both for the English and the pathologist M. Dubois, the only member to propose a reform by which dissection would almost completely substitute vivisection, was vividly illustrated in the final resolution, which declared that the complaints made by the Society for the

[1] Bonner borrows the phrase from Gerald L. Geison (1972, 41).

Protection of Animals were "without foundation," and that the performance of vivisection "should be left to the discretion (*sagesse*) of men and science" (qtd. in Orlans 1993, 18).

The resolution and the French Academy's scornful reproach of English antivivisection, however, far from succeeded in silencing international criticism against French experimental physiology. The most memorable affronted response to Alfort was still to come in the form of the Irish (and London-based) activist and suffragette Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904). In her article "The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes" (first published in the November 1863 issue of *Fraser's Magazine*), Cobbe denounced that "the French system has terribly transgressed the limits of morality" (2004, 237). In Cobbe's view, there were three fundamental and irrevocable reasons underlying this accusation. Firstly, like Martin, she emphasized the irrelevance of such procedures at a practical level, which violated the object of medical science in itself:

> Of those [experiments] actually performed daily at Allfort [*sic*] (64 on each horse) the great majority were (like the removal of the hoof) wholly useless, and present no kind of compensating benefit for the acute torture they inflict, inasmuch as the operations cannot be copied in the human subject, nor would they ever be used by any owner in the case of a horse. As to the primary motives justifying such taking of life for purposes of science, they cannot be alleged in the case at all; for there is no attempt at discovering any new fact, or ascertaining any doubtful one, ever propounded. (Cobbe 2004, 237)

Secondly, Cobbe attacked the French for their general reluctance to employ anesthetics, the use of which meant that the physiologist "can test at will any scientific truth at the cost, perhaps, of life, but never of torture" (2004, 234). She claimed that in France, dogs and horses had for years "been dissected alive and submitted to every conceivable operation for the instruction of pupils in anatomy and veterinary surgery, and that no chloroform [had] been in use on these occasions." The stark contrast was marked by England, where vivisection was "comparatively rare" and "performed only by scientific men for the ascertainment of physiologic facts, and usually with the exhibition of chloroform" (2004, 236-37).

Thirdly, Cobbe argued that the French were perpetuating a moral infraction against the natural maturation of civilization towards mercy and kindness. "The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes" opens with a parable about two antithetical but strangely related worlds, fleshed out by Eastern and Western culture. In the ancient Moslem story, the king's city is destroyed because of the people's wanton wickedness, cruelty and greed. Only one man is pardoned by Allah, a man who once showed mercy to a camel, and who survives for a thousand years in solitude and prayer, until a servant of God relieves him from the world with a blessing. In the Western story, an allegory of French culture, there rises a city of opulence, sophistication and cultivation, as reflected in the wondrous architecture and gardens. Yet moral corruption spreads amongst the learned people of the city, beclouded by their unfettered pride in their knowledge, an excess that blindly leads

them to believe themselves unique and distinct from the lesser cultures and to a hoarding of vaporous epistemological merits. The self-venerating wise men and their pupils employed themselves in public buildings (the Videlicet School of Medicine, the College of France, the Faculty of Sciences and the Veterinary School at Alfort), where they took "tame and inoffensive animals" and "having bound them carefully for their own safety, proceeded to cut, hew, saw, gouge, bore, and lacerate the flesh, bones, marrow, heart, and brains of the creatures groaning helpless at their feet." It was in this manner "that these wise men, and learned men, and honourable men discovered that a horse could be made to suffer for ten hours, and to undergo sixty-four different modes of torture before he died" (Cobbe 2004, 218, 219). The moral abomination of deliberate cruelty, Cobbe suggests, is even greater when the culture perpetuating such atrocities has already reached a stage of intellectual refinement. Outweighed by reason, the practitioners are not the only ones to blame: it is the stagnancy of the entire community, indifferent to the infliction of pain and suffering, which "continue[s] to uphold the torturers in esteem, and in high public functions" (2004, 220). The ancient Eastern story is one of primal peoples; their behavior is to some extent justifiable, as they had not yet evolved into a state of refinement. And yet they are the ones who, paradoxically, are castigated with the ultimate divine punishment. Cobbe transposes these allegories into class-based categories. "As a rule," she states, "the most cultivated are the most merciful" (2004, 244). France, however, perverts and inverts this logic. Mirroring the Moslem legend, Cobbe regards England as a land where

> it is the half-brutalized and scottish [*sic*] carter, or the degraded and filthy dealer in 'marine stores,' who is brought up before the magistrate for furiously flogging his stubborn horse, or skinning alive some miserable cat.[2] In France, alas! it is the men of science–men belonging to the learned professions–who disembowel living horses and open the brains of dogs. (2004, 245)

Much to the dismay of French medical circles, the surgical practices at Alfort would continue to figure as emblematic instances of French deviancy in British antivivisection literature for years to come. In 1876, a Paris correspondent for the *Daily News* wrote that "the French still have a few lessons to learn as to the treatment of human and dumb creatures," and criticized the Alfort veterinary surgeons for wrongfully believing that since animals possessed no imagination, it was impossible for their suffering to extend beyond the first impact. The correspondent finished by drawing on English literary excellence as a counterpoint to what he suggested was a moral abnormality characteristic of the French: "I prefer Shakespeare's notion, that the poor beetle that we tread upon, in corporal sufferance feels a pang as great as when a giant dies" (*Birmingham Daily Post*, "Vivisection in Paris," 21 January, 1876, 7). In his 1892 address "Vivisection: Is It Justifiable?," Dr Charles Bell

[2] The 1822 Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act ("Martin's Act") was amended by the 1835 Cruelty to Animals Act to include the protection of other domestic animals and prohibit baiting.

Taylor would again resurrect the horror of the Alfort procedures through the testimonies of a certain Dr Crisp, who had visited the Veterinary School years earlier.

4. Ongoing Criticism and the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act

Throughout the ensuing decades, vivisection increasingly became the RSPCA's central target, including a failed attempt to prosecute Eugene Magnan, one of Magendie's pupils, after his polemical demonstrations at the Congress of the British Medical Association held in Norwich in 1874. To discredit experimental physiology, antivivisectionists continued to rely on eyewitness testimonials of those who had been to Alfort or studied under a French vivisector. An 1863 issue of the *British Medical Journal* featured an anecdote by Dr Latour, who recollected a demonstration by Magendie: "I remember once, amongst other instances, the case of a poor dog, the roots of whose spinal nerves he was about to expose. Twice did the dog, all bloody and mutilated, escape from his implacable knife; and twice did I see him put his forepaws around Magendie's neck and lick his face. I confess—laugh vivisectors if you please—that I could not bear this sight" (qtd. in Ryder 2000, 101).

James Maculay, one of Magendie's students, also recalled his repudiation of the experiments, and felt "thankful such scenes would not be tolerated in England by public opinion" (qtd. in Bertomeu-Sánchez 2012, 13). Dr George Hoggan, although omitting the name of Claude Bernard, with whom he had studied in Paris, wrote in 1875 for the *Morning Post* that he was "of opinion that not one of those experiments on animals was justified or necessary," and that it was not advancements for "the good of humanity" which were sought, but rather "to keep up with, or get ahead of, one's contemporaries in science, even at the price of an incalculable amount of torture needlessly and iniquitously inflicted on the poor animals" (qtd. in Cobbe 2012, 637). English students who had once enjoyed French tutelage and had incorporated vivisection into their own research were targeted, as were other vivisectors beyond the English borders. Such was the case of the German professor Moritz Schiff, who had also studied under Bernard and who was publicly disparaged in Florence by Cobbe in the early 1860s during her visit to the city. Cobbe's petitioni to Schiff, published in *La Nazione*, to cease his experiments on animals was signed by 783 people, most of whom were aristocrats or eminent members of English or Florentine society.

The 1870s turned out to be the crucial decade in the legislative regulation of vivisection in Britain. In 1873, the two-volume work *Handbook for the Physiologist*, edited by John Scott Burdon Sanderson, was published. The book very clearly absorbed and paid homage to the methods and state of the art practices and techniques that had launched experimental physiology in France and Germany, and represented a quixotic gesture "to transform the status of British physiology within a generation" (Richards 1987, 127). Sanderson himself had received part of his training from acknowledged European scientists, including Bernard. It was the first book of its kind to be published in the English language, and featured the collaboration of established members of the medical profession with an academic

post, including the physiologist Michael Foster, the histologist Emanuel Klein, and the pharmacologist Lauder Brunton. With elementary students in physiological science as the target readers, the purpose of the *Handbook* was overall educational, and included numerous illustrations and plates to strengthen the didactic input. However, its failure to comply with the British Association for the Advancement of Science's insistence on the avoidance of pain and suffering automatically made it a target of the antivivisectionists, for the text lacked any adequate discussion as to the need for anesthesia.

In 1875, Cobbe and Hoggan joined forces for the founding of the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection, soon to become known as the Victoria Street Society (and later renamed the National Anti-Vivisection Society [NAVS]). A few months earlier, their attempts to pass a bill in the House of Lords regulating vivisection had clashed with the interests of another bill presented in the House of Commons, one that more clearly protected the endeavors of Burdon Sanderson, Charles Darwin, T.H. Huxley and the English pro-vivisection scientific community. The contradictory nature of the two proposed bills as well as escalating press coverage of the matter were reason enough for the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the issue. After subsequent months of recommendations from the Commission and ensuing lobbying, the result was the Cruelty to Animals Act, which received Royal Assent on August 15, 1876. The Act referred only to vertebrate animals and stipulated that all experimenters had to be licensed by the Home Secretary under positive recommendations from specified medical overseers. It additionally authorized the inspection of the places where the procedures were conducted. In order to carry out experiments without anesthesia or procedures for the illustration of lectures and demonstrations, researchers had to request a special certificate.

The 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act satisfied neither pro- nor antivivisectionists. As Rupke contends, it epitomized "a traumatic development in the still informal and largely untried relationship between scientists, the government and the lay public" (1987, 188). Unsurprisingly, the Act was not received favorably by the Victoria Street Society. Rather than protecting animals, the new legislation secured the invulnerability of the vivisectionist. Not only could the special certificates annul the restrictions collected at the beginning of the Act but henceforth, once the special certificate had been acquired, the vivisectionist was fully protected by the law. Nor were the supporters of vivisection content. Although many restrictions had been avoided, the experimenters nonetheless felt their individual enterprises were curtailed by the Home Secretary's responsibility to grant or deny licenses. "True, relatively few applications were rejected," Turner explains. "But even those few hurt, especially when the decision flew in the face of the medical recommendations to the Home Secretary" (1980, 92).

5. New Tactics and the Persistence of Anti-French Lobbying

All in all, despite the Act's attempts to ameliorate public tensions, the dispute continued rather intensely in many circles throughout the end of the nineteenth and beginning of

the twentieth century. The same year that the Act was passed, the constant onslaught from the humane advocates compelled scientists to create what Marshall Hall had striven for so ardently,[3] the Physiological Society of Great Britain. Five years later, London became host to the International Medical Congress, which united the scientific elite for the defense of their research and the most practical and appropriate methods to carry it out. Their message was clear: vivisection was necessary for the advancement of medicine, and the British surgeons and scientists who attended the Congress (among them James Paget, T.H. Huxley and the anatomist Richard Owen) were in dire need of making the nation understand this. Lobbying continued in 1882 with the establishment of the Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research (AAMR), which ultimately aimed to repeal the Cruelty to Animals Act. By influencing public opinion through leaflets and Owen's *Experimental Physiology: Its Benefits to Mankind*, the AAMR attempted to reach out to the administrative authorities (by the 1910s and under the accusations of Stephen Coleridge, the Home Office would eventually admit to its connections and consultations with the AAMR for the granting of licenses). As Rupke notes, at the epicenter of the controversy were still the matters of utility and cruelty. The former proved an easier point to defend: in his Folkeston address in 1881 Owen himself listed several well-known discoveries resulting from vivisection, including experiments by Harvey, John Hunter, Bernard, Pasteur, or Bell, and "even if certain experiments did not have demonstrably direct bearing on the maintaining of health and the curing of disease," Rupke writes, "it could be argued that scientific and medical knowledge are one and indivisible" (1987, 195). As to the matter of cruelty, scientists continued in the tradition of relying on equations of animal exploitation: if animals suffered and were tortured for other purposes, namely for food and sports, was not scientific progress a more justifiable motive? Causing pain for entertainment, comfort and fashion, in the view of many, concealed a deeper violation than science, whose prime object was to benefit the wellbeing of man, could ever fathom.

Turner argues that the organized protection of animals somewhat subsided in Britain and in America during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. He rightfully bases part of his contention on the facts that: (1) the SPCAs shifted their focus more clearly onto the ethos of domesticity, inculcating in children kindness towards animals;[4] (2) the SPCAs lost a notable amount of members who, on account of the organizations' growing conservatism, either joined the more radical antivivisection societies or abandoned the animal protection cause altogether;

[3] Hall's experiments on the circulation of blood and on reflex had attracted criticism of such magnitude in Britain that at least twice in his lifetime (first in the early 1830s and later in the late 1840s) he found himself in the position of having to propose a physiological society that would regulate such procedures.

[4] These SPCAs include the RSPCA and its American counterparts, which developed during the second half of the nineteenth century and which modeled themselves upon their British forerunners. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), founded in 1866, led the way, and was soon enough followed by organizations in Pennsylvania (PSPCA), founded in 1867, and Massachusetts (MSPCA), New Jersey and San Francisco, which were created in 1868.

(3) the vertiginous effects of Darwinism (and the notion of kinship with animals) and industrialization had faded, and such fears had dissipated within the routine of everyday life; and (4) new legislative measures protecting the lower classes, women and children and the emergence of social services made the matter of animal cruelty less urgent for the channeling of compassion (Turner 1980, 123).

Despite these cultural shifts and the British scientific community's empowerment through the AAMR and its support from continental Europe, I would argue that revulsion to French experimental physiology was still to be a central part of the antivivisection crusade during this period, and the image of the French vivisector as a bloodthirsty sadist was to remain prevalent in humane advocacy. There was, however, a noticeable change in the tactic of assailing experimental physiology and its particularly French character. The 1876 Act, which after all was but a means of hindering, not suppressing, vivisection may not have met either of the parties' expectations, but it certainly demanded a rearrangement of strategic moves. Cobbe's 1880s antivivisection pamphlets adopted a more aggressive tone, and French physiologists such as Bernard or the Russian-French Cyon were targeted more severely than ever. Her best known pieces, "Bernard's Martyrs" (1879) and "Light in Dark Places" (1883), were particularly vocal about the heinousness of French physiology. Anesthesia, which she had once viewed (although rather skeptically) as the lesser of two evils to use in the performance of surgical procedures, no longer afforded a humane solution. Too many times chloroform and ether had been used ineffectively, applied incorrectly or insufficiently. The use of curare, a potent plant extract, raised the most nightmarish image of all: as far back as the 1860s, Bernard had attested to its paralyzing properties while leaving the subject not only fully conscious, but also fully sensitive to pain. Curare was anything but an anesthetic, and it rendered possible the best conditions for the vivisector: the animal was immobilized and there was no other effect that would interfere with the natural function of the body.

Bernard's comments on curare hauntingly reappeared in Cobbe's pamphlets and addresses, for they fittingly reflected the rapacious, fiendish nature of the vivisector, suggesting a sadistic pleasure on the part of the scientist emanating from his power over a creature fully aware of its own helplessness. Death under curare, claimed Bernard, was "accompanied by the most atrocious suffering that the imagination of man had conceived" (qtd. in Cobbe 1889, 185). In "Light in Dark Places," Cobbe also anticipated contemporary animal rights maneuvers by 'illuminating' what was usually concealed from the general public. She reproduced drawings from Bernard's *Physiologie Opératoire* and Livon's *Manuel de Vivisection*, as well as plates by Cyon and Bert. These illustrations graphically catalogued the horrors of the tortures; from the instruments used to the manner animals were held down, and reproduced key moments of the surgical interventions. Cobbe's retaliation in using the Frenchmen's own engravings alongside descriptions of their procedures written by them to appeal for an amendment of the 1876 Act represented an alternative strategy more in the line of straightforward "shock tactics" than her habitually compact and eloquent essays.

Cobbe continued writing incessantly, revealing a growing radicalism that demanded nothing short of abolition. She helped found the antivivisection journal *The Zoophilist* in 1881, and two years later launched a French version of the periodical, *Le Zoophile*, to reach out to the Parisian readership in the hopes of stirring civil unrest from within the nation that had started it all. The initiative, however, was short-lived. After roughly six months, Cobbe gave up *Le Zoophile* on account of the negative response of readers, who, in her words, "obviously found the paper too dry for their taste" and remonstrated "against the occasional references in it to religious considerations" (2012, 671). In 1898, Cobbe left the NAVS and formed the even more exigent British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), which received the enthusiastic support of George Bernard Shaw.

Like Cobbe, Charles Bell Taylor often relied on the vivisector's own description of his experiments, which generally sufficed for discursively inducing an explicit image of the French experimenter's depravity and viciousness. Taylor "de-contextualized" the data collected by Dr Brachet, Professor of Physiology at the École de Médecine, on what he ironically referred to as a "moral experiment." Much like Martin had accomplished in his retelling of Magendie's demonstrations, Taylor paraphrased Brachet to denounce the cruelty involved in the animals' slow and painful deliverance from the world. Taylor quoted Brachet as follows:

> I inspired . . . a dog with the greatest aversion for me, by plaguing or inflicting some pain or other upon it as often as I saw it. When this feeling was carried to its height, so that the animal became furious as soon as it saw or heard me, I put out its eyes. I could then appear before it without manifesting any aversion. I spoke out, and immediately its barkings and furious movements proved the passion which animated it. I therefore destroyed the drum of its ears and disorganized the internal ear as much as I could, and when an intense inflammation which was excited had rendered it deaf, I filled up its ears with molten wax. It could no longer hear at all. Then I went to its side, spoke aloud, and even caressed it, without its falling into rage: it seemed even sensible to my caresses. (1892, 4)

Aside from Cobbe and Taylor, other advocates continued to combine previous discursive methods with new alternatives to contravene French physiology and its transnational contagion. Henry Salt founded in 1891 the Humanitarian League, promoting respect for all sentient beings through a Thoreauvian-inspired doctrine, and in 1894 he published *Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress*. Salt insisted on the argument that the justification of vivisection on the grounds of utility was worthless, its most threatening effect being that of compromising society's striving for moral balance. France, just as much as Germany, was often invoked as an example of historical moral error (Salt and Leffingwell 2010, 136-37). Anna Kingsford, the first Englishwoman to graduate from the Paris Faculty of Medicine, campaigned internationally to pressurize the French government into regulating vivisection and even published a paper vilifying Louis Pasteur called "La Rage de Monsieur Pasteur." Like Cobbe, she attacked medical materialism,

was adamant in her demands, and invoked historical analogies to persuade readers, as for example comparing vivisectors and the medical community to the Inquisition (Finn 2012, 194), thus also anticipating contemporary animal liberation discourse which allegorizes laboratories as concentration camps. Yet unlike Cobbe, not only was she a vegetarian and a spiritualist-esoterist, but she had actual experience in working with physiologists, a fact that became of increasing importance for building a case for antivivisection. Among her innovations, Kingsford linked vegetarianism to antivivisection and augmented shock-tactics through what today perhaps would be considered publicity stunts:[5] she offered her body as a replacement for experimental animal subjects and claimed to have cursed Bernard and Bert, thereby causing their deaths (Elston 1987, 276). More poignantly, Kingsford, alongside other feminists such as Isabella Ford and Ouida, explicitly likened animal experimentation to surgical practice on women, children, and the poor. The use of female subjects in French medical and experimental practice certainly inspired an entire body of literature by feminists, whereupon ovariotomies were compared with the cutting of live animals, and research on hysteria with the experiments related to hydrophobia. The feminist implications of vivisection have been extensively documented by scholars.[6]

Although Kingsford advocated regulation in compliance with the English model (Finn 2012, 193), it became evident at the turn of the century that experimental physiology had rather successfully seeped into medical courses in London when two members of the Swedish Anti-Vivisection League, Lizzy Lind-af-Hageby and Leisa Katherina Schartau, published the critically-acclaimed *The Shambles of Science* (1903). The two students had come into contact with French vivisection in their 1900 visit to the Pasteur Institute in Paris. Shocked by what they witnessed, they enrolled in physiology classes at the London

[5] Shock tactics and publicity stunts have today become the norm to draw attention to animal rights and liberation issues: from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animal's controversial campaigns and advertisements to street performances and demonstrations, the movement has continuously explored ways through which to flesh out an anti-speciesist discourse since the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Since animality has been historically defined according to its counterpointing to what is categorically human, post-Darwinian experimenters have found themselves cornered as to what to ontologically and ethically make of their animal subjects: if their physiological, biological, psychological and emotional resemblances to humans are what makes them useful for research, do not these similitudes also signify upon our obligation to respect them precisely because they are so much like us? Current pro- and antivivisectionist arguments and campaigns are motored by the rhetorical possibilities afforded by the likeness / difference dilemma, obviating the matter that, as Huggan and Tiffin contend, it is not so much the animals themselves that pose a problem for postcolonial civilizations, but rather our representation of them. These representations are "indicative of our attempts to reconcile, and thereby come to terms with, the contradictory attitudes to animals that most human societies harbor" (Huggan and Tiffin 2010, 138). Nonetheless, as Cary Wolfe (2003) has fairly recently argued, the concept of animal rights and its associated representations are flawed insofar as we have yet to overcome the humanist discourse that places human subjectivity at the center of our social, philosophical, bioethical and biopolitical structures. This humanist subjectivity, fueled precisely by the likeness / difference paradigm, fails to acknowledge the uniqueness of animal species and individuals, for it only assimilates the 'other' on account of kinship to humans, hence redistributing different species within our ethical consideration, but ultimately refraining from imploding the speciesist structure itself, whereby there will always be some species at the bottom and more privileged ones at the top.

[6] For a more thorough analysis of these aspects see Elston (1987), Kean (1995), Lansbury (1985), Miller (2009) and Pollock (2005).

School of Medicine for Women. Their book, which ran to five editions before World War I, stressed the importance of having first-hand experience in physiological research the better to combat it, and again placed the French at the center of institutionalized cruelty to animals. The contemporary vivisector represented a "philosophical retrogression" (Lind-af-Hageby and Schartau 2012, 6): he had in a way degenerated back to Cartesian doctrine through his regard of animals as mere machinery deprived of feeling and consciousness. London professors reproduced the experiments performed by Bernard (and also other international scientists such as Heidenhain and Pawlow), and seemed to always fail either in the justification of the experiments or in the efficient administering of anesthesia, if it was used at all. The triumph of experimental physiology was not just proven by the institutionalization of vivisection as part of the educational lecture (despite the restrictive measures in the 1876 Act), but also by the fact that the dominating male scientific approach had alienated women from their natural predisposition to kindness and nurturing: "The woman vivisector has arrived. She 'works' with perfect tranquility, and is above all anxious to blot out sentiment. . . . Will women who have been trained at the vivisection-table become gentle, loving mothers?" (Lind-af-Hageby and Schartau 2012, 186-87). Not only, as Kingsford, Ford or Ouida had attempted to convey, were women being subdued by French male-centered powers through gynecological research, but the incorporation of women within the medical sphere as vivisectors represented an interesting twist, in fact, to what Cobbe had so ardently (and quite successfully) been avouching in England: that the participation of more conservative women in the public sphere through their joining forces with antivivisection organizations was an activity which safeguarded women's feminine virtue. The emerging professionalization of women as vivisectors in England, in other words, represented the ultimate triumph of the medical field that had been initiated in France: not only had experimental physiology fared well in influencing British legislation and medical schools, but it had also stretched as far as corrupting women in Britain who were seeking a space in the public sphere.

Conclusion

The birth of experimental physiology as a discipline and the institutionalization of vivisection as the chief method of research in France generated throughout the nineteenth century a heated and somewhat xenophobic response from animal protection groups in Britain. As experimental physiology spread from continental Europe to Britain, antivivisection advocates developed a discourse that progressively established a formulaic rhetoric intent on discrediting French physiologists, physicians, veterinary surgeons and their pupils. Arguments such as the lack of utility, the entertainment value, the sadistic, fiendish, cold temperament of the vivisector and the descriptive accounts of slow, torturous deaths contravened to some extent a smooth and apathetic adoption of French scientific approaches, but proved insufficient to halt the passing of an Act that antivivisectionists regarded for the most part as a *carte blanche* legitimizing the physiologist's authority. As

a result, antivivisectionists incorporated new discursive and publicizing strategies that would go on to define the anti-experimentation animal protection movement in the Edwardian period.

Although, as Turner (1980) and other prominent scholars argue, the notable medical breakthroughs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century caused an inner fracture within the ranks of the antivivisection movement (since the argument as to the utility of the experiments no longer seemed so convincing), handfuls of antivivisectionists continued their struggle for abolitionism or further restriction for years to come. True, the antivivisection discourse would in time lose its original discursive potency (along with its solid, loyal audience), and supporters in Britain as much as in America would increasingly find themselves cornered by accusations targeting their lack of scientific knowledge. The American surgeon William Williams Keen (2009), for instance, repeatedly expressed his bitterness towards the antivivisectionists' penchant to revive examples of experiments carried out decades earlier in France, hence ignoring the extent to which medical knowledge had advanced and offensively distorting the character of the medical practitioner.

Still, although the arguments purported by Cobbe, Hoggan, Salt, Kingsford, Ouida, Lind-af-Hageby and Schartau, among scores of others, would, for the most part, fade for several decades, their message would become powerfully resuscitated within the animal liberation movement invigorated from the mid-1970s onwards. In spite of the fact that many of these arguments —primarily those based on utility and on anti-French reactions— were, needless to say, outdated by then, the spirit of their crusade succeeded in reaching a new generation of animal protectionists and activists in Europe and in the United States.

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Accounting for Causal Constructions within the Framework of the Lexical Constructional Model

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This article sets out to examine causal constructions by focusing on a particular verbal class, namely, *entity-specific change-of-state* verbs. The most important step consisted in finding a theoretical framework capable of accounting for the intricate syntactic behavior of these verbs and of giving equal importance to the contribution of both lower-level and high-level configurations. The present study also shows that the *external constraints* formulated by the *Lexical Constructional Model* constitute useful analytical tools for the integration of this verbal class into the intransitive causal construction. The external constraints involve cognitive mechanisms such as high-level metaphor and metonymy, which produce a change in perspective of a lexical predicate and allow it to be easily subsumed into a given construction.

Keywords: intransitivity; causal constructions; Lexical Constructional Model; metaphor; metonymy; change-of-state verbs

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Las construcciones de causalidad dentro del marco del Modelo Léxico Construccional

Este artículo se propone examinar las construcciones de causalidad, centrándose en una clase verbal en particular, a saber, los verbos de *cambio de estado específico*. El paso más importante consiste en encontrar un marco teórico capaz de dar cuenta del complejo comportamiento sintáctico de estos verbos y de lograr un equilibrio entre las configuraciones de bajo y alto nivel. El presente estudio también demuestra que los constrictores externos formulados por el Modelo Léxico Construccional constituyen herramientas analíticas útiles para la subsunción de esta clase verbal en la construcción intransitiva de causalidad. Los constrictores externos se refieren a mecanismos cognitivos como la metáfora y la metonimia de alto nivel. Estos producen un cambio en la perspectiva de un predicado que le permite subsumirse fácilmente en una construcción dada.

Palabras claves: intransitividad; construcciones causales; Modelo Léxico Construccional; metáfora; metonimia; verbos de cambio de estado específico

1. Introduction

The main aim of this article is to study the *intransitive causal construction* from the perspective of the *Lexical Constructional Model* (LCM) by focusing on a particular verbal class, namely, *entity-specific change-of-state* verbs.[1] The thorough examination of a large size corpus (i.e., the Sketch engine) demonstrates that these verbs display a much richer variety of configurations than previous scholars have claimed (for further information see Levin 1993 and Wright 2002). These verbs have been generally studied in connection with their (non)-participation in the causative / inchoative alternation (e.g., **The sun bloomed the roses* / *The roses bloomed*). However, the intransitive causal construction, which is also very productive with these verbs, has so far been paid little attention.

In our analysis we draw from previous works by Dirven (1993, 1995), Radden (1998) and Cuyckens (2002), which provide evidence in favor of the causal nature of prepositions. Nonetheless, the scope of their studies is too generic to account for the intricate constructional behavior of this particular verbal class. For this purpose we have made use of some of the explanatory and analytical tools of the LCM, which precisely studies the principles regulating the interaction between lexical predicates and constructions. The LCM combines insights from functionalist approaches to language, like Functional Grammar (FG; Dik 1997), Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) and Role and Reference Grammar (RRG; Van Valin and La Polla 1997; Van Valin 2005), with compatible developments in the Lakoffian branch of Cognitive Linguistics (Lakoff 1987, 1993), with special emphasis on the constructionist approach to grammar (e.g., Goldberg 1995, 2006). In this study we will employ the external constraints put forward by the LCM (see Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007), which take the form of high-level metaphor and metonymy, in order to account for the subsumption (or integration) of the verbs under consideration into intransitive causal constructions. In addition, when discussing the cognitive motivations behind non-emotional causality, we discuss different proposals, viz. Dirven's (1993, 1995) metaphorical approach and Cuyckens's (2002) metonymical treatment. However, we opt for a more encompassing approach, namely the postulation of a conflational continuum in cognitive processing.

This article is structured as follows: In section two, we introduce the reader to the most relevant theoretical postulates held within the LCM. In section three, we present a descriptive and explanatory account of intransitive causal constructions, making the distinction between purely L-Subject forms and other figurative intransitive causal constructions. By figurative we refer here to non-literal language involving a figure of speech, such as metaphor or metonymy. Section four includes the classification of entity-specific change-of-state verbs into three main groups according to their conceptual similarity, as well as an analysis of the factors that motivate the lexical-constructional behavior of these verbs. Section five centers on the conceptualization of emotional and

[1] *Center for Research in the Applications of Language* (www.cilap.es). Financial support for this research was provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, grant no. FFI2010-17610.

non-emotional causality with these verbs. The final section comprises all the findings of our research.

2. The Lexical Constructional Model

The LCM is a meaning construction model which features four levels of description: level 1 contains argument structure lexical and constructional specifications; level 2 deals with conventional and non-conventional implicated meaning; level 3 involves illocutionary constructions, and level 4 centers on discourse configurations. In the present research the focus will be solely on level 1.

The building blocks of the LCM are lexical templates and constructional templates. Lexical templates are low-level constructional representations of the semantic and syntactic properties of a predicate whereas constructional templates are higher-level, non-lexical representations with a grammatical impact. In this study we are concerned with lexical-constructional *subsumption* which is a basic cognitive operation appearing at all levels of meaning construction. It consists in the principled incorporation of lower levels of semantic structure into higher levels of syntactically-oriented structure. This operation is regulated by a set of external and internal constraints. External constraints, such as high-level metaphors and metonymies, help construe lexical predicates from a different perspective so that they may be integrated into a particular construction without changing their internal structure. Internal constraints involve the conditions under which a lexical predicate can modify its internal configuration (i.e., its encyclopedic and event structure makeup) so as to be subsumed into a given construction.

Some of the high-level metaphors postulated by the LCM are "a communicative action is an effectual action" (e.g., *Di Caprio snarls* his way through the film *with an admirable sense of focus;* Sketch engine doc#325884), "an activity is an (effectual) action" (e.g., *He let his voice caress* her into sleep; COCA 1993), and "an emotional state is an effectual action" (e.g., *He [God] will love* us . . . into holiness*;* Sketch engine doc#715874). High-level metonymies motivate four different types of grammatical processes, such as categorial conversion, subcategorial conversion, enriched composition and parametrization. For example, the sentence *He's coughing and he has a temperature* (Sketch engine doc#132457) is licensed by the "generic for specific" metonymy, whereby the generic phrase "having a temperature" stands for a more particular situation, viz. "having a higher-than-normal body temperature."

Regarding internal constraints, these have been divided into two groups: (i) vertical constraints operating on a paradigmatic basis: *Full Matching, Event Identification Condition, Lexical Class Constraint* and *Lexical Blocking*; and (ii) constraints operating on syntagmatic grounds or horizontal constraints: *Predicate-Argument Conditioning* and *Internal Variable Conditioning.* In this section we will only illustrate the Internal Variable Conditioning since this constraint will be used later on in the analysis. It refers to cases in which the world-knowledge information associated to an internal predicate variable places

restrictions on the nature of both the predicate and the constructional arguments. For example, the semantic information conveyed by the verb *swell* and the entity undergoing swelling constrain the nature of the resultant entity Z, which must be bigger in size or have a bigger value than the Y element (e.g., *The work, which was originally meant to consist only of a few sheets, swelled* into ten volumes).

3. Intransitive Causal Constructions

The intransitive causal pattern is a construction that has been understudied by grammarians. This pattern matches easily with entity-specific change-of-state verbs probably because speakers need to assign causes to processes occurring in nature. The verbs under consideration give rise to the following intransitive causal configuration: NP1 V *with / in / from / under* NP2, in which various prepositions can make the connection between the action encoded by a verb and the cause underlying that action.

The preposition *with* is polysemous, since it is employed to express instrumentality, company, causality and even result, as will be shown at a later stage of our discussion. The boundary between these four notions is sometimes fuzzy. For example, the sentence *Napoleon destroyed the city with his army* can puzzle the reader who is indecisive as to what gains more conceptual prominence in this utterance: company, instrumentality or both. We tip the balance in favor of a conflation between company and instrument because Napoleon is accompanied by his army in battle and at the same time he uses his soldiers as an instrument to achieve his goal, in this case the destruction of a city. But what about the role of *with* in the oft-cited sentence *He broke the window with a hammer*? If there were no conflation between instrumentality and causality, how else would we be able to explain the possibility of promoting the hammer to a subject position as in *The hammer broke the window*? Another sentence which undoubtedly stresses the causal role of the preposition *with* is *John died with pneumonia*, where the disease becomes the cause of John's dying. We relate this example to another one which makes use of an entity-specific change-of-state verb, viz. *The garden flowered with roses* (Levin 1993, 251). An alternate construal of this event would be illustrated by an intransitive locative construction as in *Roses flowered in the garden*. The intransitive causal and locative constructions were analyzed together in the linguistic literature and were denominated with the term *swarm* alternation (see Anderson 1971; Salkoff 1983; Dowty 2001). This form is considered to be the intransitive counterpart of the locative alternation shown by *spray / load* verbs in their transitive use (cf. *John sprayed paint on the wall / John sprayed the wall with paint* vs. *John loaded hay onto the truck / John loaded the truck with hay*). Dowty (2001) offers an exhaustive characterization of the *swarm* alternation, by relying heavily on Salkoff's (1983) observations. In his terminology, the intransitive locative construction (e.g., *Bees swarm in the garden*) is called an AGENT-SUBJECT (A-Subject) form whereas the *with* pattern (e.g., *The garden swarmed with bees*) is termed LOCATION-SUBJECT (L-Subject) form. Dowty (2001, 8) is not so much concerned with the A-Subject form (e.g., *Ants are*

crawling on the bed) simply because it does not have any peculiar semantic or syntactic features which differentiate it from other sentences like *Ants are dying on the bed* or *Four ants are crawling on the bed*. Contrary to Levin (1993), Dowty (2001) enumerates only five verb classes that appear in the L-Subject form, i.e., light emission verbs (*beam, burn, blaze, twinkle,* etc.), the sound emission verb class, in which he includes animal sounds and Levin's (1993) sound existence verbs (*buzz, chatter, echo, resonate,* etc.), degree of occupancy / abundance verbs (*teem, rife, abound, throng,* etc.), verbs denoting small local movements which occur repetitively (*flutter, pulsate, gush, ooze*; in this class he merges two of Levin's (1993) classes, namely, substance emission verbs and verbs of modes of being involving motion), and verbs describing smells and tastes (*reek, smell, taste, be fragrant,* etc.). Nonetheless, he leaves out Levin's (1993) verbs of entity-specific modes of being (*bloom, blossom, sprout, bristle*). Among the most salient properties of the L-Subject construction, Dowty (2001) mentions:

(I) The *holistic / partitive* dichotomy. According to this, the L-Subject form entails the activity denoted by the verb filling the whole location, whilst this is not the case with the A-Subject form. For the sake of clarity, compare the entailments of the A-Subject and L-Subject constructions: *Bees are swarming in the garden, but most of the garden has no bees in it* vs. *#The garden is swarming with bees, but most of the garden has no bees in it*. The A-Subject construction implies that the cluster of bees occupies only a small area of the garden, whereas the L-Subject construction suggests that the swarm of bees is distributed over the whole garden.

(II) The *with* pattern is an indefinite plural or mass term, but never a singular NP (cf. *The wall crawled with roaches / *The wall crawled with a roach,* Salkoff 1983, 292; *The garden buzzed with flies / *The garden buzzed with the big fly*). However, the final NP position can be filled with a noun specifying an estimated amount, but not a precise enumeration (cf. *The garden swarmed with a hundred bees* vs. *?The garden swarmed with fifty-three bees*). An exception to this rule is the sentence *The whole school buzzed with the rumor about the librarian dating the principal*, where the sound emission verb alludes to many re-tellings of the rumor by different people in the school.

(III) When the verb of an L-Subject construction is a sound verb, the *with* pattern is more natural with a sound expression than the agent or instrument that produces that sound (Salkoff 1983, 307; *The barnyard cackled with the calls of geese* vs. *The barnyard cackled with geese*).

(IV) Salkoff (1983) himself remarked that the L-Subject form is highly productive in metaphorical instantiations such as *Fireflies danced in the garden / The garden danced with fireflies* or *Visions of success danced in his head / His head danced with visions of success* (Dowty 2001, 4). The same verb is disallowed in an L-Subject form when used with a literal meaning (cf. *Lovely couples danced on the stage* vs. **The stage danced with lovely couples*).

(V) *The Dynamic Texture hypothesis*. The events described by the verb of an L-Subject form happen simultaneously and repetitively throughout all parts of a place or space.

> The cluster of activities is so encompassing that it creates a "texture of movement" in the surface as a whole. The perception of the movement-texture in the surface becomes more salient than the individual events or agents (cf. **The table crawled with the ant on the right side*). So, the focal requirements of the L-Subject construction are the following: 1) a location must be entirely filled with individual entities or the sound produced by those individual entities (e.g., *The forest resonates with buzzing insects*); or 2) there must be a visual illusion that the space is completely filled up through repeated movements scattered all over the surface (e.g., *The garden danced with fireflies*).

In connection to the restrictions mentioned in (ii), we contend that the reason why the *with* pattern can never combine with a singular NP is given by the *Internal Variable Conditioning* constraint. According to this, the predicate of an L-Subject form, which already implies a large number of small entities, constrains the nature of the following constructional argument, which cannot be lexicalized by a single entity. The second use restriction of the *with* pattern (the combination with an estimated amount) has a perceptual motivation grounded in the logic of the "substance" and "collection" image-schemas. In discussing the multiplex-mass image-schema transformation, Lakoff (1987, 442) points out that "as one moves further away, a group of individuals at a certain point begins to be seen as mass. Similarly, a sequence of points is seen as a continuous line when viewed from a distance," i.e., we visually perceive collections of bounded individuals as unbounded entities (i.e., substances) and in an approximate way. Lakoff (1987) supports the existence of a metaphorical operation that lies at the heart of this kind of transformation, namely "collection is mass." For example, the sentence *The fans poured through the gates* relies on this metaphor, and as such we conceptualize aspects of the perceived behavior of a mass of people in terms of corresponding aspects of the observed behavior of flowing liquids.

Moreover, Dowty (2001) is not able to provide an explanation for the unacceptability of a literal sentence like **The stage danced with lovely couples.* We contend that, in the non-figurative use of *dance*, there is a conceptual clash between the verb and the L-Subject constructional pattern, which requires a verb that denotes a manner of filling up a location. World-knowledge information about dancing as an activity tells us that choreography implies a visually balanced spatial distribution in choreography there is a visually balanced spatial distribution where the motion of the couples has to be perfectly coordinated. The dancing couples, therefore, have to be visually separated in order to give a harmonious impression, thus leaving large portions of the stage uncovered. On the other hand, in the figurative use, it is possible for the "dancing" entities (i.e., fireflies, thoughts) to involve no coordinated motion, but rather a chaotic movement provided that such motion takes up the whole of a given space.

Coming back to the examples in our corpus (*The garden flowered with roses / Roses flowered in the garden*), it is worth noting that they are also subject to the holistic

/ partitive effects in the sense that the whole garden seems to be affected by the blooming process in the L-Subject construction. The lack of agentivity in the L-Subject construction, as postulated by Levin (1993, 54), is highly debatable for two main reasons. First, we should clearly differentiate between the syntactic function of subject and the semantic function of agent. In this respect, Dik (1997, 37) has posited the existence of three possible functions for any construction: (i) syntactic functions, such as subject, object or other terms without a subject / object function; (ii) semantic functions, such as agent, goal, recipient, beneficiary, instrument, location or time; and (iii) pragmatic functions, such as topic and focus. In a sentence like *John broke your china* the NP *John* simultaneously fulfills three different functions, that of subject, agent, and topic (i.e., a piece of information that is known to the speakers), whereas the NP *china* is, at the same time, an object, a patient, and a focal element (i.e., a piece of information that is new to the speaker). The coincidence of these three functions is, however, not always the case. Consider for contrastive purposes the utterance *JÓHN broke your china (not Jim)* in which *John* is the subject and agent, but also constitutes the focal element of the sentence. The marked stress suggests that the speaker did not know the identity of the person who broke the china. Dik (1997) also claims that the assignment of subject and object can be understood in terms of the notion of perspective, that is, the point of view from which a state of affairs is presented in a linguistic expression. A similar view is supported in Langacker's (1991a, 1991b, 2005) Cognitive Grammar which equates the subject with the notion of *trajectory* (TR) and the object with the *landmark* (LM), respectively. The former is the most salient element or the primary figure in a profiled relationship, whereas the latter stands out as the second focal element or the secondary figure. Thus, according to Langacker (2005, 111) the participant that receives primary focus becomes the subject, and the participant that receives secondary focus is the object or the oblique NP. I agree with these positions and furthermore would claim that a prototypical subject is also expressed by a prototypical agent. Syntactic functions derive from semantic functions that have undergone a process of desemantization. This process gave rise to more marginal transitive or intransitive constructions, such as the instrument subject construction (e.g., *The hammer broke the window*) or the middle construction (e.g., *This book sells easily*).

Second, I consider that there is a cline of agentivity ranging from the more prototypical to the more marginal cases. Thus, Taylor (1995, 207) characterizes a prototypical agent by enumerating the following features: (i) consciousness and volition: the agent is typically a human being who has control over the event and the action is carried out purposefully; (ii) the agent acts upon an inanimate patient through direct physical contact, and the effect on the patient is immediate and leads to a change of state. Radden and Dirven (2007, 288-91) discuss non-prototypical agents and classify them into two main groups: agent-like causes and enabling causes. The first category comprises natural forces (e.g., *Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans*), instruments (e.g., *Guns don't kill people, people kill people*), or other generic causes (e.g., *The strike closed down the railway system*).

In the instrument subject construction an agent that acts on the instrument is implied. Nevertheless, it is agreed that the instrument has a certain degree of independence from the agent, as if it were somehow acting on its own. Nevertheless, instruments cannot be coordinated with agents (**Guns and gangsters kill innocent people*) or carry out deliberate actions (**Guns kill people for fun*).

The middle construction is another case of non-prototypical agentivity, where the agent takes the subject position. Consider the sentence *This books sells easily*. Radden and Dirven (2007, 290) argue that an internal quality of the book acts as an enabling condition that influences its sale. That is why external agents cannot be added to the middle construction (cf. **The book sold easily by the bookseller*). Taylor's work (1995, 217) offers a similar perspective on the middle construction which "seems to highlight the contribution of the merchandise itself (e.g., the fact that the book appeals to a wide audience) to the high sales figures." Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2007, 385) show that the middle and instrument-subject evaluative constructions contribute an evaluative ingredient that can affect either the process or the result components of the "process for action for result" high-level metonymy. Figure 1 below constitutes a graphical representation of the "process for action for result" metonymy, where either the process or the result component is highlighted depending on the adverbial phrase following the verb:



Figure 1. Highlighting in "process for action for result"

For instance, in the sentence *This book sells easily,* it is the process that is evaluated, as revealed by the paraphrase *It is easy to sell this book*. By contrast, the adverbial phrase *well* in *This book sells well* assesses the result of the book sale (cf. **This book sells / *It is well to sell this book*). Therefore, the choice of the adverbial phrase determines what part of the high-level metonymic chain is being exploited, i.e., *easily* focuses on the initial source domain (the process), while *well* highlights the final target domain (the result). In this connection, our L-Subject construction (*The garden flowered with roses*) makes use of a non-prototypical agent, i.e., the location, whose intrinsic quality (the good state of the soil, for example) acts as an enabling condition influencing the flowering process of the roses. This L-Subject construction is a clear instantiation of what Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) have labeled *non-congruent grammatical*

realization and can be contrasted with its intransitive locative congruent version, i.e., *Roses flowered in the garden*. We contend that the L-Subject construction is licensed by the high-level metonymy "a process (in a location) for an (instrumentally) caused event" (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2001; Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña 2008). The metonymy is illustrated in the diagram below:



Figure 2. "A process (in a location) for an (instrumentally) caused event" metonymy

Figuratively, in a high-level of meaning construction, we treat the garden as if it were able to "bloom" by making use of its flowers. Thus, the process of blooming, which typically has only one participant role, viz. an undergoer (the flowers), occurs in a given place / location. In an L-Subject construction this process metonymically stands for a caused event in which a volitional agent uses an instrument of action.

In our corpus we have come across many figurative intransitive causal constructions. Consider the example . . . *this movement blossomed* with the opening of more than 20 schools *offering programs in Naturopathic Medicine* (Sketch engine doc#216733), in which the opening of schools is the cause of the flourishing of the movement. Nevertheless, we should note that our example has deviated somewhat from an L-Subject form since the subject *movement* is no longer a location. The development of an ideological movement is metaphorically seen as the blossoming process undergone by flowers and schools do not have the ability to literally blossom the movement, but they can propel it. This sentence can be compared with *The leaves blew with the wind*, where the wind caused the leaves to move in the air. There is a low-level metonymy from "intentionally caused motion by expelling a current of air through the mouth" to "non-intentionally caused motion through the creation of a current of air (wind)." In the previous example, the low-level metonymy shifts from a non-intentional enabling action (cf. *The flowers blossomed with the sun / *The sun blossomed the flowers*, the sun is only a co-causal factor of the blossoming process) to an intentionally caused action which makes an ideological movement thrive (cf. *Schools were opened by the government,* but it is odd to say *?The opening of schools blossomed the movement* because this action only enables the flourishing process).

4. Intransitive Causal Constructions with Entity-specific Change-of-state Verbs

We have classified Levin's (1993) twenty-one entity-specific change-of-state verbs into three main groups on the basis of their conceptual similarity: (i) verbs describing an increase in size (e.g., *bloom, blossom, flower, germinate, sprout, swell, blister*); (ii) verbs describing a negative, destructive change affecting the integrity of an entity (e.g., *burn, corrode, decay, deteriorate, erode, molder, molt, rot, rust, stagnate tarnish, wilt, wither*), and (iii) the verb *ferment* which does not involve any increase or decrease in size of an entity and the change is neither positive nor negative.

As mentioned earlier, the intransitive causal construction can accept a wide range of prepositions, such as *with, in, from,* or *under*. The sentence *The camera blossomed* in the hands of indigenous photographers *as colonialism waned and the Ghanaians adopted photography for themselves* (Sketch engine doc#684231) makes use of a causal *in* preposition. The idea of causation in this utterance could not have been expressed by means of the preposition *with* because the NP *hands* collocates in a natural way with the preposition *in*, which activates the "container" schema (the camera was held in the hands of the indigenous people). Again, the verb *blossom* is exploited metaphorically to suggest that the indigenous people developed skills in photographic techniques. Also, holding an object in your hand is conceptually associated with possession or exertion of control over that entity. The use of the entity as an instrument to perform an action can be finally linked to the idea of causation (e.g., a gun that you hold in your hand can become a tool to kill a person). Ruiz de Mendoza (personal communication, 2012) contends that there is a continuum in cognitive processing which leads from the position of an object in a given location to the abstract domain of causation: IN-location in a container [*hands*]> possession of object > instrumentality > causation. Note that the most basic scenario is that of an object located in a container, and as we move forward along the continuum the relations between entities become more complex.

The existence of a continuum in cognitive processing is further supported by Grady and Johnson's (2002) developmental model of primary scenes and primary metaphors. In their work they provide compelling evidence from the process of children's acquisition of grammatical constructions in order to demonstrate the existence of subscenes which are built into more complex scenes for the creation of primary metaphors. According to these authors, subscenes are situated "at the lowest level of cognitive processing to which we can consciously attend-that is, they are self-contained dimensions of subjective experience" (2002, 552). They predict that the possessive meaning, which corresponds to a subscene, is learned first whereas the instrumental meaning is learned relatively late, since it requires the acquisition of a complex scene which involves the relation between an object, a person, and an activity (Jackendoff 1990). Johnson (1997) shows that children treat an example like *What are you doing with the knife?* as a normal *Wh*-question, i.e., as a literal question about an activity, and not as an instance of the WXDY construction, which refers to the incongruity of the addressee's holding that object. Grady and Johnson

(2002) explain that this is possible because such sentences can receive two interpretations depending on the meaning assigned to the preposition *with*. Children obviously interpret it as a possessive preposition (cf. *John stood in the doorway with a knife*) because this is the simplest explanation and it corresponds to a subscene. The second interpretation, which is based on the instrumentality of the preposition *with,* requires the activation of a relatively complex scene in which a person uses an object to perform an action. Therefore, the complex scene of a person using an instrument of action includes the simple subscene of a person possessing or holding that instrument. To conclude, the possessive meaning is subsidiary to the causation meaning.

Another preposition which can evoke causality is *from,* e.g., *Frescoes generally became dark or decayed* from moisture (Sketch engine doc#137647). Through an elaborate cognitive process, we are able to understand what it is that allows *from* to become causal. This preposition cues the activation of the "path" schema, and more specifically a particular portion of it, viz. the starting point. The starting point of a path is thus related to the state or quality of being damp (*moisture*) by means of an underlying primary metaphor "states are locations" (cf. Lakoff 1993, for a preliminary discussion of this metaphor). It is very interesting to notice how the human mind brings together three apparently different domains: states, locations, and change. The verb *decay* highlights the final state of the frescoes, indicating that the affected entity has now reached the final point of a path (cf. "a change of state is a change of location"). In a naive interpretation of the world the source of motion is mixed up with its cause because at the motion's source are also found the conditions that trigger the motion. Therefore, in the human mind the initial state conflates with both the source and the cause of the motion. Correspondingly, a final state would correlate with the destination of motion and the resultant state (cf. *The rotten brick* decayed to dust; Sketch engine doc#1046209).

Conflation involves the human mind imposing its own patterns onto reality, which is far from objective. But this idea is not new and we can trace its roots back to the phenomenologist revolution in philosophy initiated by Merleau-Ponty (1962) who highlights the role of human consciousness and intentionality in the joint interaction of the body and the mind with the surrounding environment. Moreover, embodiment does not concern only the body, but is rather a matter of the mind acting through the body. The philosophical postulates of Merleau-Ponty (i.e., the notions of experientialism, realism, and the assumption of an embodied mind) are also stressed by Violi (2008), who blends Merleau-Ponty's ideas with Peircean semiotics:

> Through perception the subject meets the world in the first place and begins to give meaning to it. Phenomenological and perceptive meaning is transformed into linguistic meaning through the *corp propre* [lived body] which founds, at one and the same time, the subjectivity of consciousness and the exteriority of the world. Here we can see another possible compatibility with Pierce's philosophy: in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, too, external and internal world are not separate and in opposition with one another, but related to each other via the mediation

> of the *corp propre* that operates, in a way, as translator of perceptually constructed meaning into linguistic and conceptual meaning. (2008, 57)

Thus, it is made clear that the human perceiver imposes his / her subjective structure on the things perceived. Meaning is created in the body through perception which is "not merely the simple and passive record of an external world," but rather "the active construction of a world already endowed with meaning and intentionality" (Violi 2008, 57).

Finally, the preposition *under* can also appear in a causally construed semantic environment, as in *But the plant soon wilted* under the hot sun (Sketch engine doc#2335524). *Under* is a spatial concept designating a lower position of an entity in contrast with another one that is situated on top of it. Although no motion is entailed, the three conceptual domains of location, state, and change are still inextricably interwoven. The reader is left to infer the state of the plant whereas the verb *wilt* pinpoints the final event which was obviously generated by the weak condition that the plant was in. The preposition *under* can also take part in figurative intransitive causal expressions, e.g., *Friends of White said his health wilted* under the strain *of both confronting priests and comforting victims* (Sketch engine doc#970). In this sentence the aggravation of a person's state of health is metaphorically mapped onto the wilting process of a flower probably because people's health is considered to be as fragile as a flower whose growth depends greatly on favorable environmental conditions. The noun *strain* is also employed figuratively; it maps a concrete situation in which a heavy entity exerts real physical pressure on another one (e.g., *Extra fat* puts a strain on *the heart, kidneys, liver;* Sketch engine doc#340711) onto a situation in which life problems exert mental pressure on a person's mind. Mention should be made of the fact that the causal expression *under the strain* can only be associated with a negative final condition of an affected entity (cf. *?Mary blossomed under the strain of managing both a family and a career*).

In section two a distinction has been made between purely L-Subject constructions and deviated intransitive causal constructions. The subject position of the former coincides with the semantic function of location, whereas the subject of the latter is no longer a place but an abstract entity. It has been argued that a sentence like *The orchard now blooms* with apples (Sketch engine doc#200425) is motivated by the high-level metonymy "a process (in a location) for an (instrumentally) caused event," whereby the orchard is regarded as being able to "bloom" by making use of the apple trees as an instrument of action. This sentence could be paraphrased as *The apple trees bloomed in the orchard*. There is a metonymy "container for content," whereby the orchard stands for the plants located within it which undergo the natural process of blooming. The result of the blooming process is expressed by means of a company complement introduced by the polysemous preposition *with*. The noun *apples* cues the metonymic target, which is the apple trees (see Ruiz de Mendoza 2011 for further discussion of the cueing operation).

By contrast, consider the example *Western civilization bloomed* with the Christian religion (Sketch engine doc#2360092). In this utterance Western civilization is not a location but rather an abstract entity that undergoes a process of development directly

caused by the advent of Christianity. The term civilization metonymically stands for the significant landmarks of a culture, i.e., architecture, poetry, etc. Nevertheless, the relationship between the subject and the *with* element is somewhat similar to the one established between an orchard and the apples located within its boundaries. Any civilization is a set of cultural elements and religion can be understood as one of them. There is a symbiotic relationship of co-evolution and mutual benefitting between the Western civilization and Christianity. At the beginning there were two distinct separate entities, i.e., the Roman culture and the ideological Christian movement. The Christian religion was engulfed within the Roman culture, becoming a part of the latter. Thus, the preposition *with* can be said to conflate three different domains: causality (Christianity makes Western civilization thrive), company (Christianity co-exists with other Western cultural elements) and instrumentality (Western civilization makes use of one of its cultural components to reach maximal development). The conflation of these three domains is visually represented in Figure 3 below:



Figure 3. Conflation of causality, company and instrumentality.

Causality can be expressed either by means of the preposition *with* or *in*. Consider the example *His face was blistering* in the heat (Sketch engine doc#715101), where the preposition *in* conflates location, state and causality (i.e., the skin is exposed to the sun, feels hot and the heat causes the emergence of blisters on a person's face). In some cases the cause can be concrete (e.g., *they [ticks] bury their head into the flesh and the body swells* up with engorged blood; Sketch engine doc#163143, where the physical cause combines with a result lexicalized by the adverb *up*) or abstract (e.g., *Fox viewers swell* up with pride; Sketch engine doc#41852, where the cause of the physical expansion is an emotion). Also, the intransitive causal blends with an intransitive resultative construction which can be encoded either by a prepositional phrase or an adjectival phrase as in *The veins swelled* dark *on his forehead* with surcharge of passion (Sketch engine doc#667737).

Just like the verbs of the first group, verbs of the second group, which describe a negative destructive change, can appear in the intransitive causal construction although

causality in such cases is realized by a richer prepositional gamut. Verbs of the first group were shown to occur with causal prepositions like *in* and *with*. Unsurprisingly, verbs of the second group follow a similar pattern, e.g., *he cruelly left me behind when he set off to seek a life of adventure, leaving me behind to stagnate* in misery (Sketch engine doc#253878); *"Shout at the Devil" and "Home Sweet Home" have not tarnished* with age, *perhaps because the appeal of these songs is so primal* (Sketch engine doc#290735). In the first sentence the preposition *in* conflates the cause of cessation of progress with a state that is seen as a container on the basis of the primary metaphor "states are locations." The second sentence implies that time can destroy the appeal of songs. Sometimes the intransitive causal configuration can mix with a resultative construction (e.g., *The enclosure had been so full of kerosene vapor, that it burned* black with noxious fumes; Sketch engine doc#171747, where the poisonous smoke produced by burning causes the enclosure to acquire a black color) or a causative pattern (e.g., *Do not tarnish* your badge with a stain of corruption; Sketch engine doc#244525, in which the noun *badge* metonymically stands for the reputation of a person wearing the badge; the implicature is that corruption or corrupt actions can destroy a person's reputation). Causality can also be activated by the preposition *from* as seen in *the entire structure [the military] is deteriorating* from neglect - *morale at all levels appears dismal* (Sketch engine doc#638341) and *But bells now rust* from inactivity (Sketch engine doc#1045093). The low-level metaphor "states are locations" enables us to perceive a state of neglect and inactivity, respectively in the examples, as the starting point of a path. The gradual degradation of the military system, in the first example, and the bells, in the second example, are conceived as motion along a path which is cued by its point of departure. The preposition *under* can be associated with causality as in *Less-sturdy pans might wilt* under excessive heat (Sketch engine doc#1292335). This preposition, which highlights a lower spatial position of an entity with respect to another one, hints at the fact that the heat oppresses and acts upon the pan in a damaging way.

Lastly, the verb *ferment* also occurs in the intransitive causal construction headed by a *with* preposition that conflates causality and instrumentality (e.g., *She was still fermenting* with anger*;* Sketch engine doc#2321751, where a negative emotion causes a state of agitation in a human agent).

5. Emotional and Non-emotional Causality with Entity-specific Change-of-state Verbs

Radden (1998) analyzes emotional causality in terms of four different image-schemas, namely containment (e.g., *She trembled in fear*), companionship (e.g., *She was stiff with anger*), front-back (e.g., *She cried for joy*),[2] and emergence (e.g., *She cried out of pride*). In this section only the first two schemas will be reviewed. Some entity-specific change-of-state

[2] An emotion and its response are aligned along a front-back axis, where the response occupies the front-region and the emotion is located in the back-region.

verbs were shown to participate in both emotional and non-emotional causal constructions. Consider the example *The president's face wilted* in confusion and bewilderment (Sketch engine doc#1300889). Following Radden's (1998) line of argumentation, it could be argued that in this sentence the emotion of confusion is conceptualized as a container which triggers the undergoer's physiological reaction of drooping. The emotions that collocate with *in*-phrases are intense and predominantly negative (e.g., *in fear, in anger, in fury, in terror*). Nevertheless, we have come across a corpus example which makes use of a positive causal emotion, namely *it will certainly give cause to our Christian readers to swell* their chests out in pride (Sketch engine doc#1783987). According to Radden (1998, 276), all these properties stem from the logic of the container schema. Thus, the experiencer of an intense overpowering emotion feels as if s / he were held in a container which prevents her / him from moving around freely. *In*-phrases can be narrowed down to two conceptual metaphors, i.e., "intensive emotions are container" (e.g., *I trembled in terror*) and "external circumstances are containers" (e.g., *the petunias wilt* in the heat; Sketch engine doc#157642). However, we wonder how Radden (1998) would account for an example that was mentioned in section three, i.e., *The camera blossomed* in the hands of indigenous photographers: probably by postulating another conceptual metaphor, "causes are containers." Instead of formulating another metaphor, we contend that the human mind moves along a conflational continuum:

location in a container > possession of object > instrumentality > causation

Emotions can also be involved in causal chains as in *The little cats have six toes and no tails to swell* out in fury *at the sight of a dog* (Sketch engine doc#49242). In this example *the sight of a dog* can be seen as the stimulus that triggers the fury of the cat, which in turn causes the physiological reaction of swelling.

Regarding the preposition *with,* Dirven (1993, 81; 1995, 101) claims that it has a basic spatial "accompaniment" meaning (e.g., *he was walking* with two Jewish policemen; Sketch engine doc#23425) and four other metaphorical extensions, namely "instrument" (e.g., *We cut grass* with a ride-on mower; COCA 1991), "manner" (e.g., *I listened* with great care; COCA 1991-1992), "circumstance" (e.g., *I canna hear it* with this water runnin'; COCA 1989), and "cause" (e.g., *She was shaking* with fear; COCA 1990). Radden (1998, 279) lists two other usages for this preposition, viz. "possession" (e.g., *It was the man with a moustache*), and "attendant emotion," which overlaps with Dirven's (1993, 1995) "cause" meaning. In a similar vein, Radden (1998) interprets these other usages as metaphorical extensions of the overall metaphor "associated entities are companions."

Cuyckens (2002, 259) strongly disagrees with Dirven's (1993, 1995) metaphorical treatment of the preposition *with*. Take for instance the sentence With the development of computer-based resources, *many schools are now able to offer a full computer-across-the-curri approach to teaching* (COCA 1993). According to Cuyckens's reasoning, this example cannot be licensed by the metaphor "cause is circumstance" because the notion "circumstance"

and "cause" are not two separate discrete domains, but rather they are part of the same event idealized cognitive model. For him these two domains hold a conceptual contiguity relationship encapsulated by the metonymy "circumstance for cause." Furthermore, Radden (1998, 282) argues that the metonymy "an emotional state for the cause originating from that state" uses the companion schema because of a strong connection between a given emotion and its physiological reaction. We distance ourselves from these views since we account for the usages of this preposition by a conflational continuum, as was the case with the analysis given above for the metaphorical use of the preposition *in*:

company > possession of object > instrumentality > causation < effect

Thus, being in the company of an entity facilitates using that entity. Having an instrument enables people to perform actions, i.e., to cause events to happen. It is true that the relations between these domains are metonymic, but not in the contiguous sense evoked by Cuyckens. Just like the preposition *in*, *with* can be found in a double causal chain as in *Amman is burning* with anger at the United States and its threats *against Iraq* (Sketch engine doc#1235974), where the threats of the USA trigger the experiencer's anger, which in turn causes the physiological reaction metaphorically described as burning. The expression of cause can be linked to a resultant state as in *He has those cartoonish dark eyes that burn* bright with obsession and self-absorption (Sketch engine doc#25160). As has been demonstrated earlier, the preposition *with* can collocate not only with emotional causes but also with non-emotional causes (e.g., *utensils tarnished* with frequent domestic service; Sketch engine doc#904287).

6. Conclusions

The intransitive causal construction is realized at the syntactic level by the configuration NP1 V *with / in / from / under* NP2, where NP2 indicates the cause of the event described by the verb. The second NP can be an event (e.g., *their citizens' privacy rights are eroded* with the initiation of the Decode deal; Sketch engine doc#18108), a location (e.g., *The camera blossomed* in the hands of indigenous photographers), an emotion (e.g., *And the mother´s heart swelled big* with anguish) or a state (e.g., *Frescoes generally became dark or decayed* from moisture). The first group of verbs is more productive with causal prepositions such as *in* and *with* (e.g., *The camera blossomed* in the hands of indigenous photographers; *The garden flowered with the roses*) whereas the prepositional gamut for the second group is richer (e.g., *Do not tarnish your badge* with a stain of corruption; *The petunias wilt* in the heat; *But bells now rust* from inactivity; *Less-sturdy pans might wilt* under excessive heat). In order to motivate the use of spatial prepositions to express causality, we posit the existence of conflational continuums: location in a container > possession of object > instrumentality > causation for *in* and, respectively, company > possession of object > instrumentality > causation < effect for the preposition *with.* Although L-Subject constructions share the

syntax of the NP1 V *with* NP2 intransitive causal constructions, their semantics differ. The subject position of an L-Subject construction is always occupied by an NP indicating a location as in *The orchard now blooms with apples.* We have argued that such sentences are licensed by the high-level metonymy "a process (in a location) for an (instrumentally) caused event," whereby a place is conceived as being capable of blooming by making use of the real blooming entity as an instrument of action.

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Will, Suffering and Liberation in William Golding's *The Spire*

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Although William Golding's *The Spire* has been submitted to frequent analyses, none has explained one of its central elements: the will that the protagonist identifies with that of God. First illustrating this general weakness through a well-known reading of the novel, this article then attempts a more comprehensive interpretation, focused on the primacy of the will, with the aid of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy. Schopenhauer's theory throws light on the uneasy relations between the intellectual perspectives adopted by the two main characters, Dean Jocelin (a religious man with a vision) and Roger Mason (the builder who puts his technical expertise at the Dean's service) on the spire that gives the novel its title. More importantly, it can help us to see how both perspectives serve the all-powerful, amoral will that also fuels Jocelin's sexual desire and underlies the world as a whole. In Golding's novel, as in Schopenhauer, the insatiable quality of willing causes widespread suffering, but Jocelin's involuntary liberation from the force of will (thanks to his aesthetic contemplation of the spire and his subsequent demise) eventually puts an end to his pain.

Keywords: William Golding; Arthur Schopenhauer; will; suffering; aesthetics; death

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Voluntad, sufrimiento y liberación en *The Spire*, de William Golding

Aunque *The Spire*, de William Golding, ha sido objeto de frecuentes análisis, ninguno ha explicado uno de sus elementos centrales: la voluntad que el protagonista identifica con la divina. Tras ilustrar esta carencia con una de las lecturas más conocidas de la novela, el presente artículo intenta ofrecer una interpretación más exhaustiva, centrada en la primacía de la voluntad, con ayuda de la filosofía de Arthur Schopenhauer. El pensamiento de Schopenhauer puede esclarecer las tensas relaciones entre las perspectivas intelectuales adoptadas por los dos personajes principales, Jocelin (el deán que tiene una visión) y Roger (el constructor que pone su pericia técnica al servicio de Jocelin), en relación con la aguja que da título a la novela. Además, permite apreciar cómo ambas perspectivas sirven a la voluntad todopoderosa y amoral que alimenta el deseo sexual de Jocelin y subyace al mundo entero. En la novela de Golding, como en Schopenhauer, la naturaleza insaciable de la voluntad causa sufrimientos generalizados, pero la liberación involuntaria de Jocelin respecto a la voluntad (gracias a su contemplación estética de la aguja y a su posterior fallecimiento) acaba con su dolor.

Palabras clave: William Golding; Arthur Schopenhauer; voluntad; sufrimiento; estética; muerte

1. Introduction: Ways of Seeing

William Golding's *The Spire* (1965) recounts the construction of a four-hundred-foot spire. On the basis of an alleged vision, Jocelin, Dean of a mediaeval English cathedral, drives the master builder Roger Mason to carry out the project despite the temple's marshy foundations. The building work destroys the normal fabric of cathedral life and ruins the lives of all involved. Initially blinded by the intensity of the revelation, Jocelin eventually sees so much destruction that he is forced to recognise his own secret motivations—the hitherto unconscious sexual desire for Goody Pangall that he has been sublimating—as well as those of the people around him. After the work has been brought to completion, Jocelin's life ends in puzzlement as he considers the soaring pinnacle, which reminds him of a sapphire "kingfisher," an "upward waterfall" and a blooming "*appletree*" (205, 223; emphasis in original).

The action of the novel is triggered by an episode during which, in his own account, Jocelin understands God's will to be that a great spire be added to the existing cathedral. The narrator abstains from giving us clear enough clues to decide whether or not Jocelin is a true visionary; but at the same time the text also undermines the scepticism of Jocelin's opponents. On the one hand, the story begins many years after Jocelin's revelation, when the construction of the spire has already started. However, even before the builders begin to experience any serious difficulties, Jocelin reveals that his memory of his vision is as faint as that of "a dream remembered from childhood" (67). The only proof that the erection of the spire is carried out in response to God's intention is Jocelin's word, but frequent doubts are cast on his sanctity and his very sanity. On the other hand, it soon becomes clear that those who criticise the Dean's unquestioning religiosity—beginning with Roger—are motivated by a shortsighted perspective based on rational calculation. Even Jocelin's fellow priests are too concerned with worldly business to pay attention to manifestations of the supernatural. If the real nature of the novel's triggering illumination is hard to ascertain, it is equally difficult to determine the meaning of Jocelin's kingfisher, waterfall and apple tree. The problem here is not so much that we are not sure about the reality of his vision, but that we are not sure of how to interpret it.

Of all the explanations that critics have provided for Jocelin's initial revelation and his final contemplation of the finished spire, the most sophisticated is probably that of Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor. Their discussion concentrates on Jocelin's ways of seeing as successive steps in a process of increasing comprehension. Chronologically, they argue, the Dean moves from metaphysical vision to physical sight and finally achieves multifaceted insight. While the visionary stance dominates most of the novel, the second and third modes occupy the final pages, when the dying Dean catches a glimpse of the finished spire.

This "essential threefold process" of focusing, as Kinkead-Weekes calls it (1987, 75), appears in most of Golding's novels, although usually in a different order. To begin with, the narratives rely on a presentation of concrete physical impressions; for Golding there can be "no true seeing that is not primarily and simply visual" (67). Physical appearances are usually less objective than we might expect, because it is part of our egoistic nature to

see things from an individual, self-centred point of view. Only exceptionally may one reach a "wholly 'objective'" view of things, this being the point at which sight operates "with the greatest impersonality" (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002, 367, 369). Due to the ego's "falsifying power," it is much more common "to see only what one wants to see" (371, 173). Apart from being generally conditioned by egoism, physical perception has a further shortcoming; if it is never abandoned in favour of more penetrating modes of cognition, it leads to a physical dead end: "at a deeper level," concrete seeing remains "unaware of the nature of things" (Kinkead-Weekes 1987, 67).

Whereas sight presents objects from one single perspective, insight thrives on the "contradictions" created by the "multiplicity" of existing world-views (scientific, religious, artistic, etc.), and "fuses opposites into inclusive acceptance" (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002, 372). As regards this second stage, there is some scholarly agreement that Golding's method consists in "setting up a tension between two contradictory . . . patterns" (Tiger 2003, 119). After taking part in this conflict as the representatives of one of those clashing patterns or world views, Golding's insightful characters realise that all perspectives "are true" to a certain extent, and that "a thorough conviction of the truth of one to the exclusion of the other yields a distorted and narrow view of the world" (Boyd 1988, 73). It is thus that insight ushers in pluralism. When one oversteps the limits of one's world-view, simultaneously occupying more than one standpoint (religious, scientific and artistic, for example), the result is "the overturning of certainties" (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002, 173). In the process, one's understanding of the world becomes much richer, even if it is never complete or perfectly coherent.

The third step corresponds to metaphysical vision. As with insight, this dimension has attracted the attention of critics other than Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor. Redpath, for example, stresses Golding's aspiration to "make us aware . . . of the need to achieve wholeness" (1986, 178). Pitting a series of world-views against each other, his novels expose them all as "inadequate" (119). All clashing perspectives can be subsumed by or belong in a greater whole; behind the plurality of world-views there is some deeper unity. After emphasising multiplicity, therefore, Golding insists that "no human seeing can be truly human unless all things are made one, if only for an instant" (Kinkead-Weekes 1987, 73). The progression from sight to insight comes to an abrupt end when the characters rupture the patterns that have helped them to understand the world, and they come into contact with the "one-and-all" (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002, 254).

Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor maintain that the order in which these three steps are taken in *The Spire* is different from that described in other novels. First comes Jocelin's vision, then sight and finally insight. The vision occurs before the beginning of the narrative, but its impression is so strong as to tinge Jocelin's views for most of the novel. Jocelin's contact with the divinity may have been real and his intentions sincere; but even in this case we should remember that his vision was not grounded in other, worldlier modes of cognition. For Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor, this makes it extremely dangerous: under the influence of his vision, Jocelin remains oblivious of human needs, neglects his

ecclesiastical duties, falls out with the other priests and the builders, and, worst of all, puts everyone's lives in danger. While this happens, Jocelin's perspective conflicts with Roger Mason's entreaties to be reasonable and to see the situation physically, with an awareness of both human and material limits. But the Dean's monomania endures until the very end of the novel, when he acquires sight and finally insight. Both modes follow each other in quick succession. In a sudden moment of what Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor call "*literal, physical, seeing*," Jocelin perceives the spire's beauty (2002, 197; emphasis in original). As we shall discuss, Golding's own explanation of the novel's meaning focuses primarily upon this aesthetic encounter. For their part, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor argue that Jocelin's untoward aesthetic contemplation is surmounted, just as unexpectedly, by "double" or "split" insight (170). Up to this point the conflict of world-views provoked by the spire has crystallised in the mounting friction between Jocelin's faith in religious metaphysics and Roger's confidence in physical science. In the novel's closing pages, Jocelin comes to incorporate the builder's way of seeing into his own, the effect being the impossibility of describing the pinnacle in a way that satisfies both religious beliefs and technical precision. For this reason, the Dean must resort to figurative language. When Jocelin now attempts to describe the spire, we witness a "flowering of emblematic meanings" (198). Paraphrasing the Dean in a very loose way, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor compare the pinnacle to "an upward 'fall' rushing like a fountain" (199), a "kingfishershotoverslidingwater" (200) and "the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil" (198). At this point, it is hard to say whether the complexities that the critics identify stem from the object that Jocelin perceives, from his double point of view, from the symbolic language that he employs, or indeed from the critics' approach itself.

Despite its suggestiveness, this reading is not altogether satisfactory. Leaving aside the fact that their account of insight and vision is not entirely clear, the main problem is that the authors hardly mention—and thus fail to explain in a convincing manner—the notion of will, which the novel presents as the main attribute of the deity. Unfortunately, this absence recurs in all other readings of the novel, where the various authors lay the focus elsewhere: for example, on the struggles for worldly power and the explosion of carnivalesque subversion (Crawford 2002); on Golding's narrative method and style, which are condemned as mystifying and clumsy (Lerner 1981), or else praised as suggestive of some other reality beyond the physical (Clements 2012); or on artists' inability to control their creations (Jay 2006). By contrast, I shall argue that the will is one of the pillars of *The Spire*, insofar as it is the object of Jocelin's metaphysical vision, that which provides the initial stimulus for the pinnacle's construction. The Dean is certain that this will is God's. However, the way in which this will is described in the novel is far removed from the image of divine lovingness and morality that dominates the Christian tradition. In the final analysis, I think it necessary to acknowledge the irrational, non-conscious, amoral character of both the will and the divinity in the novel. My contention is that we can gain a better understanding of the centrality of the will in *The Spire* if we make use of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, which divides the world into the universal will and its

manifestations, places as much cognitive value on irrational feeling as on reason, and gives moral precedence to disinterest over interest. This theoretical framework throws light on the outrageous nature of the will that fuels Jocelin's obsession, and on its direct relation to the Dean's unconscious sexuality. It illuminates the disparate modes of cognition—including physical perception and metaphysical vision—available to Jocelin and the other characters, as well as the relation between his irrational obstinacy and their rational calculation. Finally, it highlights the importance of feeling and death as ways of escaping from interest and suffering.

2. Varieties of Knowledge and the Will

One habitual way of reading *The Spire* has been to see in it a dramatisation of the tension between different understandings of the rising pinnacle. This may also be a good starting point for us. As the narrative unfolds, it becomes clear that the clash between the ways the protagonists see the spire as an object in the world are symptomatic of their more general intellectual approaches to the world as a whole. In this regard, the theme on which most of the narrative focuses is the long struggle between Jocelin's and Roger's world-views. As in the rest of the novel, the dominant perspective is the Dean's, and the presentation of events cannot escape the intense metaphysical tinge inherited from his vision. Whenever he looks he sees, in everyday reality, clues to the divinity's plan, in which he plays a central role. Both the influence exerted upon the narration by Jocelin's point of view, and his tense dialogues with Roger Mason, make it clear that their individual perspectives are (relatively) unitary, closed and, therefore, irreconcilable. Behind their dispute it is not difficult to discern the difference between physical and metaphysical cognition, between rational pragmatism and stubborn irrationality.

We can fully grasp what is at stake in this opposition if we examine Schopenhauer's views on cognition—conscious *representation*, as he calls it. In his view, cognition can be classified in two ways. First, according to its rational or irrational functioning, the former giving rise to knowledge through *feeling* and the latter giving rise to knowledge through *concepts* (the basis of linguistic utterances and all other cultural products). While he defines feelings as concrete representations, he speaks of concepts as abstract "representations of representations" (Schopenhauer 1966a, 40), thus suggesting that meaningful concepts necessarily rest on feelings. Despite their vicarious character, concepts have two advantages: while the contents of feelings can always raise suspicions, the truth of concepts can be established with absolute certainty; further, concepts are easy to communicate by means of denotative uses of language which appeal to reason, while sometimes feelings can only be communicated by using language evocatively—figuratively—so it will appeal to the irrational intellect. The second classification of knowledge is into *physical* cognition (the perception of material objects in their temporal, spatial and causal contexts, and the concepts derived from these perceptions) and *metaphysical* cognition (all other kinds of representation, including a person's inward contemplation of their own will, and the

aesthetic contemplation of objects, together with the concepts built on them). Although both oppositions are not exactly the same, the fact remains that when we speak about the world we usually refer to its physical side, and that, with the exception of philosophers, cognition of the world's metaphysical plane seldom goes beyond inchoate feelings. In fact, this is precisely the difference between scientific and religious discourses. Schopenhauer holds that science deals with physical objects and appeals to the rational intellect, while religion starts from metaphysical objects and appeals to the feelings of the believers (art also focuses on the metaphysical realm and appeals to the audience's feelings, but it does so from an aesthetic standpoint; philosophy focuses on the metaphysical realm, but it appeals to reason).

With respect to *The Spire*, it is reasonable to interpret Jocelin's opinion that "the spiritual" is more important than "the material" as referring respectively to the metaphysical and the physical (Golding 1965, 193). While Jocelin's conduct is guided by a feeling of the metaphysical will (which he locates outside rather than within himself), Roger can but rely on physical feelings and concepts in order to bring the spire's construction to a successful conclusion. As the two characters soon realise, in the absence of any common intellectual ground they can only share the same perspective if one succeeds in forcing his own upon the other. Jocelin tries to convince Roger and his army of workers that the spire's erection has been ordained by God himself, while the master builder reacts by exposing the Dean's folly. In the following passage we witness Roger's attempts to make Jocelin see reason and to allay his own misgivings through the fusion of physical sight and rational calculation: "I know how much the spire will weigh, and I don't know how strong it'll be. Look down, Father—right over the parapet, all the way down. . . . I have to save weight, bartering strength for weight or weight for strength, guessing how much, how far, how little, how near, until my very heart stops when I think of it. Look down, Father" (117). Since Jocelin is eager to "build in faith, against advice" (108), and seems blind to all considerations of feasibility, it falls to Mason to work out how to build a durable structure. As the spire increases in height, however, we witness how Jocelin's irrational faith in the metaphysical will and Roger's rational consideration of material factors complement each other, and the reader is left in no doubt that both are needed during the works. The key to why they need each other can be found in the fundamental role that the narrative allots to the universal will, and in Golding's—and Schopenhauer's—view of the process of artistic production. These are the issues to which I now turn.

Despite the disastrous consequences of his obsession, Jocelin's initial reaction is to dismiss them. At first, God is only made responsible for the presumable positive aspects the spire's construction will have—not only solidarity among the workers, but also the spiritual renewal of the whole community of laypersons and clerics at whose centre the cathedral stands. All the other consequences—Jocelin's sinful pride in being the chosen one, his sexual attraction to Goody Pangall, Roger Mason's drunkenness and attempted suicide, his cheating on his wife, the death of Goody and her husband, "the debts, the deserted church, [the] discord" (Golding 1965, 194)—are routinely attributed to Satan. Evil is also associated with the unexpected intrusion of a hitherto hidden side of reality,

a terrifying underworld to which we usually have no conscious access and which, in Jocelin's view, should never come to light. What the Dean does not realise is that this dark region, whose doorway is the stinking pit full of human remains that the builders open inside the cathedral in order to inspect its foundations, may be the very place from which his revelation comes. To understand how this can be the case, we must again recall Schopenhauer's thought.

The keystone of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the polarity between the single universal will—which he presents as the world's unconscious essence—and its countless manifestations—which in fact make up the world we are usually aware of, but which he reduces to mere appearances. The universal will is "a constant striving without aim and without rest" (Schopenhauer 1966a, 311), to which the will of each individual is connected. The universal will is "the truly real" essence of the world, and the realm of appearances "is like a dream" (229, 8). The universal will is omnipotent, but it is also lacking, because it is in constant need of satisfaction. Since it is all that, in the final analysis, we know to exist, the only way in which the universal will can suture this gaping wound is through its manifestations, more specifically through the emergence of organic life. The universal will finds satisfaction when its manifestations fulfil their desires, which they often do in mutual competition. In the ensuing war of all against all, the almighty energy pushes every individual manifestation to reproduce itself and to preserve its life at all costs (even preying on other individuals of the same or a different species); for this reason we can say that the universal will is a will to life. Because of its inherent lack and of the way in which it compensates for this through cut-throat competitiveness and violence, Schopenhauer condemns the omnipotent will as more devilish than divine (see 1966a, 349). Life is a "constant struggle, *bellum omnium*, everything a hunter and everything hunted" (Schopenhauer 1966b, 354; emphasis in the original). In such a state of permanent warfare on a global scale, cognition proves a lethal weapon.

In Schopenhauer's view, some forms of metaphysical cognition—especially the inner contemplation of the individual will—give us a glimpse of the essential kernel behind the veil of appearances. As it is rooted in the universal will, the striving of the individual will knows no respite. As a rule, individuals believe their own will to be theirs alone and isolated from the will of others. This opinion springs from the egocentrism of the individual, that is, from their exclusive reliance on their own individual perspective and their failure to notice that their apparent separation from other beings does not apply to the essential will. Insofar as it serves individuals to satisfy their individual will, cognition is egoistic or interested as well as egocentric. As a matter of fact, however, it is always the needs of the universal will that an individual unconsciously fulfils through his or her individual will. Egocentrism and egoistic interest only operate within the domain of appearances. Egoistic interest appears even in the case of rational cognition, whose sole function is to prove one's point, thus satisfying "a *purpose of the will*" (Schopenhauer 2000, 417; emphasis in original). Owing to the combination of the insatiability of the individual will and the subordinate role of interested cognition, for the creatures that populate the plane of

appearances the world is characterised by "much and long suffering" amidst which "only momentary gratification" can be found (Schopenhauer 1966b, 354).

Schopenhauer's moral theory gives feelings precedence over concepts because the former can be disinterested. Disinterest defines those forms of feeling that are involuntary, those that involve knowing what one did not seek or want to know or, alternatively, what one cannot help but know. This is a type of knowledge—usually metaphysical in character—that has no bearing whatsoever on the satisfaction of a person's individual will, and therefore has nothing to do with the selfish employment of certain means for the attainment of certain ends. Ordinary cognition is tied to interest; it always contains a measure of anxiety, because it cannot fail to seek the avoidance of suffering and the pursuit of satisfaction. By contrast, disinterested cognition is absolutely placid and painless. It is, quite simply, an unselfish "better consciousness" liberated from one's will (see Janaway 2002, 6).

A good example of better consciousness can be found in the origin of Jocelin's obsession. As we know, the vision that triggers the construction of the spire is strikingly absent from the main storyline, and is only narrated at some length towards the end of the novel. The allusions to the episode, which occurred when Jocelin was still young, are scant and difficult to interpret. The longest reference is the Dean's own record in an old notebook:

> One evening . . . *a feeling rose from my heart*. It grew stronger, reached up until at the utmost tip it burst into a living fire . . . which passed away, but left me now transfixed. For there, against the sky, I saw the nearest pinnacle; and it was the exact image of my prayer in stone. . . . *[A] fountain burst up from me*, up, out, through . . . an implacable, unstoppable, glorious fountain. . . . The vision left me at last; and the memory of it . . . shaped itself to the spire. (Golding 1965, 191-93; emphasis added)

The incident leads to Jocelin's acquaintance, in his own view, with "a Will without limit or end" which he identifies with "God's will" and to which his own particular will is somehow linked (Golding 1965, 84, 40). From what he says, it is nevertheless apparent that the will that urges him to action is not (only) God's but his own. In Schopenhauer, the feeling of a person's individual will is the first stage of the philosopher's conceptualisation of the universal will (see Schopenhauer 1966a, 110). This feeling is not directed outwards but rather inwards, towards one's heart as it were, and allows individuals to grasp the source of their voluntary actions as well as the site of their emotions and passions, which in Jocelin's case are more carnal than pious. Although the Dean subsequently attributes his vision to God, the truth is that the old notebook locates its origin within—in the heart—not without. Other passages in the novel confirm that when he speaks of God's will he also means his own will. A case in point is his attempt to reassure the master builder with these words: "You'll see how I shall thrust you upward by my will. It's God's will in this business" (Golding 1965, 40). It is legitimate to surmise that it is in fact his own will that the Dean refers to when he speaks of his heart. The reason why he does not fully realise the inner source of his vision lies in his attempt to deny the sinful passions that dwell inside him.

Jocelin's notebook tells us how, following on from the explosion that rises from his heart, he is struck by the idea of a new tower. One explanation is that, as Schopenhauer tells us, the metaphysical feeling of the will cannot be easily translated into denotative words, and requires a better embodiment in other kinds of expression. A poet may use language figuratively to evoke certain feelings; a painter may create a two-dimensional picture; a sculptor and an architect may conceive three-dimensional structures. In Jocelin's case, the vehicle is a spire which functions not only as a monument to the almighty and omnipresent will but also, unwittingly, as a direct expression of his own will and as a work of art. In reality, his revelation seems to have consisted of two different kinds of experience: inward contemplation (projected outside) combined with aesthetic inspiration. By virtue of this second moment the novel would be a dramatisation of the artistic process, starting with the work's inception, proceeding to its production and ending with its reception. This analysis tallies with Golding's account of the novel as an exploration of "the problem of what is an artist, why is an artist, how is an artist" (as reported by Baker 1982, 150).

In his frequent mentions of beauty, Schopenhauer maintains that the artist's task is to elevate the receiver's mind beyond the physical dimension of objects to the metaphysical-aesthetic sphere. Aesthetic contemplation produces "the deliverance of knowledge from the service of the [individual] will, the forgetting of oneself as individual, and the enhancement of consciousness to the pure . . . timeless subject of knowing" (Schopenhauer 1966a, 199). Works of art make the aesthetic dimension accessible to the audience, in much the same way as artistic inspiration made it accessible to the author. Grasping objects in an aesthetic manner (and any object can be treated in this way) allows individuals to transcend themselves by reaching a state in which they become "free from individuality" and from "servitude" to their own individual will (180). This state—in which the craving individual gives way to an unselfish observer that appreciates universal beauty in a particular object—opens the door, temporarily at least, to a better life. The disinterested moments of artistic inspiration and reception are mediated by artistic execution, which, according to Schopenhauer, is driven by interest. As it is intended to materialise the artist's creative feeling and to produce a similar effect upon the audience, a work of art can only aspire to be the most suitable technical means to the artist's ends.

The disparity of the first two stages, the inspiration and the construction, is most evident in the case of architecture—particularly of contemporary architecture, where the creative architect frequently needs the technical assistance of an engineer (in this respect, the collaboration between Jocelin and Roger in *The Spire* is perhaps more characteristic of our times than of the construction of mediaeval cathedrals); but in Schopenhauer's opinion the disparity is present in all artistic manifestations. However disinterested artistic inspiration may be, interested calculation becomes instrumental in the work's elaboration. Opposed as they are in other respects, Roger and Jocelin are equally eager to complete the steeple. Because it is his professional prestige as well as his life that is at stake, the former employs rational calculation to perfect his building techniques. The latter's obsession with finishing the pinnacle proves to be similarly interested. Consciously, Jocelin justifies the

construction as a way to please the divinity; but it is also a way of proving to himself and others that his vision was genuine, that he has been chosen for the task and that his is not a "bogus sanctity" (Golding 1965, 209). At an unconscious level, the spire is an outlet for his latent sexuality as well a means of increasing the Church's and his own power over the whole region. The way in which his thirst for power fuses with lust is illustrated in this scene:

> He . . . was looking away from the tower and out into the world. . . . I would like the spire to be a thousand feet high, he thought, and then I should be able to oversee the whole county . . . He examined the strips and patches of cultivation, the rounded downlands that rose to a wooded and notched edge. They were soft and warm and smooth as a young body. . . . In a flash of vision he . . . understood how the tower was laying a hand on the whole landscape, altering it, dominating it, enforcing a pattern that reached wherever the tower could be seen, by sheer force of its being there. . . . The countryside was shrugging itself obediently into a new shape. (Golding 1965, 105-08)

As the story unfolds, Jocelin becomes progressively aware of these dual motivations. The discovery shakes his faith as much as the construction's difficulties shake Roger's confidence in reason. Whereas the builder can hardly believe that the spire has not yet collapsed despite its lack of foundations, the cleric becomes increasingly suspicious that the steeple may be for him the fulfilment of something other than the Christian God's will. At first he simply believes that he is attuned to the omnipotent divinity. Now seeing himself as an instrument of the Lord's will, now identifying his own will with God's, Jocelin treats other people as mere tools in order to ensure that the spire gets built. Initially, he is adamant that his will "is linked to a Will without limit or end" (Golding 1965, 84). But as the story advances, and the afflictions caused by the erection multiply, he becomes uncertain as to whether his illumination is the result of God's will, or "his [own] will, or whatever will it was" (150). By the end of his mental and physical ordeal Jocelin cannot but harbour serious doubts about God's plans: "*There is no innocent work. God knows where God may be*" (222; emphasis in original). Perhaps he is correct in believing that he is obeying an omnipotent will, and perhaps he is entitled to regard this force as divine; but in that case, what kind of God is he talking about?

It becomes apparent that the Dean's will (one of whose components is sexual) is linked to the world's essential will (the will to life), and that his own will ends up being embodied in the erect spire. Carey states that "the ruthless willpower with which Jocelin drives on the spire's 'erection' is . . . a sublimation of his lust as well as—or rather than—an expression of pure faith" (2009, 272). To make the sexual undertones of Jocelin's mania all the more manifest, Golding thought the novel "ought to be called *An Erection at Barchester*" (as reported by Biles 1970, 100). Although he did not stick to this title, Golding made sure that the concern with sexuality would not escape the reader's attention. To begin with, the model of the cathedral with the new spire resembles a man with an erection lying

on his back: "The nave was his legs placed together, the transepts on either side were his arms outspread. The choir was his body; and the Lady Chapel . . . was his head. And now also, springing, projecting, bursting, erupting from the heart of the building, there was its crown and majesty, the new spire" (Golding 1965, 8). The sexual implications are even more explicit in one of the Dean's dreams, where the building is again identified with his body, whose penis is stroked by a red-haired Satan resembling Goody: "Only Satan himself . . . clad in nothing but blazing hair stood over his nave and worked at the building, tormenting him so that he writhed . . . and cried out aloud" (65).

Even after he has begun to realise that the force that he locates outside himself might in fact be his own inner will, and that this springs from a greater will that underlies the whole world, Jocelin clings to the comforting idea that the will that he obeys is, like his own conscious motivations, irreproachable. In refusing to see the obscene drive that propels him for what it is, he tries to divorce himself from the obscenity. Jocelin is "seriously ignorant of human nature, priding himself in his attempt to exclude sexuality in excessive and morbid revulsion" (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002, 184). When he affirms that the spire is not so much "a diagram" of "Jocelin's Folly"—the name given to the construction by the workers—as of "God's folly" (Golding 1965, 128, 121), he seems to ignore the true implications of the words that he has chosen. Among the senses of "folly," the *OED* records that of "lewdness" or "wantonness." On this linguistic evidence, Boyd argues that the will "that forces the spire upwards" is more closely linked to the pagan "dark gods" abhorred by Jocelin than to the Christian divinity (1988, 100). The very term *will* can have carnal and genital connotations (94-95). For everyone except himself, it is soon obvious that behind his conscious motives lies a demonic impulse that tends towards excess and disruption, an almighty drive that takes no account of human morality and needs. As McCarron notes, Golding's novels frequently suggest that "the irrational, numinous force . . . at the centre of existence . . . can be apprehended as much, if not more, by outrage and violence as it can by conventional piety" (2007, 192).

Among the exuberant images that abound in the novel, two point with clarity to the way in which knowledge of the workings of the will finally intrudes into Jocelin's cloistered consciousness. When the workers start digging a hole at the centre of the cathedral's body, they open the gates of an uncanny area that Jocelin would have preferred to remain ignorant of. From the bottom of the pit arises a force that—like Schopenhauer's universal will—animates even lifeless matter. This force poses a real threat to Jocelin's Christian faith and ominously foreshadows the end of his individual existence:

> a patch . . . fell out of the [pit's] side below him and struck the bottom with a soft thud. The pebbles that fell with it . . . never settled completely. He saw . . . that they were all moving more or less, with a slow stirring, like the stirring of grubs. . . . Some form of life; that which ought not to be seen or touched, the darkness under the earth. . . . Doomsday coming up; or the roof of hell down there. Perhaps . . . the living, pagan earth, unbound at last and waking, Dia Mater. (Golding 1965, 79-80)

Here, as in the dream quoted earlier, the encroaching powers of evil that surface from the subterranean chambers of the earth and the unconscious are associated with femininity. In this case the female figure is Dia Mater or Demeter, the pagan goddess of agriculture who presided over the fertility of the earth, and whom Jocelin sees as the enemy of "God the Father" (Golding 1965, 7). This is not the only occasion on which the unstoppable energy of vegetable life is linked to Jocelin's growing awareness of a hidden dimension of the world. There is another passage in which the narrator tries to convey, in Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor's words, "the disturbance of a mind unconsciously aware of things it does not wish to know consciously, things which insist on intruding" (2002, 180). The images of plant growth convey the invasion of Jocelin's hermetic mind by a force that exceeds human control:

> [H]e saw there was a twig lying across his shoe, with a rotting berry that clung obscenely to the leather. He scuffed his foot irritably; and . . . [h]e found himself thinking of the ship that was built of timber so unseasoned, a twig in her hold put out one green leaf. He had an instant vision of the spire warping and branching and sprouting; and the terror of that had him on his feet. (Golding 1965, 95)

Given the close affinities between *The Spire* and Schopenhauer's thinking, Jocelin's expressions are likely to remind us of the philosopher's description of the will as "the inner, mysterious, sprouting force" from which appearances grow (Schopenhauer 1966b, 478). In general, the image of "a plant with strange flowers and fruit, complex, twining, engulfing, destroying, strangling" symbolises the "unlooked-for things" that come with the spire, "things put aside" that return to upset Jocelin's sense of reality (Golding 1965, 194, 105).

Though the dispute between Jocelin's irrationality and the rest of the characters' calculating reason is largely maintained throughout the novel, the story's progression blurs the other oppositions between appearance and essence, consciousness and unconsciousness, faith and sexuality, Jocelin's Christianity and the workers' pagan rituals, masculinity and femininity (God the Father and Dia Mater), the spire and the pit. Jocelin gradually discovers that the first cluster of elements is not opposed to but must be understood as manifesting or at least depending on the second. He is thus forced to admit the wisdom of the words of Roger's old master: "a spire goes down as far as it goes up" (Golding 1965, 43). The loftier the spire, the deeper its foundations should be. And the same goes for the spire's instigator: the higher he soars, the more clearly his non-conscious motivations are exposed. Here again it is easy to see the relevance of Schopenhauer's characterisation of the will as "the *prius* of consciousness, and the root of the tree of which consciousness is the fruit" (Schopenhauer 1966b, 139; emphasis in original). The unconscious essential will is not opposed to conscious representations, but is rather their source or "maternal soil" (390). A similar idea lies behind Jocelin's repeated allusions to the unconscious motives that thrive, as in a dark pit, "in the vaults, the cellarage of [his] mind" (Golding 1965, 166).

The links between Schopenhauer's views and Golding's themes continue in the last stretch of the novel. The concluding pages, where Jocelin appears as a broken man, reintroduce one of the modalities of feeling with which the story began—the cognition of the object's aesthetic dimension. As he lies dying, the Dean catches a glimpse of the finished spire, and sees it not from a religious perspective but aesthetically, as an object of beauty. As Golding explained, it cannot be denied that "the book is about the human cost of building the spire." Yet it is also about something else: Jocelin "does not think of beauty" until the very end of his life, and "only when he is dying does he see the spire in all its glory." Previously he had not been aware of the aesthetic character of the enterprise, and it is only after many hardships have transformed him into a new man that he comes to appreciate the pinnacle from an artistic angle. So important was the aesthetic interpretation for Golding, that he placed it as the book's main theme: "after all the theology, the ingenuities of craft, the failures and the sacrifices, a man is overthrown by the descent into his world of beauty's mystery and irradiation" (1984, 166-67).

In the novel, aesthetic inspiration and aesthetic reception are separated not only by a lapse of several decades but also by a gulf of unsettling experience. The place of the pinnacle that does not initially exist outside the Dean's imagination is at the second moment occupied by a completed physical structure that everyone can admire. Jocelin initially believes the projected spire to satisfy God's all-powerful will, later realising that it is his own lascivious desire that the spire fulfils. Now he discovers the spire's aesthetic aspect, and this allows him to escape, during an instant of unselfish tranquillity, from the vicissitudes of individual willing. Schopenhauer's discussion of these two features of aesthetic cognition (the contemplation of beauty and the accompanying relief) can help us understand the ending of Golding's novel. As we have seen, Jocelin likens the spire to an "*appletree*" (Golding 1965, 233; emphasis in original), which for a man who has never paid attention to aesthetics, must be an accessible image of beauty. By a happy coincidence with Golding's narrative, Schopenhauer explained this aspect of his philosophy through the example of a tree: "if . . . I contemplate a tree aesthetically . . . it is immediately of no importance whether it is this tree or its ancestor that flourished a thousand years ago, and whether the contemplator is this individual, or any other living anywhere and at any time. The particular thing and the knowing individual are abolished" and nothing remains but the universal dimensions of the object and its observer (Schopenhauer 1966a, 209). The coincidence of vocabulary highlights the connection between Schopenhauer's ideas and Jocelin's contemplation of the spire qua aesthetic object. The universal quality that the philosopher attributes to art makes it easier to explain why the spire's contemplation makes Jocelin blurt out: "Now—I know nothing at all" (Golding 1965, 223). On the subjective side, egocentrism disappears, and there is no individual ego that can be held responsible for aesthetic reception. On the objective side, aesthetic contemplation does not afford any (conceptual) knowledge; it consists in the feeling not of any physical thing in particular but of the object's metaphysical-aesthetic dimension. Alongside its cognitive value, art has other advantages. As the observer of the aesthetic dimension of an object,

Schopenhauer notes, one leaves one's willing behind. Whoever comes across beauty becomes a "will-free . . . intelligence without aims and intentions," a person in whom individual will "vanishes entirely from consciousness" (Schopenhauer 2000, 415). Since the striving to satisfy one's will is the source of one's suffering, "with the disappearance of all willing from consciousness, there yet remains the state of pleasure, in other words absence of all pain" (416).

3. Conclusion

Although the value of aesthetic liberation is undeniable, one of the consequences of reading *The Spire* side by side with Schopenhauer's writings is to open our eyes to the transient, relative nature of such relief. Through aesthetics we cannot achieve "a lasting emancipation, but merely . . . an exceptional, and in fact only momentary, release from the service of the will" (Schopenhauer 1966b, 363). Metaphysical awareness of the aesthetic dimension of objects lies outside the bounds of ordinary cognition; but it is not the most extreme experience of disinterest that Schopenhauer brings to our attention. In a sense, the place of honour within his philosophy is reserved for involuntary death. Death is "a deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as pain" (408-09). It delivers us from suffering by allowing us to escape individual interest for good. Compared with aesthetic contemplation, death has the advantage of providing a more effective and permanent relief from an individual existence that is too painful and too long. As if it wanted us to witness a complete liberation from suffering, *The Spire* ends with its main character's demise. Living individuals usually rebel against death, an interested "*fuga mortis*" that comes "solely from the blind [individual] *will*" (Schopenhauer 1966b, 468; emphasis in original). Together with sexuality, this reveals the will qua will to life, i.e., to existence in the realm of appearances. Nevertheless, for Schopenhauer, passive acceptance of death is a token of wisdom. Indeed, those who have lost all interest in the world acknowledge death as "the great opportunity no longer to be I," the moment of definitive "liberation from . . . individuality" and thus from pain (507, 508). Precisely because aesthetic experience involves becoming an unselfish subject, it is a good preparation for death: anyone whose will has been "burnt up and consumed" by disinterested cognition "will be least afraid of becoming nothing in death," since he "no longer takes any interest in his individual phenomenon" and therefore disdains "any keen desire for individual existence" (609). What this suggests is that, if Jocelin were wise enough (the novel does not tell us), he would welcome death as the perpetuation of his unselfish, painless apprehension of the beautiful spire that he has helped to build.

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Crossing *The Secret River*: From Victim to Perpetrator, or the Silent / Dark Side of the Australian Settlement

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Kate Grenville's *The Secret River* (2005) is a moving account of the disturbing colonial development of Australia. In historical terms, it dramatizes the transformation of the white settler's dream into the worst of all possible nightmares, and brings to the fore the darker side of Australia's past. This article will show how the novel defamiliarizes some of the most important myths of the Australian nation. It will also rely on the ideas put forward by some outstanding ethics and trauma theorists and postcolonial critics in order to analyse *The Secret River* as a further example of a recurrent phenomenon in contemporary Australian literature, namely, the attempt to spell out the trauma and anxieties of (un)belonging that haunt settler culture as a result of the belated and painful revelation of Aboriginal dispossession and genocide. This article will therefore show that Grenville's novel testifies to the desperate attempt on the part of some non-Indigenous Australians to offer an apology to the Aborigines so that the much longed-for national Reconciliation may some day be possible.

Keywords: Australian settlement; Australian national myths; Aboriginal genocide; victim vs. perpetrator; apology; reconciliation

. . .

Cruzando *The Secret River*: de víctima a verdugo, o el lado silenciado / oscuro de la colonización australiana

The Secret River (2005), la novela de Kate Grenville, es un relato conmovedor de la inquietante colonización de Australia. En términos históricos, relata la transformación del sueño del colono blanco en la peor de todas las pesadillas posibles y saca a la luz el lado más oscuro del pasado australiano. Este artículo mostrará cómo la novela utiliza y cuestiona algunos de los mitos más importantes de la nación australiana y se basará en las ideas propuestas por algunos destacados críticos postcoloniales y teóricos de la crítica ética y el trauma para analizar *The Secret River* como otro ejemplo más de un fenómeno muy frecuente en la literatura australiana contemporánea: el intento de articular el trauma y la ansiedad de la no pertenencia que perturba a la cultura blanca, como resultado de la tardía y dolorosa revelación del genocidio aborigen. Por último, analizará el intento desesperado por parte de algunos australianos no-indígenas de ofrecer una disculpa a los australianos aborígenes para que la tan deseada reconciliación nacional sea posible algún día.

Palabras clave: colonización australiana; mitos de la nación australiana; genocidio aborigen; víctima vs. verdugo; disculpa; reconciliación

1. Introduction

The Secret River (2005) is a moving account of the disturbing colonial development of Australia.[1] In historical terms, it dramatizes the transformation of the white settler's dream into the worst of all possible nightmares and brings to the fore the darker side of Australia's past. As Eleanor Collins argues, "Atrocity, especially atrocity in your own country, does not make for a cosy read. Kate Grenville's *The Secret River* is a discomforting novel: compelling through long stretches, evocative, but also troubling" (2010, 167). Much of the discomfort and challenge that it raises, this critic goes on to argue, has to do with "a paralysis born of denial and guilt, in the general white Australian response to stories of colonial injustice and barbarity," an emotional conflict that has been clearly displayed in the so-called "History Wars" (167).[2] Not in vain does the title of the novel directly borrow from W.E.H. Stanner's announcement in a 1968 lecture that "there is a secret river of blood in Australian history:"[3] by turning to fiction, Grenville manages to transform the act of recalling the repressed secrets of her ancestry into an act of recalling the repressed secrets of Australian national mythology.[4] The novel stirred up vehement critical reactions on the part of a number of historians (Mark McKenna, Inga Clendinnen, Helen MacDonald, John Hirst, and Alan Atkinson automatically come to mind), who claimed that the writer was trespassing on a territory she knew very little about and was not entitled to set foot in. Their main complaint was that the book is not

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[2] As Marc Delrez summarizes (2010, 55 and 63), in the wake of the anthropologist W.E.H. Stanner's pronouncement about the "Great Australian Silence" in the late 1960s, a number of historians set out to fill in this void at the heart of national self-representations by offering different, and at times even contradictory, viewpoints through which the Australian past could be seen and interpreted. This generated a polemical debate that came to be labelled as the "History Wars." A number of progressive historians, such as Charles Rowley, Henry Reynolds, Bain Attwood, Andrew Markus, Heather Goodall, Ann MacGrath and Tim Rowse, strove to write up the forgotten pages of Australian history by paying attention to the long-term violence inflicted on Indigenous Australians by the British settlement of Australia. A fierce counter-attack was, however, soon launched by more conservative historians, mainly led by Geoffrey Blainey, who went as far as to deny this genocide and coin the well-known expression "black armband view of history" to refer to those historians who had dared to endorse a historical narrative deeply concerned with the shameful dimension of the Australian national legacy. As is well known, these pro-settlement views gathered more and more strength after the election of the conservative Federal coalition government in 1996, with the then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, openly supporting their views. This situation was significantly modified when Kevin Rudd, the then Labour Prime Minister, pronounced his "sorry speech" on 13 February 2008, in which he acknowledged the profound grief, suffering and loss inflicted on Australian Aborigines for such a long time.

[3] For more information on these lectures (known as the Boyer Lectures), see W.E.H. Stanner's *The Dreaming and Other Essays* (2009, 172-224).

[4] In *Searching for the Secret River*, the text where Grenville accounts for her inspiration and novel-writing process, she meditates on her own sense of collective guilt, resulting from her realization that her convict ancestor, Solomon Wiseman, had not harmlessly taken up land on the Hawkesbury river, but had rather forcibly taken the land from its Indigenous owners. This discovery prompted her to set about a research process that finally led to the writing of *The Secret River*, a novel partly based on her ancestor's life.

based on actual facts, but rather transposes anecdotal evidence in anachronistic ways in order to bend it to the author's purpose.

Kate Grenville's novels question the processes whereby the myths of nation are constructed and that have systematically put to the test Australian clichés and values, in narratives that tend to explore the point of view of those who, like women, have often been regarded as marginal and unqualified for national belonging. However, it is only in *The Secret River* that Grenville delves into the "secret," as it were, of settler colonial violence and brings it into the open, thereby disclosing what might be labelled as the Australian foundational trauma.[5] As Julie McGonegal puts it, this novel has at its narrative centre "a secret concerning the unspeakable horrors committed against Aboriginal people that is protected by the settler-protagonist, and both insist on not only the impossibility but also the *necessity* of (re)presenting that secret" (2009, 73; emphasis added). This novel can be seen as a further example of a recurrent phenomenon in contemporary Australian literature, namely, the attempt to delve into what critics such as Gooder and Jacobs (2000) have come to label as the dilemma of "the apology in postcolonizing Australia," the term "apology" being understood both as an apology for the actions of white settlers and as an apology, however indirect and insufficient, to Indigenous Australians. In other words, Grenville's novel could be said to endeavour to spell out the trauma and anxieties of (un)belonging that haunt settler culture, with the aim of promoting Aboriginal, and by extension national healing, and paving the way for the so-called Australian Reconciliation process.[6] As is well known, these anxieties were reinforced and gathered unprecedented strength with the growing realization that modern Australian culture, together with the foundation of the nation itself, had come about at the expense of previously unacknowledged acts of Aboriginal dispossession and genocide. The publication of the *Bringing Them Home* report in 1997, for example, greatly contributed to this belated and painful revelation which galvanized what is now known as the "Sorry Movement" and inevitably precipitated in descendants of settlers,[7] Kate Grenville included, a traumatic

[5] As Cynthia Sugars and Gerry Turcotte speculate in their editors' introduction to *Unsettled Remains: Canadian Literature and the Postcolonial Gothic* (2009), the rhetoric of the secret, which shares certain theoretical concerns with haunting, such as trauma and memory, prevails in contemporary academic discourse on settler literatures and cultures. Similarly, critics such as Wendy Brown (2001) and Fiona Probyn-Rapsley (2007), to mention but two well-known examples, have relied on the notions of hauntology and spectres of the past as developed by Derrida (1994) in order to analyse the guilt, shame and complicity continuum in contemporary life.

[6] In 1991, the Commonwealth parliament voted unanimously to establish the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and a formal Reconciliation process that might contribute to building relationships for change between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. Also in the 1990s, the Australian High Court decided two landmark cases: Mabo vs. Queensland (1988 and 1992) and Wik Peoples vs. Queensland (1996), which overturned the concept of *terra nullius* which claimed that land was legally available for colonization because Aborigines had no legal rights to it.

[7] The revelations of the *Bringing Them Home* testimonies about the practice of removal of Aboriginal children, which started in the nineteenth century but continued until the 1970s in some rural areas, led thousands of ordinary Australians to sign "Sorry Books," and to participate in nationwide marches and demonstrations on National Sorry Day (a designated day of commemoration begun in 1998 and continued every year since), as a gesture of personal apology in a context where the Federal Government was at the time adamantly refusing to offer an official apology.

sense of the loss of a properly constituted national selfhood. Their former sense of belonging and being-in-the-nation began to crumble, and the previously unquestioned authority of colonial possession suddenly seemed to become irretrievably de-legitimized. This feeling of anxiety is what Hodge and Mishra labelled as "the dark side of the dream" of Australian national identity, the "occluded but central and problematic place of Aboriginal Australians in the foundation of the contemporary Australian state and in the construction of national identity" (1991, 24).

As Sue Kossew sees it (2007, 8), two different narratives collide in bringing to the surface this occluded space: on the one hand, the Aboriginal oral stories of ruthless attacks on the part of settlers and, on the other, the European historical accounts, whose main aim is not to understand or to interpret, but rather to justify and legitimate the white presence and occupation of the land. What Grenville strives to accomplish in her novel is a kind of impossible task. She tries her hand at offering a double apology: examining her own convict ancestor's implication in acts of Aboriginal genocide and dispossession, while also acknowledging the strength, courage, and determination that made settlement possible. A reconciliation most difficult to achieve, given the precarious nature of balancing such antagonistic feelings as blame and admiration. Whereas, from today's perspective, the white settlers' story can be seen as one of opportunities and egalitarianism, since convicts who worked hard could eventually become free landowners, it is also a story of violence that has left perennial traumatic marks on the psyche of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.

It is my contention that Grenville's novel allows for different and contradictory readings. Much of this debate was instigated by a polemical exchange between Kate Grenville and Melissa Lucashenko, an Indigenous scholar, about the meanings and implications of "taking up" land (see Gall 2008), which disclosed how irreconcilable Indigenous and non-Indigenous positions are and how scarce the possibilities for reconciliation appear to be. Critics such as Gall (2008), Probyn-Rapsley (2007) and Radstone (2013) have claimed that the empathy and understanding that the novel often shows towards its protagonist indirectly endorse Aboriginal genocide and dispossession. In keeping with this, critics such as Rowse (2003) and Blomley (2010) have stated that the "counterfactual" past that the novel describes prevents it from fully understanding and representing Aboriginal perspectives, and have in turn concluded that land ownership should be regarded as a precondition, rather than an outcome, of dispossession. Although I fully subscribe to these views, I also claim that Grenville's novel contributes to acknowledging some of the atrocities committed against the Aborigines and to demanding that an apology on the part of non-Indigenous Australians be made.

2. Defamiliarizing Some of the Myths of the Australian Nation

According to Eleanor Collins (2010, 168-70), the novel draws on three Australian myths, playing one off against the other two: the myth of the good convict, of the good pioneer,

and stories of first contact. First, the narrative of the victim and "almost" innocent convict, William Thornhill, begins in late eighteenth-century London, where he is born into extreme poverty, cold, and hunger. The family is too large and too far down the English class system to be able to get along by strictly honest means, and Will, decent at heart but mainly concerned with staying alive, learns skilful theft as a means of survival: "The dainty parson could shrill all he liked about sin, but there could be no sin in thieving if it meant a full belly" (16). When he marries Sal, the daughter of a local waterman, he seems to have the chance for a new and better life, but with the unexpected deaths of his parents-in-law his rise in fortune is short-lived. He is left indebted and unable to support his wife and their child. In his desperate search for a little extra money, he takes many risks, eventually ending up before an Old Bailey judge, accused of stealing a boatload of timber. Initially condemned to death, he is saved from the hangman's rope by Sal, whose clever activities on his behalf result in the more lenient sentence of transportation to New South Wales. According to this myth, England is a land of social and legal injustice that produces, paradoxically, a better and fairer Australia by sending there all those subjects whose principal crime was sheer destitution.

Once Will and Sal reach Australia, the myth of the good convict gradually becomes the second national myth: that of the pioneer. Will Thornhill works hard as a boatman between Sydney and the Hawkesbury river, the frontier of settlement. He earns his pardon, and his longing for a piece of land he can call his own leads him to join other emancipist settlers along the lower reaches of the Hawkesbury. There he sets about carving a "civilized" place for himself and his growing family: he builds a hut, plants crops, even takes on two convicts as hired hands. This section of the novel partly reminds us of the Robinson Crusoe story, since it is the tale of one self-made man's courage and determination. Will is able to cope with an unfamiliar environment in order to provide his family with sustenance and better prospects. However, what Will fails to realize is that he is not the owner of the land he calls Thornhill's Point. The territory he regards as "the emptiest place in the world, too wild for any man to have made it his home" (101) is, in fact, inhabited by the Darug people, who are unpredictable and frightening. They carry spears, know nothing about boundaries and, therefore, threaten the settlers' lives and property.

It is at this point that the third national myth, that which distorts and smears the other two, takes over, that is, the recurrent story of first contact, described by Mary Louise Pratt as the moment when "peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations," with the result that "subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other" (1992, 6-7). The first contact moment is, therefore, liminal. As is well known, liminality (from the Latin *limen*, "a threshold") has often been defined as a psychological or metaphysical subjective, conscious state of being on the threshold of, or between, different existential planes. The liminal is therefore described as a period of transition, as a threshold state of ambiguity, openness and indeterminacy, and it is only after going through this process that one may enter into

new forms of identity and relationship. At the moment of first contact, then, anything is possible, since the situation allows for multiple possibilities.

Stories about the first encounters between Europeans and Aborigines are omnipresent in works by Australian authors, Thea Astley (*A Kindness Cup*, 1974; *The Multiple Effects of Rainshadow*, 1996), Thomas Keneally (*The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith*, 1972) and David Malouf (*Remembering Babylon*, 1993) being three well-known examples, although the list could be never-ending. As argued by Benedict Anderson (1991), one of the main functions of national myths is that of unifying, defining, and binding the nation. Likewise, the classical / realist novel also concludes with unity: all the gaps, mistakes and miscommunications making up the plot are resolved at its end. Unlike other novels by Grenville, *The Secret River* is quite a realist and straightforward narrative, which makes the reader hope for a happy ending. Contact between other emancipist settlers and the natives or "blacks," as they are often called in the novel, ranges from Blackwood's harmonious relationship with them (he even has an Aboriginal wife and child), made possible thanks to his clever policy of give-and-take—"*Ain't nothing in this world just for the taking*, he said. . . . *A man got to pay a fair price for taking*, he says. *Matter of give a little, take a little*" (104; emphasis in original)—to Smasher Sullivan's cruel mistreatment of Aborigines,[8] which often leads him to commit abominable acts of mutilation, rape, and murder. The protagonist will have to make his own decisions. As Sal wisely says, "*Got to work it out for ourselves, looks like*" (210).

Will's first reaction towards the blacks is one of fear and aversion. He regards them as wild, unclean, unchaste and irrationally aggressive, that is, they stand for the inferior and dangerous Other that must be kept under control or eliminated altogether so that civilization is possible. Following the same line of thought, the blacks might also partly encapsulate Julia Kristeva's notion of the abject, since, as this critic explains in her groundbreaking book *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (1982), the abject is what threatens the integrity of the subject, who thus depends on her / his capacity to extrude the forces that threaten to dissolve the ego and that constantly confront it with the terror of annihilation. The improper, unclean, disorderly elements which generate abjection (urine, faeces, pus, vomit, blood) must be forced out of the subject's clean and proper self if it wants to survive. Similarly, the blacks must be kept at bay, even erased, as a prerequisite for the creation and preservation of an orderly and civilized white society / nation. Like the rest of the settlers, Will initially considers the blacks to be "lower in the order of things even than they were" (92). He considers them childish and wild creatures who have no sense of property, who do not work the land: "there were no signs that the blacks felt the place belonged to them" (93); "like children, they did not plant today so that they could eat tomorrow. It was why they were called savages" (141). They do not seem to be ashamed of being naked, unlike him, who "would have rushed to cover her [wife] up" had his wife ever stood before him in such a state of undress (194). They carry spears all the time, and are accused of committing

[8] Hereafter, whenever italics appear in quotes from the novel, they must be understood as emphasis in the original.

so many crimes that the settlers had "a handy expression that covered all the things the blacks did, and suggested others: *outrages and depredations*" (95). Communication is not possible between these emancipist settlers and the Aborigines: Will and Whisker Harry, a member of the Darug people, exchange words in their respective tongues, but only to finally realize that "words between them [were] like a wall" (197). As if this chasm were not deep enough, Will fills the need to make differences clear: "A line had to be drawn with the blacks" (193). The abject / Other must be kept at bay so that the white man's safety, orderly life and desired identity are preserved.

However, with the passing of time, Will is able to look at the Aborigines in a different way. He eventually realizes that their difference sometimes implies a certain degree of superiority. They can see the whites all the time, whereas, as Blackwood tells him, "*only time we see them is when they want us to*" (102). They can reproduce English words "as clear as could be" (213), whereas Will is not capable of reproducing theirs: "Thornhill caught the first sound but the rest evaporated into the air like steam out of a kettle. . . . It was as if a word that had no meaning could not be heard" (214). They leave their marks and messages on rocks, thus making it clear that, contrary to what the whites think, the land is not an empty space (154), and their dances (corroborees) are dramas, tales that "could reveal their secrets, but only to a person who knew how to read them" (244). They show Will that making fire with only two sticks is not, as he had thought, a "bit of tomfoolery" (212), but something they do on a regular basis, and dare him to match their skill (213). Their scars are very different from those of the convicts: if those of the latter meant pain and humiliation, theirs "were carefully drawn," like "a language of skin" (91). In addition, they never feel naked as the whites often do, but are rather "clothed in their skins" (194). Their teeth are "the most astonishing white" (200), "their hands [are] ever so fluid it seemed that they had extra joints in their fingers" (222), they know how to turn up and disappear all of a sudden, without making any noise, and they can "[look] through him as if he were made of air" (199). Furthermore, they find the whites funny because, although they "sweated away under the broiling sun, chopping and digging, . . . [they] still had nothing to eat," while they themselves "strolled into the forest and came back with dinner hanging from their belts" (202). So strong is Will's admiration for their way of living, that he once goes as far as to compare them with the English gentry, with the only difference being that they are rather more egalitarian, thus temporarily allowing class considerations to take precedent over race distinctions: "They spent a little time each day on their business, but the rest was their own to enjoy. The differerence was that in their universe there was no call for another class of folk who stood waiting up to their thighs in river-water for them to finish their chat so they could be taken to their play or their ladyfriend" (230).

The minor transactions that Will and Sal eventually make with them (a bag of flour in exchange for some kangaroo meat; a bonnet in exchange for some wooden dishes) leads Will to reach the conclusion that "some version of normal society" can be established between the two communities (230). He even has the farsightedness to conclude that their blood is "the same colour as [his] own" (280), and that differences based on skin

colour are nothing but a cultural construction, since "their skins were not black, no more than his own was white. They were simply skins, with the same pores and hairs, the same shading of colour as his own" (214). Even Sal, when walking into their camp for the first time, realizes that, contrary to what she had at first thought, they are not savages, since they are also able to build their own homes and turn an empty space into a domestic place (287). Everything is a matter of perspective, Will concludes when acknowledging that the forest takes on a different aspect depending on whether you contemplate it from the outside, when "the eye was confused by so many details," or from inside a hut when, "framed by doorway or window-hole, the forest became something that could be looked at part by part and named" (161). It is the unfamiliar that shocks and frightens Will but, as soon as he gets used to it, all of a sudden difference loses its frightening dimension to be assimilated to sameness. Kangaroos look so wrong and disproportionate only because he does not know them: "A kangaroo was a freak of nature. But Thornhill was discovering that if a man looked at a kangaroo for long enough, it was the idea of a sheep that became peculiar" (224).

In this way, Will begins to realise that the barrier between self and Other is as insurmountable as one wants to make it. After all, as was stated before, the Other is nothing but a construction to help us to conform and preserve our identity, to feel safe and in control, in short, the projection of all of those attributes and qualities that we refuse to recognize in our own civilized selves, and which must therefore be thrust away so that we can preserve our own integrity as subjects. The Other consequently becomes the scapegoat who is made to bear the blame for our own sins and faults. This, famously argued in postcolonial studies by Edward Said (1978), is also the conclusion that Dominick LaCapra reached when he dealt with Holocaust trauma, and which might be extrapolated to the Australian case. According to LaCapra (2001, 165), Nazi ideology was primarily based on "sacrificialism and scapegoating." In particular, he asserts that "scapegoating" is related to an almost ritual and phobic horror over contamination by "the Other." The way in which this fear is confronted (expulsion, extermination) is of secondary importance; the really important thing is to erradicate it altogether. Just as the Nazis felt the compulsive need to preserve what they regarded as their pristine race by getting rid of the Jews (and other victim groups like communists, gypsies and homosexuals), the white Australian settlement inexorably implied the demonization and subsequent annihilation of the country's Aboriginal population. However, as was argued earlier and as Grenville's novel also seems to show, those evil attributes and qualities that we systematically project onto the Other are also part of ourselves, the dark side that we would rather ignore, but that suddenly erupts, doing away with all the defences that we build to keep it hidden. Smasher, another emancipist settler living in the area, is very quick to accuse the blacks of being "nothing but thieves" (169), thus conveniently forgetting, as Blackwood makes him see, that most convicts were transported to Australia on account of just such a crime. As far as Will is concerned, no sooner does he enjoy a better social position than he starts to show towards his subaltern the same arrogant attitude that he so much abhorred in the

English gentry when he was a poor waterman in London. He strolls like a gentleman while refusing to give Dan, one of his convict servants, a break (180). Such is his delight to have this power, almost of life or death, over Dan, that he makes him call him Mr Thornhill, despite having been one of his childhood friends in London: "His own pleasure in it, as he had bullied Dan on the wharf, had come as a surprise to Thornhill: he had not known that he had it in him to be a tyrant. A man never knew what kind of stuff he was made of, until the situation arose to bring it out of him" (177).

Will, like Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, at times also falls prey to even baser instincts. He is scared to discover the beast within himself as, on one of his visits to Smasher, he is confronted with the Aboriginal woman that Smasher has enslaved to satisfy his sexual appetites and, much to his alarm, a lascivious impulse takes hold of him: "For a terrible vivid instant, a scene lit by lightning, Thornhill imagined himself taking the woman. Could feel her skin under his fingers, her long legs straining against him. It was no more than a single hot instant, the animal in him. . . . Thornhill was seized with a desperation to get away from this airless place. If he did not he would stifle to death there and then" (252).

The memory of this woman will haunt him for ever. Not only did he feel like raping her for a second, but later he was unable to do anything to help her out of the abominable situation. His passivity turns him into a collaborator: "Now the evil of it was part of him" (253). Last but not least, Will transforms into a mad man and is about to strike Sal, his dear wife, when she demands that they should leave Thornhill's Point: "He saw that she did not recognize him. Some violent man was pulling at her, shouting at her, the stranger within the heart of her husband" (291). The whites can be savages, and not only towards their enemies, but also towards their own kin. George Twist, for example, was "famous for the fact that one of his hogs had killed his youngest infant, and rumour on the river had it that he refused a burial on the grounds that the hog might as well finish what he had started" (257).

Unfortunately, Will's greed and obsessive need to possess the land will prevent him from foreseeing the imminent tragedy and from opening himself up to the Aboriginal Other so that some peaceful coexistence between both groups might somehow become possible. He copes with the unwelcome intermittent irruptions of the Aborigines, but his tolerance comes to an end when they burn his corn patch and destroy his crop. As interracial tension escalates into murderous violence, a dilemma takes hold of him, and all he can feel is panic: "He had stepped on a great wheel that was spinning him away somewhere he had never planned to go. . . . But he did not want to look at what it might mean, or where it might lead" (234).

Much to his regret, Will must make a most difficult choice. New South Wales had become "a machine in which some men would be crushed up and spat out, and others would rise to heights they would not have dreamed of before" (182). Either he becomes a loser or a winner. In other words, complying with his wife's ultimatum, he must leave the land of his dreams never to return, or align himself with the other emancipist settlers

and take part in their attack on the Aboriginal camp to defend his own interests. To put it differently, in order to preserve what he wants he must become a killer. However strong his love for Sal may be, his love for the land, "a hunger in himself he had never known before" (108), is even stronger, since it finally leads him to join the other settlers and commit violent acts, thus breaking the promise he made to his wife that he would never do "such a thing:" "'*I would never*,' he said. . . . '*Not never ever*'" (159). The settlers' attack is, in fact, so brutal and merciless that readers presumably find it increasingly difficult to side with Will's aspirations. The Aboriginal presence undercuts the legitimacy of the pioneer story. The pioneer dream can only come true if the Darug people are expelled from the land and ultimately annihilated. But the price paid is far too high: the victim has turned into a perpetrator. As Eleanor Collins puts it, "One of the discomforts of *The Secret River* is the pressure of weighing the Thornhills' considerable suffering in an unjust English class system against the Darug people's unimaginable suffering in an unjust colonial racial system. . . there is a sense in the novel's structure that one system of harshness and lack has led directly to the other" (169).

3. The Traumatic Victim / Perpetrator Paradigm

Stories of first contact are all about division, misunderstanding, violence, fear, in a word, trauma. Similarly, the final pages of *The Secret River* conjure up feelings of separation, impotence, guilt and failure. Will Thornhill is not, apparently, aware of the meaning and implications of the slaughter. Yet, deep down in his heart he knows that, unlike Long Jack, the one and only Aboriginal survivor of the massacre, he does not have "a place that was part of his flesh and spirit" (329); in a word, he does not belong to this place. To make matters worse, he cannot understand why, after having finally succeeded in life—he owns more land, two vessels, a villa surrounded by an English garden and a wall—"it did not feel like triumph" (334). Similarly, his collaboration in the massacre has made a permanent breach in his relationship with Sal:

> Thornhill noticed, but said nothing. It was part of the new thing that had taken up residence with them on the night he had come back from the First Branch: a space of silence between husband and wife. It made a little shadow, the thing not spoken of. . . . But whatever Sal knew, or guessed, was with them and could not be shifted. He had not thought that words unsaid could come between two people like a body of water. (324)

How could this happen? How could he, a good man, he wonders, "do what only the worst of men would do?" (300). The view that perpetrators of crimes against humanity are utterly different from average folk derives from the human desire to believe that this is a just and orderly world, composed mainly of persons who would harm others only in self-defence. However, the consideration of historical traumatic events such as the Shoah makes it clear that, contrary to what most people would like to believe, and as Grenville's

novel clearly shows, the most ordinary human beings are capable of the most inhuman acts. Genocide is often committed by "ordinary men" who,[9] like Thornhill, are caught up in a particular set of circumstances. As Holocaust literature has widely demonstrated, the monstrosity of the majority of barbaric actions seems all the more monstrous because of the ordinariness of the perpetrators. More often than not, perpetrators lack the demonic dimension we would all like them to have. As Hannah Arendt exclaimed after attending the Eichmann trial as a reporter for *The New Yorker* and realizing that this Nazi victimizer lacked all the evil qualities that the prosecution had attributed to him, the shocking truth about human nature is "the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying *banality of evil*" (1984, 287; emphasis in original).

Moreover, perpetrators do not often operate as isolated individuals, but as members of groups, which provide a shared view of the world and rewards for conformity, both of which facilitate the shedding of inhibitions and the annihilation of *excendance*, the key concept in Levinasian ethics as put forward in *De l'Évasion* (1935), which designates the drive to escape a view of the self as closed to the Other in order to define it in opposition to, rather than in relationship with, the Other. There is nothing like colonialism and blind jingoism, and by extension fascism, to illustrate a celebration of isolation and self-complacency gained at the expense of doing away with all kinds of empathic bonds and annulling *excendance*. Furthermore, most perpetrators seem able to distance themselves from the acts they committed and go on with their lives. Very often, as Anna Freud (1937) and other later prestigious psychologists, such as Lapanche and Pontalis (1967), Cramer (1991) and Michael Khan (2002) have put forward, perpetrators manage to overcome remorse through psychological defense mechanisms that deny, falsify, or distort reality. Whereas primary defense mechanisms (repression, denial) prevent unacceptable ideas or impulses from entering the conscience, secondary defense mechanisms (identification, projection, sublimation, rationalization) work to change or subvert reality, thus preventing the individual from feeling anxiety and guilt.

Especially important for the analysis of Grenville's novel are the mechanisms of denial and repression (white settlers relieve anxiety by ignoring a threat in external reality—Aboriginal presence—and in their own internal reality—greed and violence), and of projection, whereby, as was previously explained when dealing with Kristeva's notion of the abject, all of those qualities, feelings and wishes that settlers refuse to recognize or simply reject in themselves are expelled from their selves and relocated in the figure of the Aboriginal Other. Another closely linked defense mechanism worth considering is that which Robert Jay Lifton, in his polemical study *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing*

[9] This expression automatically brings to mind Christopher R. Browning's well-known study of the Holocaust perpetrators, titled *Ordinary Men: Reserve Batallion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (1992). For more information on the polemical figure of the perpetrator, see Herbert Kelman's "Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers" (1973); Ervin Staub's *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989); and George C. Browder's "Perpetrator Character and Motivation: An Emerging Consensus?" (2003).

and the Psychology of Genocide (1986), labelled as "psychological doubling,"[10] whereby the individual has two selves (that of the perpetrator and that of a normal decent human being) that are part of the same overall self, although each of them obviously functions as though it were a separate autonomous self.

Perpetrators can also attempt to find excuses for their actions. More powerful, however, are techniques of neutralization that combine denial, repression, and projection defense mechanisms in a whole set of excuses and justifications. This is Will's case. He tries to deny responsibility, to exonerate himself from murder, he longs "for it to be yesterday, . . . a time in which this thing did not have to be dealt with" (293). He finds it difficult to confess to his killing of Whisker Harry: "The gun went off" (307), we read. However, it was he who pulled the trigger. Echoing Smasher's attitude, he also tries to deny the humanity of the victims. The blacks are only lazy savages, by no means entitled to occupy the land: "*They ain't never done a hand's turn . . . . They got no rights to any of this place. No more than a sparrow. . . . Them blacks ain't going to stand in my way!*" (290). Furthermore, the blacks have done terrible things: they speared Sagitty, another emancipist settler, to death, they burnt his corn patch. Last but not least, Will appeals to higher loyalties, namely, his obligation to look after his family, "He held all their destinies in his hands" (120), and his love for Sal to justify his actions: "How could he choose, between his wife and his place? Making things so that she would stay was worth any price" (299). He tries to repress his sense of guilt, to convince himself that he is a good man. He offers clothes and food to Long Jack, one of the few Aborigines who still remain alive, who rejects them altogether, much to his amazement.

But all these efforts are in vain. No matter how often he repeats to himself that Thornhill's Place is *his* place, "the wind in the leaves up on the ridge was saying something else entirely" (139). Moreover, he knows that his "possession" is ephemeral for, if he ever left the place, "it would not take long for Thornhill's Point to melt back into the forest" (295). No matter how many fences he puts up or how many English flowers he grows in his garden, "the everlasting forest [cannot] be got rid of, only pushed back" (250). He must face up to "the moment of cold nothing" (326), to "the shocked silence hanging over everything" (309), to "the blankness [that] might tell the story to anyone who had eyes to see" (325). His life will not go on as it did before, because he is no longer innocent: "fear could slip unnoticed into anger, as if they were one and the same" (285); but he is responsible for what he did: "he [chose] it, of his own free will" (301). He has achieved success, has become "something of a king" (314), thus keeping the boast made to his sister years earlier that "*William Thornhills will fill up the whole world*" (11). However, he has lost one of his sons who, disgusted by the massacre his father took part in, decides to leave the

[10] As Lifton explained in an interview years later (in Kreisler 1999, 4), these doctors were not originally killers, but ordinary men who were socialized to evil. While in Auschwitz, they had an Auschwitz self which was responsible for making the selections and running the killing process, as well as for the vulgar life (sex, alcohol, etc.) that they led there. However, when they went home to their families, for weekends or on leave, they would behave like normal loving fathers and husbands, thus incarnating a non-Auschwitz, and rather more decent and humane, self.

family home to go and live with Blackwood. Furthermore, Will feels the compulsive need to look through his telescope every single day, looking for "them," the blacks. He wants to believe they are still there, in the forest, of which they are part: "He could not say why he had to go on sitting there. Only knew that the one thing that brought him a measure of peace was to peer through the telescope" (334). Yet, in spite of all his efforts to deny the facts, his traumatic memories and deeply felt sense of guilt inexorably and relentlessly come to the fore. Each time he looks "it was a new emptiness" (334).

4. On the Elusive Nature of Apology and the Trauma that Hinders Reconciliation

The dynamics of scapegoating, the transformation of the Other into an object of abjection, are to be found everywhere and are intimately connected with trauma. The British colonization and settlement of Australia is a case in point. As stated earlier, the victimization of others is always related, in Levinasian terms, to a mode of being concomitant with the ravaging destruction of the Other to assure the self, or, in terms of trauma theory, to the annihilation of the empathic bond that lies at the core of trauma. Will Thornhill strove to define and preserve his humanity by depriving the Aborigines of theirs and, by so doing, became inhuman himself. Violence obliterates the humanity of both the oppressed and the oppressors. In spite of the fact that Will has apparently succeeded, he is aware that he has lost much of his humanity on the way, and cannot therefore help having a "bad conscience," an expression that could be understood in both the common and the rather more specific Levinasian way. If we agree with Levinas that "the human is the return to the interiority of non-intentional consciousness, to *mauvaise conscience*, to its capacity to fear injustice, and to prefer that which justifies being over that which assures it" (1989, 85), then it is obvious that Will ends up experiencing this *mauvaise conscience*, this mode of being that realizes that the self exists only because of the Other; should the Other cease to exist, so too will it cease to exist. Will knows that, in his attempt to colonize the Other, he adamantly refused to acknowledge the Aboriginals' right to exist and be different in order to justify his actions and muster some good conscience (*bonne conscience* in Levinasian terms) about his dealings with them.

The Secret River could thus be said to corrobotate one of Benedict Anderson's main contentions (1991) and offer a credible account of how easily national discourses can cross the boundaries of reality to enforce their own "imagined" past, and of how an individual of good instincts can cross the ultimate human boundary to become involved in acts of the utmost barbarity and atrocity. To put it another way, this novel could be read as an apology (Kossev 2007, 9), that is, as a convenient instrument "to provide an arena for managing guilt, apology, and reconciliation" (Weaver-Hightower 2010, 132). It could therefore be argued that Grenville's novel also contributes to disclosing the other / dark side of the Enlightenment project. The barbarism of the Australian settlement does not preclude the notion of "civilization." On the contrary, the white settlers often relied on

rational means ("The White Man's Burden," to use Rudyard Kipling's well-known poem, to rule other "inferior" peoples for those peoples' own benefit) in order to implement sheer irrationality, such as treating the Aborigines with the same brutality that they themselves condemned and suffered at the hands of the British authorities. Moreover, Enlightenment entails a violent and totalitarian system in which full control is a must. Everything that is different or resistant to the order must be eliminated; the Other must be reduced to the same, whenever it is not altogether annihilated. The Aborigines almost died out as a consequence of this ideology, but the white humanist idea of man partly died with them as well. The present neurotic condition of the Australian (literary) panorama is the result of this death. The past in reality, though, will never die, the traumatic past will always continue to haunt the present. However, *The Secret River* could also be seen in a rather more ambivalent light. As critics like Weaver-Hightower have stated (2010, 134), although Grenville's novel can be interpreted as clearly testifying to the settler's feelings of guilt, it could also be read as evidence of the denial that undercuts the attempt to offer an apology. In keeping with Weaver-Hightower's arguments (138-40), it could be said that not only does the very setting of the novel encourage denial, but the storyline also insists on depicting the settler as the ultimate victim, mainly by confronting the figure of the preponderant well-meaning and unintentional "good colonizer" with that of the marginal competing and aggressive "bad colonizer." Setting the novel in the past subtly contributes to depicting the conflict of settlement as an event that took place only in the past, thus displacing guilt onto the modern day settlers' ancestors and playing down contemporary racial struggles and feelings of shame. Similarly, by focussing on the agony of Will Thornhill as a colonial victim of the brutal and unfair British legal system, the plight of the Aborigines is conveniently diluted and minimized. To quote Weaver-Hightower:

> By portraying their non-Indigenous protagonists as downtrodden but resilient settlers, as victims and not perpetrators of colonization, often with the non-settler English as the 'real' colonizers, [these novels] identify with the victim position and project colonial aggression. That is, these novels spend a great deal of time depicting non-Indigenous Australians as colonial victims of the British compared to the brief nod to non-Indigenous Australians as themselves colonizers of Indigenous Australians. (139)

Although *The Secret River* never denies that even well-meaning settlers were guilty of land appropriation, it nonetheless offers a very ambivalent picture of non-Indigenous Australians' collective guilt. It is true that Grenville's novel clearly confesses to this guilt at times, but it is also undeniable that it often tries to minimize and hide it by highlighting the figure of the white settler as victim and distinguishing between the many "good" and the very few "bad" settlers. As a result, some readers will choose to read the novel as an apology, others will prefer to focus on the excuses that dilute the settler guilt, and yet others will inevitably consider both positions. That said, what remains clear is that novels like this contribute to bringing to the fore the traumatic wounds that lie behind the dark side of the

Australian colonial past, silenced for so many decades. The British settlement of Australia is therefore subject to an ongoing process of revision and discussion, and the myths of the Australian nation can no longer conceal, let alone erase, Australia's foundational trauma.

In the face of this, is it possible to hold out any hope for a harmonious future? Unfortunately, to quote Collins' words again, "Neither novel nor nation can find unity in this encounter" (170), and yet, the secret gaps and muffled histories that make up the forgotten colonial archive must be opened and disclosed to allow for reconciliation to begin. Remembrance does not guarantee reconciliation but, as McGonegal concludes, "the impossible task of remembering is a very preliminary step in a reconciliation process that must be conceived as an open-ended, perpetually ongoing, and always unfinished conversation" (2009, 78). Novels like *The Secret River* confront the non-Indigenous reader with the need to become aware of, and thus confront, what Terry Goldie defines as the spectre of indigenization, a neologism conveying "the impossible necessity of becoming Indigenous" (1989, 13), either by erasing and replacing the Indigenes (fear) or by incorporating and acquiring them (temptation). Furthermore, non-Indigenous fiction that dares to represent the unrepresentable awareness of colonial genocide has the power to open up new worlds where harmonious coexistence is honestly sought. Literary texts can, and must, tackle traumatic experiences, if not to help us fully overcome them, at least to make it possible for us to try and articulate them in some kind of healing narrative. After all, as Judith Butler claims, it is only literature that can encapsulate the "kind of saying that takes place on the border of the unsayable," a saying that puts our perspectives and identities to the test, thus making it possible for us to "think about worlds that might one day become thinkable, sayable, legible" (1997, 41).

However, important as these texts and their potential to spell out an apology may be, they must also be accompanied by some kind of social change such that non-Indigenous Australians are not tempted to put all the blame on their ancestors, thus exonerating themselves from responsibility for contemporary injustices. To be able to say "sorry" is the first, but by no means the last, step. Moreover, as critics such as Eva Mackey have denounced, the apology should never be used as a white strategy to re-gain / assure their innocence. The understanding of the apology as a "speech act," she argues, can run the risk of granting apologizers direct forgiveness, while no reparation whatsoever has been offered to the victims. In her own words,

> How could it be possible that a few words of regret and apology (no matter how earnest, remorseful, or passionate) are expected to erase or begin to address 200 years of colonial violence? How is it that the apologizers emerge, after the ritual, washed clean and innocent, congratulating themselves on their action? How do whites get so much for so little? Is this as good as it gets in a supposedly post-colonial nation? (1999, 35)

Mackey also highlights that the term "reconciliation" is rather inappropriate, since it implies the recovery of some previous form of national harmony, and the rehabilitation

of criminals who were cast out as a result of their offence. Yet, it is clear that national harmony never actually existed in Australia, and the perpetrators of those violent policies against the Indigenous Australians were never actually excluded or held in disregard in the country, with the result that, Tavuchi argues (1991, 31), the "crucial concern" of this form of national apology is "the reclamation and revalidation" of rights and obligations "enjoyed prior to the discreditable transgression." To make matters even worse, Mackey goes on to argue (36), since the Reconciliation was first put forward as a "nation building process," the fact that it is only victims that can forgive inexorably puts them in a very difficult position. As soon as an apology is offered, they seem to have the moral duty / burden to forgive and accept the terms they have been given, whether they like them or not, for the sake of the country's unity and prosperity. As Marguerite La Caze makes clear (2006, 1-9), the relationship between apology and forgiveness is rather asymmetrical: whereas the apology can be a perfect duty and a public act (which does not necessarily turn it into an admission of individual guilt), and is based on respect and acknowledgement of the victim, forgiveness is based on love and is a personal and imperfect duty, that is, victims are not ethically obliged to forgive. Yet, however difficult reaching this national harmony may be, and in spite of their different perspectives, most social critics agree that reconciliation should be understood as a necessary process to pave the way for a better future in Australia. To quote La Caze by way of conclusion: "Although forgiveness cannot be expected it is possible to work towards reconciliation, if reconciliation is properly understood as a willingness to work together without a presumption of having overcome the past, rather than as necessarily involving forgiveness" (2006, 1).

As the workings and conclusions reached by the polemic South African TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) disclosed, an apology is always necessary, being a *sine qua non* gesture towards reconciliation, which must nonetheless enforce other measures of a rather more practical nature. Forgiveness may or may not be given by the victim, but only a previous admission of guilt by the perpetrator can open the door for this to happen. The merit of novels like *The Secret River* lies in their attempt to make non-Indigenous readers aware of the need to offer an apology to the Indigenous Australians so that a better and fairer future might some day be possible in the nation.

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The Motif of Education in Sentimental Narrative

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The motif of education is important in sentimental literature and in eighteenth-century narrative. It is both a central issue in terms of social reform in an enlightened sense, and a focal point in the love and courtship themes which are present in such narrative, the so-called *seduction plot*. It appears as a frequent topic in many authors of English, French, German and Spanish literature. The connection between the issue of education and the seduction plot is observed in the protagonists of the latter, especially in the male main character, either a libertine villain or a lovable but rakish seducer, whose personality has been influenced by a deficient education. Furthermore, such literature shows a concern more specifically focused on education, also discernible in journalism and theatre. It deals with topics such as the functionality of education itself and the pedagogy used both in public schools and in education at home with a tutor, mostly presented from a progressive perspective, usually influenced by the work of Rousseau. The progressive tendency of the sentimental novel becomes a radical discourse in the feminist and Jacobin novel of the end of the eighteenth century.

Keywords: education; sentimentalism; narrative; Enlightenment; seduction; Rousseau

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El motivo de la educación en la literatura sentimental

El motivo de la educación es importante en la literatura sentimental y en la narrativa del siglo dieciocho. Su presencia es frecuente, tanto como tema de interés general para la reforma de la sociedad en un sentido ilustrado como por su importancia dentro de la temática amorosa o de cortejo presente en tal narrativa, concretamente en la denominada *secuencia de seducción*. Esta constituye un tipo de trama habitual en numerosos autores de las literaturas inglesa, francesa, alemana y española. El encaje de la temática educativa y la secuencia de seducción se observa a través de sus protagonistas, sobre todo e invariablemente del masculino, que es un villano libertino o, alternativamente, un seductor amable pero de malas costumbres, cuya personalidad se ha formado mediante un proceso educativo deficiente. Existe también un interés más específicamente educativo en la literatura de esta época, visible en la narrativa, pero también en el periodismo y en el teatro. Este trata asuntos como la funcionalidad de la educación y las metodologías adecuadas en las escuelas públicas, así como la enseñanza privada en el hogar, todo ello desde una perspectiva habitualmente progresista e influida por la obra de Roussseau. La tendencia progresista de la novela sentimental se vuelve radical en la novela jacobina y feminista de finales de siglo.

Palabras clave: educación; sentimentalismo; narrativa; Ilustración; seducción; Rousseau

The motif of education is present in sentimental narrative in two possible ways: as reflections on the best methods and modes of education and in plots that clearly show the happy or unhappy consequences of the form of education that the main characters have received. We can also distinguish between novels focused on the education of children and young people, on the one hand, and those of courtship or seduction, on the other. In the latter, the education received by the protagonists is an instrumental factor in the development of their character. Education can thus be the central motif of a tale or of a long narrative, as is the case in *The Fool of Quality*, by Henry Brooke (1765-70), *Eusebio*, by Pedro Montengón (1786-88), or *The History of Sandford and Merton*, by Thomas Day (1783-89). However, works of this type are structured in multiple brief narrative sequences around a biographical axis, and the whole is unified not by a clearly visible main sequence, but by the paedagogic issues examined or, in more general terms, by the theme of personal growth, as in the genre traditionally denominated *Bildungsroman* or *novel of education*.[1] Such novels aspire to present the reader with a certain ideal of morality and sociability by means of a fictitious biography and a discourse that contains lessons for life in society. More specifically, paedagogic reflections regarding the acquisition of knowledge and values in the context of the relationship between master and pupil play a major role.

In the case of seduction narratives, which we will exemplify here with the works of Samuel Richardson (*Pamela* [1740], *Clarissa* [1748]), Henry Mackenzie (*The Man of Feeling* [1771], *The Man of the World* [1773]), Hugh Kelly (*Louisa Mildmay* [1767]) and Sophie von La Roche (*Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim* [1771]), we see that the character of the virtuous young woman is backed by an appropriate education.[2] On the other hand, behind the libertine villain, or even the "reformable" rake, with his sexually predatory customs rather than a perverse nature, we often find a faulty education that instils the deeply mistaken principles that rule the world and are associated in these narratives with the urban *milieu*, the metropolis and the higher classes: the correct education being that which assists the action of a person's inherent nature compared to the wrong one being that which twists it and leads the person astray. Rousseaunian metaphysics of the essential—the natural morality of the heart—underlies each sentimental narrative by means of the motif of education in a broad sense, an education whose failure is the ultimate explanation of any social evil, usually through the sins of spoilt libertine children. Thus, in eighteenth- century narrative, the topic of private education (at home, with a tutor)

[1] This is a traditional category but the limits and definition of the type are not so clear. In *Plots of Enlightenment*, Barney summarizes the key German terms: "Given my emphasis on education as key to understanding this type of novel, I must also address the terminology, because given the German penchant for taxonomic distinctions, the *Bildungsroman* proper is usually immediately distinguished from the variants, particularly the *Entwicklungrsoman* and the *Erziehungsroman*" (1999, 26). We will include in this discussion both *Erziehungsromane* (Day, Montengón) with its specific interest in pedagogic issues, and the proper *Bildungsroman* type, which deals more generally with the formation of the character of the (male or female) protagonists.

[2] As we see in *Sidney Bidulph*, by Frances Sheridan, where the following is said about the education of the heroine: "She had educated her daughter, who was one of the greatest beauties of her time, in the strictest principles of virtue, from which she never deviated, through the course of an innocent though unhappy life" (1995, 11).

appears frequently and is often associated with the stereotypes of its failure. However, the education in public schools fares no better.[3] If the former is presented as excessively permissive, in the latter the danger lies in the spread of bad habits amongst young people. Consequently, a mistaken education constitutes the origin of the personality of the main character types in a narrative sequence central to the sentimental novel, the *seduction sequence*, who are often a libertine man and a young woman of exacerbated sensibility and with sublime ideas about virtue and morality.

All these seduction tales show the end result of a mistaken education—the formed character of the now adult protagonists, which determines the course of the narrative. In others, such as *Sandford and Merton*, by Thomas Day, the motif of education occupies a more central position throughout the novel, since the main characters are the children whose moral and sentimental education is the object of the narrative. In the case of the aristocratic child Tommy Merton, however, first a process of miseducation can be perceived, which is reversed by the intervention of the good master, Mr. Barlow, with the help of the other child, the farmboy Harry Sandford.

When comparing the Merton boy, his character, family and environment, with the childhood of the male protagonists of seduction sequences in other novels (Lovelace in *Clarissa*, Thomas Sindall in *The Man of the World*, Lord Derby in *Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim*), it becomes obvious that Tommy was destined to be another libertine seducer, or at best one of the lovable, reformable rakes who often feature in sentimental narrative. Thus, he would have been just another of those characters in which the influence of bad principles and education is regulated by a benign nature, but not before having caused a great amount of suffering to himself and to others in the course of the dramatic action. The damage caused by the reformable rakes in comic actions is usually less serious, as we can see in Restoration Comedy or even in *Pamela*. Yet, whenever the plot approaches the sphere of drama and tragedy—in serious comedy, drama and bourgeois tragedy or their narrative equivalents—the emphasis on the issue of education is great and has an irremediable tinge. Tommy Merton displays the same family and social circumstances that can be recognized as the origin of the bad habits of many libertines: riches, the possibility of satisfying every caprice, an indulging mother with a complete lack of rigour, a father who prefers to ignore his child in his infancy and some companions who—being more advanced in the *Rake's Progress* due to their age—complete the process of deformation with the teaching of bad habits that they had started to learn from others at a public school.[4] The importance of

[3] In the eighteenth century, British Public Schools were educational institutions independent of the Anglican Church and therefore open to young boys (usually over twelve) of different creeds and social classes. They were, nevertheless, already associated with the elite, a role which they have retained to the current day. Private education at home was also favoured among the upper classes, usually completed by the Grand Tour, the extensive trip around the continent made by young men, in which they were accompanied by a servant-tutor or a local guide. Young men at college were also accompanied by tutors chosen by their families.

[4] *Rake's Progress* is a series of canvases by the famous British artist William Hogarth. It illustrates the importance of debauchery, libertinism and the social type of the rake in British eighteenth-century culture.

the topic can be discovered in the first moments of the narrative and in the early childhod of the character:

> Tommy Merton who at the time he came from Jamaica, was only six years old, was naturally a very good-natured boy, but unfortunately had been spoiled by too much indulgence. While he lived in Jamaica, he had several black servants to wait upon him who were forbidden upon any account to contradict him. If he walked, there always went two negroes with him, one of whom carried a large umbrella to keep the sun from him, and the other was to carry him in his arms whenever he was tired. . . . His mother was so excessively fond of him, that she gave him everything he cried for, and would never let him learn to read, because he complained that it made his head ache.
>
> The consequence of this was that, though Master Merton had everything he wanted, he became very fretful and unhappy. (Day 1970, 231)

The saving difference in this case is the fact that, from a certain moment onwards, the father prefers not to ignore the education of his child completely. Although he does not assume the Rousseaunian ideal of a father who personally takes the responsibility for the educative task, he does choose an ideal master in Mr. Barlow. This happens when the boy is still very young and his natural goodness has not yet been lost. We see the same case in the Spanish novel *Eusebio* when an adoptive father, Mr. Myden, chooses Hardyl as the master for his son, Eusebio. Hardyl will turn out to be the uncle of Eusebio, although none of them are aware of the fact when he is appointed (Montengón 1988, 87-129). In both these cases, the fathers show more wisdom than their wives and remove their sons from the permissive atmosphere of the home, which is particularly pronounced in the Merton family. In *Eusebio*, Mr. Myden has taken care of the orphan boy after the latter survived a shipwreck on the coast of New England and although he has some doubts about the advantages of sending him to Hardyl, finally he chooses this option against the wishes of his wife, Susannah, who acts like a natural mother in that she is more loving than prudent and behaves in an overprotective way. In this, Susannah behaves much like the mothers of those future libertines Tommy Merton and his companions, Master Compton and Master Mash, who are presented not simply as too loving and indulgent but as proud and foolish as well.

Compton and Mash are being educated at public schools and then become companions of Tommy Merton when he temporarily leaves Mr. Barlow's home to go back to his parents for a feast, which represents a clear moment of relapse into his bad habits (following the example of Compton and Mash, the child behaves whimsically once again). About young Master Compton, the narrator observes, "He had almost finished his education at a public school, where he had learned every vice and folly which is commonly taught at such places, without the least improvement either of his character or his understanding" (Day 1970, 289).

Public schools are therefore portrayed as infectious places where bad habits are easily spread. This same role may even be played by college if the young student frequents bad

company, as we can see in the first part of Mackenzie's novel *The Man of the World*, where we witness the ruin of Billy Annesly, a young man, innocent and passionate, who, while not a young child, is nevertheless a protagonist who undergoes a formation process in a coming-of-age story.

Among the female protagonists of seduction plots in sentimental courtship novels, we can distinguish several subtypes, according to the reason or reasons behind their ruin: 1. virtuous young women, deceived, overpowered and raped—the paradigmatic case being Clarissa; 2. young women who are too innocent, sometimes victims of a wicked plot, but often also of their own desire and their lack of knowledge of the nature of the world and the sexual and gender relations in a patriarchal society—this is the case of the heroines of Mary Delariviere Manley and Eliza Haywood in much of the presentimental narrative of the first part of the century, who could be called *unfortunate mistresses* (Ballaster 1992, 179); 3. those whose lack of virtue can be seen as a lack of good sense or prudence, whose fall is usually associated with the absence of an appropriate education, substituted for by the reading of sentimental novels—this is the case of Emily Atkins in *The Man of Feeling*, an example of seduction with tragic consequences, and of Betsy Thoughtless in the homonymous novel by Eliza Haywood, in a more comic context; 4. finally, those who may be characterized as *sensible*, in a negative and euphemistic submeaning of the term, the same as is used in the gallant French novels of this period—those of Crebillon Fils, Dorat, Duclos and others—and which implies an obvious connotation of less virtue and chastity—this is the case of Louisa Mildmay in Hugh Kelly's novel of the same name.

In the subtypes defined there is a gradation of virtuousness from a higher to a lesser degree. There are heroines who unite the traditional patriarchal virtues of chastity and obedience with sensitivity and good sense. Yet, in other cases, an excess of sentimentalism can be perceived, together with a lack of prudence that turns the story into a more conservative type, an admonitory tale that warns against the excesses of the language of sensibility and works as a critique of sentimentalism in its own terms.

However, the treatment of education in sentimental narratives does not consist only of the warning against negative examples, the risk of creating an egotistical libertine or a daydreaming, novel-reading young lady.[5] Authors may also emphasize the instillation of positive values, at the core of which—particularly in the higher stages of the sentimental novel—social sensibility and its practical consequence, benevolence, will have a leading role. The most important book on the subject in the eighteenth century, *Émile* by Rousseau, illustrates the topic with a positive model, the education of the protagonist.

In English courtship and sentimental novels, the positive model is often represented by a heroine who assumes traditional feminine virtues, such as chastity, prudence and filial

[5] Sometimes the young heroine is virtuous and intelligent but may nevertheless be under the influence of literary obsessions after having read too many sentimental novels. Her readings do not completely spoil the character but are a weak point that counteracts her other virtues and are at the core of her tragic end. This is the case of Theresa Morven in Elizabeth Sophia Tomlins' *The Victim of Fancy* (1787).

obedience. It is the imperative necessity of Clarissa to fail in her obligation to obey her family which causes her such acute suffering and makes her story tragic. The conflict of duties that Richardson's heroine faces is hugely important. The fact that she makes the right decision of following the imperative of dignity, refusing to marry the wealthy but physically and morally repulsive Solmes, is the source of her suffering and illustrates a moral dilemma for the character, which is also a confrontation of ethical systems. Creating an opposition in this moment between the new ethics of sensibility and an older moral system that focuses more on obedience and other traditional virtues, Richardson's novel does not claim to affirm the former and deny the latter, but aims to strike a difficult balance between the two. In another slightly later novel, *Sidney Bidulph*, by Frances Sheridan (1761), the protagonist is involved in similar conflicts, in which the traditional foundations of feminine virtue, obedience, prudence, modesty, are reinforced; the same behaviour that will be defended in conduct books, such as the sermons of James Fordyce or the posthumous letters of John Gregory to his daughter.[6] The conservative Richardsonian type of sentimental novel can be recognized therefore for this didacticism, which offers a model of perfect or almost perfect young heroines, and for the presence of the seduction plot. Defined this way, the influence of this subgenre reaches not only British authors such as Henry Mackenzie, Hugh Kelly and Frances Sheridan, but also German literature, as in the case of *Geschichte des Fräuleins von Sternheim*, by Sophie von la Roche. This novel, which follows *Clarissa* quite closely in plot and characters, can be associated with *Empfindsamkeit*, the German literary movement and style equivalent to Sensibility, which precedes the more typically romantic *Sturm und Drang* of Goethe and Schiller.

At the same time, in Spain, Iriarte's comedies display a didacticism that teaches the importance of an education useful for life. They do not deal with the typical seduction plots of English novels, but rather show the consequences of excessive permissiveness. In *El señorito consentido* (1788) y *La señorita malcriada* (1788), we see two very clearly defined types in the title of the comedies (a spoilt young master and a spoilt young lady) that will also appear in narratives and in periodical essays on men and manners (*artículo costumbrista* in Spain): the male is a mediocre libertine, a rakish and idle young man, given to spending the family fortune amongst false friends and treacherous lovers. The female is perhaps more peculiar to the Spanish background: a motherless young lady who leads an easy life and has something in common with certain characters of the tales of Mackenzie and Marmontel—a propensity to choose the most inadequate suitor, in this case a rogue who pretends to be a nobleman.[7]

[6] Conduct books of this type were held in bad esteem by feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft and satirized by Jane Austen in her novels.

[7] This is also the case in *La bonne mère*, featured in *Contes moraux*, by Marmontel (1822, I, 53-79) and in *History of a Marriage Made from Enthusiastic Attachment*, by Mackenzie (1808, VI, 109-119). In the authors, like Iriarte, Marmontel and Mackenzie, who offer us a progressive and enlightened approach to the much debated issue of marriage and a woman's freedom in the choice of her husband, there is a difficult search for balance between the various factors determining that choice. The feelings of the young women should be the principal one but others,

In the novels of the second half of the eighteenth century, such as those of Sterne, Mackenzie, Brooke and Montengón, we occasionally find seduction plots, often in either a dramatic or a pathetic form. Yet, at this point, social themes begin to prevail and occupy centre stage although the benevolence of earlier sentimental heroines is an occasional motif—such as Clarissa's will—which provides an opportunity to display the young woman's deep sensibility, her good heart and great virtue. The novels of this new phase, with male protagonists and often centering around a journey, usually have practical benevolence as their focus, which gives birth to numerous digressions that interrupt the course of the action.

The clearest example of this is Henry Brooke's *The History of the Earl of Moreland; or the Fool of Quality*, where an uncle educates his nephew, Harry Clinton, a second son neglected by his parents, who only think about their elder child and heir (while providing him with the mistaken education mentioned above as the origin of the libertine character). Thus, while the elder son and heir is miseducated by his parents, the second-in-line, Harry, is educated by his uncle to become a male paragon. Under his uncle's tutelage, which consists mainly of the practical and continued learning of benevolence, through encounters with other characters and a variety of experiences and adventures, the nephew develops the character of a sentimental hero.

In one section of the novel, which works as a framed-in tale, we also read the story of Hammel Clement, illustrating a more specialized though less frequent treatment of an education issue. Whereas the focus of most of the stories touching upon education is the basically moral issue of character building—as in some of the tales of Marmontel—the story of Mr. Clement deals with the social functionality (or rather disfunctionality) of the humanistic education administered in British public schools at the time, i.e., the education to which the higher classes were destined: the "education of a gentleman."[8]

Mr. Clement's father is a *nouveau riche* artisan and trader who, through mere vanity, chooses this kind of education for his son. Later on, and using the excuse of his son's dissolute behaviour, the father disinherits the young man and withdraws all monetary help, leaving him without any resources (although, in fact, the real reason is the father's re-marriage to a wicked stepmother, who is plotting the ruin of her stepson). Strolling around London cafés, Hammel meets Goodville, a benevolent man keen on helping him, but who, alas, can only offer him positions requiring specific knowledge: arithmetic, accountancy, architecture, military fortifications, sailing and civil or ecclesiastical law,

typical of marriages in earlier times in history—such as the interests of the families, honour and wealth—are not to be forgotten.

[8] Marmontel's *La bonne mère* (1822, I, 53-79), *L'école des pères* (1822, I, 149-176), *Le misanthrope corrigé* (1822, II, 1-46), *La femme comme il y en a peu* (1822, II, 47-82). These could be seen as *Bildungsroman* novels but in the form of shorter moral tales that are the French author's speciality. Marmontel was a typical encyclopedist, a liberal man of letters who advocated progress and religious tolerance. However, his moral tales are closer to the spirit of the sexual and social conservatism of many British sentimental novels than to most contemporary French narrative, which is either gallant (Crebillon, Pinot-Duclos, Dorat etc.) or openly libertine and pornographic.

sadly nothing related to Hammel's scholarship and and skills in the Latin, Greek and Hebrew:

> My poor dear child (mournfully answered Mr. Goodville), by all you can find you know no one thing of use to yourself, or any other person living, either with respect to this world, or the world to come. Could you make a pin, or a waistcoat button, or form a pill box, or weave a cabbage net, or shape a cobler's [*sic*] last, or hew a block for a barber, or do any of these things by which millions daily maintain themselves, in supplying the wants and occasions, and fashions or vanities of others; you might not be under the necessities of perishing. (Brooke 1839, I, 106)

In other words, Hammel's studies are purely ornamental in character, adequate for the aristocratic families whose children have had their fortune and a secure living since birth though such studies do not even prepare them to enter Law or Medicine, nor for a career in the church. Goodville mentions these professions because they have a certain relation with Hammel's studies and also because it was common for the second-in-line children of the nobility to continue their public school humanistic studies with a career in these fields. But Hammel's situation is worse than that of a simple artisan. He knows fewer useful things and his worldview—a consequence of having received the education of a gentleman—means it is unthinkable for him to become an artisan. We must remember that Eusebio's good master, Hardyl, teaches his pupil the job of basket weaver, and makes him renounce his nobility prejudices, which had been inculcated to the child from an early age.

This is one of the paedagogic issues that will be treated in an *Erziehungsroman* and that constitute typical matters of concern of sentimental culture and eighteenth-century society. In *Virtuous Discourse*, Dwyer notes their discussion in the press of Edinburgh from 1775 onwards (1987, 76-79). A brief summary for public schools in the Scottish context is surprisingly contemporary: education in values, esteem for teachers, parents' participation in the education process, lack of discipline and the use of punishments and cruelty.

The story of Mr. Vindex—an example of the aforementioned—is also included in the long novel *The Fool of Quality* and deals with yet another aspect of the education issue. Mr. Vindex is a tutor hired by Mr. Clinton—uncle and mentor of the protagonist—to educate Harry and a poor boy called Ned that he has taken from the streets—of roguish character but good heart. This teacher uses the methods of the public schools he comes from, especially authoritarism and cruelty. While Mr. Clinton is away on business, the young children are left to the charge of the tutor and other servants (in fact, the tutor could well be considered one of the servants) giving rise to a number of incidents, more humorous than dramatic, which originate in confrontations between Mr. Vindex and Ned. The source of this enmity is the rigidity of the tutor, who whips the child until flaying him, considering nevertheless that Ned's pranks are also serious and humiliating for the master.

When Mr. Clinton comes back, he dismisses the tutor, holding him responsible for everything that has happened and voicing his opposition to the tutor's beliefs about education:

> I am sorry, Mr Vindex, for the treatment you have got, and still sorrier that you got it so very deservedly.
>
> I have long thought, Mr. Vindex, that the method of school-masters, in the instruction of our children, is altogether the reverse of what it ought to be. They generally lay hold of the human constitution, as a pilot lays hold of the rudder of a ship, by the tail, by the single motive of fear alone.
>
> Now, as fear has no concern with anything but with itself, it is the most confined, most malignant and the basest, though the strongest of all passions. (Brooke 1839, I, 96)

In the case of the Spanish novel *Eusebio,* an aristocratic child is also educated in benevolence and bourgeois values by his uncle, and the coincidences with Brooke's novel are not limited to this, but include details such as the importance of trades and attitudes towards poor children and slaves. The main difference is given by the catholic context of Montengón's work, although in most of the novel the role of neostoic discourse is more relevant than religion. Only on his deathbed does Eusebio's uncle Hardyl renounce his pagan philosophy and accept the triumph of the Catholic faith: "Otra más tremenda verdad es la que importa y conviene que te manifieste por todos títulos, y principalmente para tranquilizar mi conciencia en que, a pesar de todas las máximas de la filosofía, triunfa la religión con toda su terrible majestad" (Montengón 1988, 758).[9]

From their treatment of the education issue, the narratives cited here demonstrate a tendency to assume a Rousseaunian version of the language of sensibility—with the implications of favouring the more progressive, sometimes even radical positions among the ideological trends of the period—in the works most explicitly interested in it and which pay it the greatest attention. This is a popular form of sentimentalism, clearly visible in the works of Thomas Day and Henry Brooke, in the sentimental development of such characters as the children, Tommy Merton, Harry Sandford, Harry Clinton and Ned. The same treatment is given to the educators Mr. Barlow, Mr. Clinton and Mr. Hardyl, even to Mr. Vindex himself, whose cruelty, as we find out at the end of his story, is a consequence of his own misfortunes. He is redeemed and undergoes a conversion to goodness and sentimentality, in one more of the stereotyped tearful scenes in which these stories abound. Rousseau's radical views on education are important here, but no more so than the

[9] The problems of censorship in Montegón's novel, which may be the background to this radical shift in ideologic perspective, are dealt with in the introduction to Fernando García Lara's edition of the novel. The censor expresses his doubts: "si la filosofía moral debe o no enseñarse prescindiendo de la religión, como lo hace el autor de *Eusebio*, es una cuestión muy controvertida, y no muy bien decidida por los autores" (Montengón 1988, 46). The religious issue is also visible in other sentimental novels and in Sandford and Merton, while it does not play a big role, it is still present in the fact that Mr. Barlow is a minister of one of the progressive sects of dissenter protestantism. In *The Fool of Quality*, the educator is actually a methodist and the novel assumes this religious perspective—new at that time—and indeed methodists even used the book in their proselityzing work. In contrast, Mackenzie and Rousseau defend a "religion of the heart," less subject to any church and compatible with all of them, as evidenced in a famous section of Émile, La profession du foi du vicaire savoyard (Rousseau 1966, 345-409) and in Mackenzie's *The Story of La Roche* (1808, V, 175-207).

sentimentalization of children—something characteristic of the culture of Sensibility—and a form of neostoicism visible in Mackenzie and Montengón. In Rousseau himself the tendencies of political radicalism, sentimentality and renovated stoicism coexist. The civic and paedagogic reflexions of *Émile* are in contrast with an exaltation of self-sacrifice and stoic virtue in *La nouvelle Heloïse* and the romantic self-reflection of the autobiographic works.

While Rousseau can be considered a radical thinker for his approach to social and political issues, and to the education of young boys, the section of *Émile* dedicated to female education—the fifth chapter, "Sophie ou la femme"—has traditionally been accused, justifiably, of extreme conservatism or even misogyny. The metaphysics of the natural man and the morals of the heart lead to a complete relegation of women, whose social role—as presented in this section of the book—is limited to maternity and as an assistant in the happiness of man.[10] Yet the radical tendency of sentimentalism will continue in a number of authors that publish their works in the nineties and have therefore been included in the genre of the *radical or Jacobin novel*. This radicalism becomes more acute in some female authors, made visible both in the treatment of the seduction sequence and in the issue of education, male and female. The authors of this period include: Robert Bage, Thomas Holcroft, John Moore, William Godwin, Elizabeth Inchbald, Mary Hays, Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Robinson. The female authors mentioned deal with the female problematic, the education and social role of women, from a clearly feminist viewpoint.

In this period, Mary Robinson published *A Letter to the Women of England* (1799) and Mary Wollstonecraft, her most important work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792). The opinions expressed therein—and also in novels like *Mary, a Fiction* (1788) or *The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria* (1798)—are critiques of the traditional view of the nature of woman, and the forms and methods of their education which aim to perpetuate and develop this prejudice of what women are *by nature*: less able beings, soft, malleable, capable of a certain moral and esthetic sublimeness, but at the same time inferior in practical pursuits and the struggle of life. Wollstonecraft criticizes sentimental language from a feminist perspective and accuses it of promoting masculine interests, naturalizing the marginalized position of women in patriarchal society.[11] In the essay by Mary Robinson we find the typical arguments of an early feminist thinker, albeit in a radical or extreme form, calling for social and legal equality between men and women while, at the same

[10] This accusation is sustained even by male authors with more progressive views of the gender questions, such as Abbé Le More and Riballier, as is shown in Gutwirth's *Twilight of the Goddesses*: "Riballier may well compose a stinging attack on Rousseau's sexism, but when he does so, he phrases it in nearly apologetic terms, after making due obeisance" (1992, 149-50).

[11] We can talk about an attack on sentimentalism from the earlier of these novels (*Mary*) which is the autobiographical narrative of a sensible young woman whose unhappy life is explained by the social conditioning of her sentimental education and her unfortunate marriage with a tyrannical husband. *The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria* is also the story of the oppression and imprisonment of two women, the protagonist and her jailer, decided by the husband of the former in order to protect the patrimony of the family, in fact his exclusive enjoyment of it.

time, arguing for the spiritual superiority of women, based on the different nature of each sex: "The fact is simply this: the passions of men are originated in sensuality; those of women in sentiment: man loves corporeally; woman mentally: which is the nobler creature?" (2003, 44). The writing of Robinson is clearly aggressive and perhaps suffers from the same inclination to oversimplify the similitudes or differences between sexes as her patriarchal or chauvinist rivals. She thinks masculine and feminine souls are of a different nature, always conceiving souls in a materialistic or naturalistic way: "Till the passions of the mind in man and woman are separate and distinct, till the sex of *vital animation, denominated soul*, be ascertained, on what pretext is woman deprived of those amusements which man is permitted to enjoy?" (2003, 44; emphasis added). Robinson also thinks that, although there are reasons to suspect that women have superior souls, the current state of human knowledge does not permit it to be ascertained. However, the most common opinion between men of learning is the superiority of men. This opinion, according to Robinson, is not based on their learning, but on their prejudices, which are the excuse to justify their power, their social advantages and the different consequences of vices for men and women. Robinson mentions sensuality, gaming, drinking and violence—as in duels motivated by the avenging of offences—insisting that women, although being generally more virtuous, should have "the right" to these vices, or, more precisely, the right not to suffer worse consequences from them than those suffered by men. This double line of argumentation—claiming for equality even in the "right to vice," while attributing at the same time, a spiritual superiority to women—is a very interesting characteristic of Robinson's thinking which can be followed through into the different trends or schools of later feminist thought.

Robinson also gives her opinion on the education of women, condemning the secular tendency of patriarchal society to reduce it to the minimum:

> Not many centuries past, the use of books was wholly unknown to the commonality of females; and scarcely any but superior nuns, then denominated 'learned women' could either read or write. Wives were then considered as household idols, created for domestic life and born to yield obedience. To brew, to bake and to spin, were then deemed indispensably necessary qualifications: but to think, to acquire knowledge, or to interfere either in theological or political opinions would have been the very climax of presumption! Hence arose the evils of bigotry and religious imposition. (2003, 65-66)

In spite of the difficulty of accessing books and knowledge, Robinson gives long lists of learned and wise women of different periods in history and cultures, from Ancient times to her contemporaries, and includes, of course, the important group of intellectual women from the middle decades of the eighteenth century called *bluestockings*. Robinson cites the opinion of one of them—Lady Mary Wortley Montagu—on female education, given in response to some satirical lines of Pope: "In education all the difference lies / WOMEN if taught, would be as brave, as wise / As haughty men, improv'd by arts and

rules" (2003, 66). Also a victim of the satire of Pope, the novelist Eliza Haywood had an important role in promoting the education of women, not only at school or as young ladies, but as adult members of society. She was the publisher of *The Female Spectator*, an important journal of the forties, famous for being the first not only intended for female readers but also written and published by a woman. As it promoted a more appropriate education for women, it focused even on a field traditionally exclusive to men, as natural science. The message is very clear: not only are scientific readings and pursuits a source of honest pleasure, but they must be an important part of the education of women as well. Haywood creates a character of a young lady interested in science, Philo-Naturae, to whom she dedicates several articles (1999, 123-28; 187-203). Haywood's aim with this journal is to promote new female types to substitute the negative traditional stereotypes like the pious lady or the coquette. It also defends the idea of the equal capacity of men's and women's mind, although certainly not in the radical and more aggressive ways of the female writers of the nineties.

Although Eliza Haywood, Mary Robinson and Mary Wollstonecraft were novelists, as well as authors of essays and journals where they advocated for the cause of female education,[12] an almost total integration of late sentimental narrative and the topics of education and seduction can be found in the work of Mary Hays, another intellectual of the Jacobin and radical group of the nineties, and an outstanding feminist. She wrote two novels *Memoirs of Emma Courtney* (1796) and *The Victim of Prejudice* (1799). We will focus on the latter, which is built around a sequence of seduction and rape duplicated in two generations, in which the tragic story of a mother and a daughter, both called Mary, is narrated. The mother has been condemned and executed for the killing of her seducer after going through all the stages of the typical tragic plot of seduction—deceived, victim of men, ruined and led to prostitution—and her story is narrated to her daughter in a letter that the adoptive father and benefactor of the young Mary, Mr. Raymond, gives to her. This story should have been an admonitory tale for the daughter but it does not work as such, since the same basic narrative of masculine abuse and female victimization, although with a slightly different slant, is repeated in the second generation. Mary's fate is not, like that of her mother and many other sentimental heroines, to be seduced by the man she loves, but rather to be raped by the aristocratic villain, Sir Peter Osborne.

The message that the older Mary very clearly states and the younger one repeats touches on the issue of education in several moments. It claims that the education of women puts excessive emphasis on chastity—something that Hays had already dealt with in her previous novel *Memoirs of Emma Courtney*—and sees the loss of virginity as something tragic and irreparable. The education women receive also leaves them little chance of earning a living as free, independent persons. In addition, the double standard forgives

[12] Barney deals with a number of earlier "women educators and novelists intent on imagining new social possibilities for their female peers under the auspices of pedagogical reform" (1999, 21): Mary Astell, Judith Drake, Lady Mary Chudleigh and Damaris Masham.

all sexual faults of men while making women victims of not their own, but their seducers' or rapists' faults. The victimized woman is rejected and led to crime or prostitution by prejudice, the greatest of social evils that the novel denounces. Even a good-hearted, honest man like William Raymond (attached to the young Mary by the bonds of pure love since their childhood at Mr. Raymond's home) will become a "man of the world" and stop loving Mary, so her friends tell her. These are inevitable laws of society, in which education acts as the central *locus* of social ideology and source of individual prejudices.

In conclusion, the view of education in eighteenth-century narrative is mainly progressive. However, at least in the earlier novels, it integrates conservative aspects proceeding from the novelistic tradition and other sources: a preoccupation with chastity and the integrity of the female body—the focus of interest in the seduction plot—and an obsession with the stoic hardening of the character, more visible in *Eusebio* than in Brooke's novel with which it shares so much. This importance of the discourse of ancient stoicism substitutes the role of religion through most of the Spanish novel, although, at its end, Hardyl, the uncle and good tutor of Eusebio, even repents and renounces this pagan creed to proclaim the need to submit strictly to the Catholic faith, if one intends to save one's soul. The issue of education in sentimental narrative, although always the object of concern and topic of long or frequent digressions, often has a subordinate functional stance: it motivates character and is—for all its flaws and shortcomings—the origin of the development of many dramatic and tragic plots. At the same time there are important tales and novels which focus on it primarily. This genuine interest and its historically new treatment is accompanied by the prevalence of sentimental language. This justifies distinguishing the genre *sentimental novel* as having a central role in eighteenth-century narrative. Even the radical as well as the progressive feminist novels of the last decade of the century can be considered a form of sentimental narrative, although they denounce the weakening and perverse effects of the education and socialization of women that took place not just through the educative system but also through sentimental novels. The language of the genre, and the genre itself, integrates physiological, psychological, moral, religious and political elements, superimposing them onto the other ancient and more traditional types of discourse also present.

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Essentialism in Children's Literature: The Emergence of Retrogressive Discourses in post- 9/11 Picture Books

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Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, a number of picture books for children were published as a response to the new socio-political context in the United States. This article explores how these books constitute an essentialist discourse whose themes and perspectives can be considered *strategic*. As will be analyzed, they reveal a "natural" positioning that generates a degree of group identification and constructs drastic dichotomies such as *us* versus *them*, by overlooking internal differences, reasserting the values of patriotism and national identity, and fostering the emergence of jingoistic dynamics that bring difference / sameness into play. Such an ethnocentric discourse is problematic because it defines the Self in opposition to the Other, and controversially induces young readers to adopt a one-sided and dogmatic ideology.

Keywords: essentialism; Self / Other; 9/11; children's formation; ideology; dichotomy

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Esencialismo en la literatura infantil: el resurgimiento de discursos retrogresivos en los álbumes ilustrados tras el 11 S

Inmediatamente después de los ataques del 11-S, se publicaron diversos álbumes ilustrados para niños como respuesta al nuevo contexto sociopolítico en los Estados Unidos. Este artículo explora cómo estos libros constituyen un discurso esencialista cuyos temas y perspectivas lo convierten en *estratégico*. A través de su análisis, veremos que estos cuentos reflejan un posicionamiento natural que genera cierto grado de identidad grupal y establece drásticas dicotomías, como por ejemplo *nosotros* frente a *ellos*, al pasar por alto la diversidad interna, reafirmar los valores del patriotismo y la identidad nacional y propiciar el surgimiento de una dinámica separatista que fomenta la distinción entre diferencias y semejanzas. Tal discurso etnocéntrico es problemático, ya que define el Yo en oposición al Otro e induce a los jóvenes lectores a adoptar una complicada ideología dogmática y unilateral.

Palabras clave: esencialismo; yo / otro; 11-S; formación infantil; ideología; dicotomía

> When a narrative is constructed, something is left out.
> When an end is defined, other ends are rejected,
> and one may not know what those ends are . . . .
> What is left out? Can we know what is left out?
> GAYATRY C. SPIVAK, *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (9/11), a series of books for children were published as a response to the new socio-political context in the US that reveal the emergence of an essentialist discourse that favors the division between the Self and the Other, us and them, good and evil. The rearticulation of these old dichotomies not only denotes a closing of cultural borders, which is detrimental for the development of cultural diversity, but also forces American children to negotiate where they stand ideologically, and basically to take sides. As will be demonstrated here, the post 9/11 picture books *On That Day: A Book of Hope for Children* (2001), by Andrea Patel; *There is a Big, Beautiful World Out There!* (2002), by Nancy Carlson; *It's Still a Dog's New York: A Book of Healing* (2001), by Susan L. Roth; and *September 11th, 2001: A Simple Account for Children* (2002), by Nancy Poffenberger, present a shared set of characteristics that establish what constitutes each group's essence and what can be inferred from it. In this paper, I examine how the reaction of the American nation at the time of the attacks reveals a process of essentialist thinking: first, by putting aside local differences in order to forge a sense of homogeneous collective identity; second, by taking a defensive position, preserving its culture and developing itself, and hence its distinctiveness, in opposition to another "frightening" culture; and finally, by reducing to an "essential concept"—and yet still incomplete—the notion of who the "Other" is and what it means, in this case, to be Arab. If as Jo Lampert (2010) highlights, prior to 2001 it was already common to separate and organize identities according to race, ethnicity and nation (I am white, I am Jewish, I am Canadian), after 9/11 the American ideology engaged in an essentializing nationalistic discourse that fostered jingoistic dynamics, constructed drastic boundaries and beliefs, and explicitly brought different / sameness into the picture.

The overwhelming events of 9/11 made the United States reverse its role, at least momentarily, from the mighty first world country to a vulnerable country under attack. The US became the target and the sufferer (Chomsky 2001; Chouliaraki 2004). It is significant that this was the first time this had happened since the war of 1812, when its colonies were attacked but not the national territory itself. As Lilie Chouliaraki puts it in "Watching 11 September: The Politics of Pity" (2004), "the 'centre' and only contemporary superpower entered the space-time of dangerous living" (186). Likewise, psychiatrist Michael Brodsky affirms that the attacks greatly affected the American national sense of identity. He comments that Americans had "been protected by two oceans, and largely immune from the kind of terrorism that many people all over the world have long experienced. And that engendered in [them] a strong collective sense of invulnerability. That was shattered

on 9/11" (qtd. in Mozes 2011). Furthermore, Chouliaraki claims that the sociopolitical impact of the attack was directly related not only to the sense of its proximity but also to how television mediated the event. She argues that images and language triggered a reaction in the American spectator that produced in turn visual as well as verbal meaning-making: "What are we to feel when watching the planes crashing into the Twin Towers? What are we to do when watching fire brigades and medical, police and municipal forces rushing to help victims just after the towers' collapse? How are we to respond when confronted with President Bush's promise to 'hunt down those folks who committed this act'?" (2004, 186). There is no doubt that the combination of the disturbing images, Bush's message and the spectator's emotional involvement brought to audiences a new sensibility. However, still more important is how they cultivated specific political predispositions to action that are underpinned by colonial structures and meaning. It is at this point that the articulation of moral stances, inherent to human beings, came into play and consequently, and due to the governmental mediation of the event, spectators felt prompted to consider hegemonic political projects such as the "war against terror" in a positive light.

According to Peter Hunt, "literature not only responds to changes in social and political climates, but also contributes to the changes" (2001, 5). As children step into and move through story worlds, they build bridges between their personal experiences and the literature they read, and thus, stories become a lens through which they can better understand their world. In the same way, books construct social relationships and promote concepts, ideas and identities that respond to what adults believe children should know and value. As Peter Hollindale puts it, "In an age which desires to propagate imperialist sentiments, children will be an army of incipient colonizing pioneers. In an age which wishes to abolish differences between sexes, races and classes the reader is a composite 'child' which is willing to be anti-sexist, anti-racist and anti-classist" (1991, 9).

The ideological effect of the collapse of the Twin Towers fuelled a spontaneous tendency in the US to think, talk and act as if Americans were a natural category by explicitly attributing or tacitly implying one essence to themselves and, consequently, another different essence to the outgroup. Through an analysis of this corpus of fiction and non-fiction picture books about 9/11, we can observe how immediately following the attacks, the predominant discourses, themes and ideology implicit in those texts reflect what could be referred to as "strategic essentialism." Although this term, coined by postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak (1987), has been used in the past to refer to subordinate or marginalized groups, I find it serves to define the US political and social aftermath found in the content of the 9/11 books selected. In this context, one may read Spivak as suggesting that the *strategic* runs alongside the pragmatic, because according to her, essentialism has little to do with theory, it rather serves as a definition of a certain political practice (Eide 2010). Thus, although there is no doubt that Americans' predominant perspective and outlook on the world cannot be associated with the idea of a subaltern consciousness, it is possible to perceive their *strategic* attempt to act together in response to their temporary vulnerability immediately after the terrorist attacks.

Strategic essentialism in this sense entails that all American citizens, while being highly differentiated internally, engage in an essentializing and to some extent a standardizing of their public image. As Elizabeth Eide explains, this contributes to "advancing their group identity in a simplified, collectivized way to achieve certain objectives" (2010, 76). The purpose at the time was to strengthen the bonds between the group's members as well as to enable the group to appear to be an entity with a reason to exist, an ideology, an agenda and a series of distinguishing attributes.

Whether the picture books that will be analyzed portray stories of recovery, heroism, individual accomplishment or community resolve, or whether they aim to help young readers cope with their fears of terrorism, defuse difficult emotions or bring hope to their lives, it is possible to find examples of how these texts are used to reassert values of national identity, patriotism, superficial unity and notions of cultural and political hegemony. With this line of thought, the questions I wish to raise are straightforward: How do 9/11 children's books contribute to the process of "educating" young readers about themselves, others, and the world in which we live? How is the notion of inclusion and acceptance of difference presented? To what extent do these books offer children the capacity to make evaluations and establish categories of their own without being manipulated by the words and ideology behind them?

Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan refer to ideology as the "process of cultural signification and personal formation that cannot be summed up merely as 'ruling ideas.' It also consists of training in certain practices or certain modes of self-identification" (1998, 237). Following this approach, the cultural practices that these books encourage reveal that essentialist thinking is the invisible hand that enhances the standing, power and social value of the group. They connote the construction of dichotomies based on particular stereotypes in which some kind of essence is regarded as part of the unchangeable reality and the natural order of things. Also, if we extend these considerations to the possibilities and constraints that these texts offer for identity formation, it is significant that readers do not passively contemplate their own identity and that of Others; instead they often feel persuaded to be part of the dominant group by their desire of social belonging and the self-esteem attached to this (Wagner et al. 2009, 369).

The four picture books selected for this study were published within the same year or the year after 9/11 and they all represent a response to the events. The first three belong to what Paula T. Connolly (2008) calls "the 9/11 canon of children's literature," and have already received considerable attention. These are: *On That Day: A Book of Hope for Children*; *There is a Big, Beautiful World Out There!*; and *It's Still a Dog's New York: A Book of Healing*. In addition, I examine a nonfiction text: *September 11th, 2001: A Simple Account for Children*. As will be further discussed, this is a peculiar picture book that has been included because its strongly subjective narration comes across as being just as fictional as the rest of the texts. My aim is to analyze each of them in order to discuss the aforementioned points on essentialism from the perspective that children's literature is first and foremost a social practice that contributes to the child's development and

perception of the world. In this regard, picture books are particularly meaningful because they include a double form of representation through both words and images, and the overall impact of the work is achieved by the interaction of the two expressive means (Nikolajeva 2006). Such representations, as Bakhtin reminds us, are not illustrative of simply the individual writers' ideas, but of a specific political sociocultural period and a collective way of thinking (Todorov 1984).

To begin with the analysis, it is significant that all four books include some kind of explicit reference to the fact that they were written in a time of sorrow and as a reaction to the terrorist attacks. The authors' perspectives can thus be regarded as the result of a specific social and natural positioning, one to which many Americans can relate and which in turn generates a degree of group identification, that is, a certain notion of essence. According to Walter Wolfgang, "neither the term 'natural' nor the term 'essence' can be thought of independent of the other; being natural implies having an essence by necessity in the eyes of the perceiver" (2009, 377). In such a case, naturalizing this essence signals that the group is an entity, a unit that sets itself apart from others and that displays uniformity and a sense of homogeneity, something all these picture books do. At the end of *On That Day: A Book of Hope for Children*, Andrea Patel includes an author's note in which she explains how on September 11th the world stopped making sense to her. It is likely that as an American citizen she had always heard about war and terrorism taking place in faraway countries but not in her homeland. Likewise, it stands to reason that, as is the case with many other Americans, her perspective of the world coincides with the US being its center, and the powerful and dominant force that brings international hegemony. Hence, while her suffering and her puzzlement are completely understandable, her way of thinking and her reaction reflect what we could call a mainstream white American mentality, by which she assumes that her beliefs are held by everyone and takes as "normal" the US position of privilege in the world, revealing what can be considered a colonial mindset (Gabriel 2000; Apple 2002).

Similarly, while the content of *There is a Big, Beautiful World Out There!*, by Nancy Carlson, does not include any reference to 9/11, the author does state at the end that she wrote it on September 12, 2001. Along with this, on the same page, is an illustration with an American flag hanging at half-mast. The text was therefore written at a time of distress and mourning, and its story seems intended to help children overcome the fears that the attacks presumably produced. In the same vein, *It's Still a Dog's New York: A Book of Healing*, by Susan L. Roth, aims, as the title says, to heal and comfort. Two dogs, Pepper and Rover, embody the struggle of many Americans coming to terms with their feelings of grief and anger, and with post 9/11 trauma. Finally, Nancy Poffenberger, at the beginning of *September 11th, 2001: A Simple Account for Children*, presents a note in which she justifies how "as a former Elementary School Teacher, a mother of four, a grandmother of four and President of a publishing company, [she] felt a real calling to write and publish a book about the events of September 11th, 2001 for young children in elementary school grades" (2).

The four authors thus coincide in their sorrow and their attempt to create a common arena in which they, and all those who feel as they do, might express and share their distress and help others to overcome those difficult moments. This "natural" reaction is a first step towards essentializing a group's attributes. In this way, as Wagner highlights, describing the reaction of the members of a group as "natural" can justify "a host of symbolic and behavioural consequences" (2009, 377), especially the creation of the group's own discourse and discrimination against outsiders. In Poffenberger's case, for instance, it is symptomatic that although in her "author's note" she emphasizes her attempt "to keep the concepts simple yet be honest in portraying the facts, stressing our patriotism over assault" (2), it is the patriotic discourse that clearly predominates throughout the text.

Furthermore, even though the main goal in nonfiction is to inform and instruct the young reader (Moss 2003), one finds that Poffenberger's "simple account" is not in fact so simple, and that her attempt to "be honest" results in a rather biased interpretation of the events, one that does not just inform but that may lead the young reader to adopt a similar ideology. Indeed, as Hollindale explains, it is exactly those values taken for granted by the writer, and which reflect the writer's integration in a society that unthinkingly accepts them, that carry much potency with children (1991, 13). Poffengerger's patriotic narrative not only conveys the previously discussed idea of social and natural positioning that favors the construction of a group's essence, but it also represents what Apple refers to as "conservative modernization," a populist discourse supported by the American right that comes to the fore in times of crisis. In Apple's words, this conservative modernization is "a social / pedagogic project to change [Americans'] common sense, to radically transform [Americans'] assumptions about what are 'appropriate' values, the role of religion in public affairs, gender and sexuality, 'race,' and a host of other crucial areas" (2002, 1767).

To continue this line of discussion, it is worth noting that *On That Day: A Book of Hope for Children*, as Patel states, "became [her] attempt to make sense of the world at a *simpler* level" (2001; emphasis added). These words, as we will see, establish one of the keys for discussion of the text. The author starts by presenting a description of the world in very simple terms: "The world is blue. / The world is green. . . . The world is very big, and really round, and pretty peaceful" (1-2). These initial sentences along with their syntax and the illustration of two circles—one, yellow / orange, and a second smaller one green / white / purple—are examples of what some critics have considered to be a return to modernist standards after 9/11 (Giroux 2002; Apple 2002; Lampert 2010). The pursuit of order and neatness, the impulse to search for "truth" and clarity, and the notion of a simpler world in which binaries such as good and evil and right and wrong are clearly identified illustrate an outlook that represents a total clash with postmodernism and the resurgence of modernist absolutes. Furthermore, as Connolly claims, Patel's perspective "not only avoids any specificity of context but its assumption of a 'pretty peaceful world' posits a fictionalized hegemony that is inaccurate to the actuality of many children's lives" (2008, 290). In this way, although the idea of such a hegemonic world is reinforced later by the image of several human beings of different skin colors holding hands, this in fact can be

read as one of the strategies of essentialism which is used to foster a sense of superficial collective identity for the group that reinforces the dichotomy of "us" against "them."

As Lampert comments, Patel's use of the personal pronouns "we" and "you" throughout the book establishes the reading positions through which readers can relate to the text (2010, 53). The author's question on page six, "Is there anything *we* can do to make the world *right* again?," aligns *us* with the notion of goodness in contrast with the idea of cruelty depicted on the previous page: "But sometimes bad things happen because people [*them*] act in mean ways" (5). Through these lines, we see how the child's agency is addressed. S/he has the opportunity to fix what *others* have done *wrong*. Likewise, the sentence on the next page, "*You* can help by sharing" (8), is another example of how the reader is driven to get involved in the reading and, moreover, summoned to perform his / her Self in particular ways. It is to be expected that children will prefer to be identified with the good "us" and not the evil "them," thereby adopting an attitude and becoming aware of the existence of such a dichotomy, thus requiring them to establish where they want to position themselves and why.

Similarly, although in Carlson's *There is a Big, Beautiful World Out There!* the story's basic message, as the title reads, is positive, it too reinforces conflicting meanings and stereotypes about what or who is to be feared. In fact, the illustrations are so garish and crude that they actually convey the sense that things such as bugs, clowns and people who look different are scary and intimidating. How then does the text contribute to the formation of the young reader? A significant question to consider is whether the book achieves the goal of reducing the fears it identifies or, on the contrary, simply creates new ones.

The book begins with the line, "There's lots to be scared of, that's for sure" (1). From here, the author presents a list of things that might be frightening for children in order to later reassess them and finally convey the message that you cannot remain "hiding under your covers" (14) in your bed, that "there is a big, beautiful world out there" (29). The problem, however, is that among the things that Carlson identifies as scary is a picture of a group of individuals with a line underneath that says, "people who look different from you" (12). In this way, Lampert points out, "the text suggests that there is something 'natural' about the fear you might have about other 'people who look different' from 'us'" (2010, 50). Here, like in *On That Day*, we find an essentialist discourse that is establishing the binary Self and Other, *us* versus *them*, but most importantly, one that implies that fear of Others is normal. According to Susan Gelman (2005), children develop an early cognitive bias and they are more susceptible to stereotyping if they are led to believe that certain characteristics are fixed and part of human nature. In this case, if the Other is related with being *different* and this difference entails a threat or a fear, they are likely to regard it with prejudice. Moreover, another problem about this picture book is that the points about fearing Others are so unsettling that apart from producing alarm, or still worse, an attitude of intolerance, they actually prevail as the central message of the book. Finally, it is not without significance that the main character in the story is a white girl. For this reason, it

is white children who are the intended target readers of this book and also who are most likely to relate to the "you" that is addressed in the texts and illustrations. In contrast to this, the Other is portrayed as non-white. Therefore, although in the illustrations of the final pages there is a slight hint at the inclusion of people of different ethnicities, they stand to the sides of the pictures. The characters in the center are the white children, whereas the non-white remain at the margins.

Putting two and two together, if in this picture book the Other is portrayed as those who look "different" and "non-white," and in *On That day* the Other is portrayed as evil, the overall discourse that these readings advocate is the shaping of a Self whose essence is categorized for what it is not, that is, in contrast to the so-called Other who is stigmatized and seen as a threatening outsider. Based on Edward Said's concept of Orientalism, this type of discourse constitutes a process of Othering that leads to the construction of certain kinds of knowledge, and this knowledge in turn not only reinforces the very power that has produced it, but also assumes that the dominant culture is "normal" in relation to those which are not. Said's book *Orientalism* (1978) notes how from the eighteenth century onward the Western colonizing powers constructed an image of the Oriental as weak, untrustworthy, passive, feminine, in the process of establishing Western identity as strong, trustworthy, active, masculine, among other cahracteristics. In Said's words, Orientalism is a Western style of thought, "a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is manifestly a different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is . . . produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power [political, intellectual, cultural and moral]" (1978, 12).

Significantly, this right and this authority that the West self-proclaims to otherize is an act of essentialization *per se*. If we foster the belief, as indeed happened, that all terrorists are Arabs, and all Arab people have the same appearance and all of them are Muslim, it becomes easier for Americans to target them and to define themselves by what they are not. In this way, as David Palumbo-Liu highlights, although President Bush urged Americans to remember that "Arab Americans are Americans, too, and that this [was] a war against terrorism, not Islam, the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan, with all its 'collateral damage,' [made] such distinctions hard to maintain" (2002, 118). In actual fact, it is known that in the wake of 9/11, as Michael Apple observes, "there were a multitude of instances throughout the nation of people who look Arab being threatened and harassed on the street, in schools, and in their places of business" (2002, 1762).

Like the two books discussed above, *It's Still a Dog's New York: A Book of Healing*, by Susan L. Roth, once again presents an essentialist perspective and the construction of the us / them dichotomy as a natural reaction to the attacks. Through the portrayal of Pepper and Rover, the two dog protagonists, there is an emphasis in this case on the trauma that haunted many New Yorkers as an inescapable side effect of the tragedy. The term trauma here must be understood, according to Cathy Caruth, "as a wound inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind" (1996, 3). Throughout the story, Pepper is described as what

Ross Chambers refers to as a "melancholic character for whom mourning cannot really be complete for the reason that trauma is never over" (qtd. in Gutorov 2011, 5). "'Those two towers are still in my head' . . . 'plain as day!'" (22), says Pepper dolefully. The process of "healing," which is the purpose of the book as its subtitle states, begins then through Rover's words to his friend that reassert their identity as New Yorkers and highlight those landmarks of the city that make it distinctive, such as the Empire State Building, Central Park, the Metropolitan Museum, etc. It is through their conversation, then, that a discourse of reconstruction takes place, in which the characters' personalities and ideology reflect Spivak's concept of strategic essentialism.

As we read, we see how in the interaction between Pepper and Rover, the role of the former echoes the figure of a subordinate subject who feels defeated and overwhelmed by the attacks. By contrast, Rover represents the self-confidence and spirit of those who maintain their principles no matter what. "Remember, we're still dogs. NOT underdogs. TOP DOGS!" (20), he says to Pepper with courage. Here the use of "underdogs" can be read literally or figuratively, but it is the latter that can be associated with the idea of being submissive to or oppressed by a superior or threatening force in a postcolonial context that triggered Spivak's original use of the terminology "strategic" essentialism. In fact, she refers in particular to the subsequent nonconformist reaction of subjugated people, in this case personified by Rover and his subversive attitude and determination to find a way to reverse the circumstances:

> 'We can roar like the lions against the horrible things that happened. We can roar like lions for peace!'
> 'We can roar loud enough for the WHOLE WORLD to hear!' said Pepper. (16)

This attempt to reassert themselves constitutes a search for agency and a call to come together as Americans to take a strategic position. In addition, the use of the pronoun "we" evokes pride and emphasizes their sense of unity. For Lampert, in this extract, "Americans are compelled to behave in a manner that is both caring and forceful, powerful and peaceful. . . . This contradictory response, making the use of force to appear gentle was strategic after 9/11. It differentiated the actions of Americans from the action of terrorists who were forceful, but, presumably, not so caring" (2010, 104).

Differentiation here again becomes a key factor to create an American collective identity in opposition to the "Other." And although "it is a difficult task to demand such a strong response (that would make the WHOLE WORLD take notice) and still be perceived as peace-loving" (Lampert 2010, 104), the anger and sense of patriotism of many Americans demanded just such a response at the time. As a matter of fact, as Richard Flynn comments, "the Bush-mandated resurgence of patriotism provided a way of acting as if one were acting to support 'America's New War'" (2005, 6).

Moreover, we also see how in order to build a collective identity, the author hints at the idea of dogs and cats coming together as friends:

'If we see sad dogs and cats we could try to cheer them up,' said Rover.
'We never talk to cats,' said Pepper.
'At a time like this, maybe we should,' said Rover. (8)

Here the dogs' empathy for cats fosters an ideal image of living in a homogeneous nation in which all Americans embrace diversity, and no distinctions are made with regard to place of birth, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. However, figuratively speaking, it is not clear who dogs and cats stand for and what they represent individually. If dogs, for example, symbolized mainstream white loyal and caring Americans, who would the cats be? Finally, it is also meaningful how in order to construct an ideal image of the city the author omits any references to issues of crime, homelessness or the racial tensions that appear regularly on the news as an integral part of the life of the city.

Finally, with regards to Poffenberger's nonfiction picture book *September 11th, 2001: A Simple Account for Children*, it is necessary to remark how the author starts by highlighting that September 11, 2001 is a historical date that "many of us will remember well" (3). While her initial use of the pronoun "us" already serves the purpose of indicating that there exists a binary (us / them), it does not clarify whether that "us" refers to only "adults," only "Americans," or whether it actually refers to "writer" and "reader" together. For that reason, in the next line, Poffenberger makes sure that she involves the reader by directly addressing him / her: "If you lived in New York City, Washington, D.C. or the state of Pennsylvania, you certainly will never forget that day" (3). At this point, even if the reader does not live in any of those places, the author has already created the sense that there are many people like her, who feel as she does. They make a group.

From here, she narrates the account of how four planes attacked these three places. "When the second hit happened, the United States realized some group or groups were trying to hurt and scare us" (6). Let us observe how the use of "us" has now expanded to include the whole country. On the other hand, she has completed the binary us / them by referring to some *other* "group or groups" that do evil actions—the antagonist group. "The name of the people who do this are called 'Terrorists'" (6), she continues, and the word "terrorist" appears in bold letters and in a bigger font. Here it is necessary to draw our attention to two relevant points: First, the author's tone begins to lack objectivity and builds up tension by emphasizing what she herself thinks is more striking, in this case the word "terrorists" and the fact that many people died (mentioned twice on the same page). Second, the undefined but essential reference to the figure of the terrorists provides the "difference" on which the opposition of her group (us) is dependent. It becomes evident therefore, as Roderick McGillis states, that "difference and sameness always are mutually constitutive" (2000, 9). Poffenberger bolsters a sense of commonality to create the fiction of two unitary and homogeneous groups that defined themselves by their being opposed to each other. What she writes, then, is not just an account of the events but a report of the experience of her group being attacked in which she reinforces their identity, culture and values, seeking ultimately to position the child reader as well.

The actual confrontation between the two groups is portrayed on the next page, where several violent scenes are evoked when describing what happened to the fourth plane, which crashed in Pennsylvania. This time the word "terrorists" appears three times and in each case how they were overcome by the people of America is (over)emphasized.

> We learned that there were some very brave people on that plane /
> who were able to stop 'the Terrorists' from flying the plane /
> . . . they decided to go after 'the Terrorists'
> . . . the people on that plane prevented 'the Terrorists' from hurting any /
> more people in Washington, D.C. (8)

The use of verbs such as "were able to stop," "decided to go after" and "prevented" connote that the agency of these "very brave" passengers was crucial to defeat "the Terrorists." Not only are they considered heroes but there is pride in their actions. They died but they fought against those aberrant Others, seems to be the message for the young reader and even a lesson to follow, especially when later the author includes a characterization of the terrorists.

> [They] are groups of people around the world who /
> do not like the way we live or the freedoms we have. /
> They do not like the idea that we have many religions in America. /
> They also think we are too rich and that we have too strong a military. /
> These people want to take over the world. (10)

The populist notes in this extract are crucial because, as Apple points out, "hegemonic alliances can only succeed when they connect with the elements of the 'good sense' of the people" (2001, 1766). It is of note that the US is thought of as an inclusive accepting nation where all religions and cultures are of equal merit. Likewise, it is emphasized that it is the freedom and lifestyle of Americans that is under threat, leaving unquestioned the side effects of US global, economic, political and cultural policies. On this note, Poffenberger's text reveals what Apple argues is the scant knowledge of the American public about "the United States's complicity in supporting and arming dictatorial regimes," and the lack of "a developed and nuanced understanding of U.S. domination of the world economy, of the negative effects of globalization, of the environmental effects of its wasteful energy policies and practices, and so much more" (2002, 1761).

Certainly, among the explanations that Poffenberger lists for the terrorists' attacks, there is no factual information about the realities of the terrorists' lives and beliefs nor an attempt to consider their possible reasons for carrying out the acts, but simply an effective mobilization of anger and patriotic fervor. Last of all, of significance is the author's approach to terrorism and the manner in which she turns the whole complex issue into a war against the United States, as if terrorism had never taken place before anywhere else in

the world. This approach, as Lampert observes, was common after 2001, when "America claimed terrorism as its own" (2010, 4). The US considered itself the principal victim of terrorism and made it its own crusade. Finally, in the last pages of the book the narrative becomes more of a symbolic call to reaffirm national unity and American values:

> People All Over The Country /
> became patriotic and wanted to show how much they loved our country. /
> Many homes and businesses put up a flag, /
> People sang songs such as 'God Bless America' (14)

These lines are intended to prompt readers to act in similar patriotic ways. Patriotism arises as an essential means for healing and, most importantly, for fighting terrorism. On the very last page, the author then closes with a statement reminiscent of the American declaration of independence. It reads,

> The People in the United States /
> all pulled together and stopped arguing over politics. / . . .
> The people of the United States wanted to say they love and /
> appreciate the freedoms they have here and that they are lucky /
> to be able to make the many choices they do each day. (16)

As we can see, Poffenberger's "account for children" ends on a reaffirming note. Her final words endorse the foundations of the United States and bring courage and reassurance to the young American readers. However, such a perspective on the events reflects more the author's own desire than the real facts. She concentrates on the beliefs and culture of the majority group in the US (middle-class, white and Anglo-Saxon) and leaves absent other ethnicities and perspectives.

In sum, there is serious doubt that the patriotic and conservative discourse in this book might possibly display the accuracy and objectivity to be expected from a nonfiction text. Moreover, as shown earlier, the account is distinctly essentialist for all the key reasons: overlooking the inner socio-cultural and political differences within the US, exaggerating the idea of a homogeneous national identity, fostering a direct and violent confrontation with the notion of a faceless Other, encouraging the centralism of the US in the world and finally, supporting the right of Americans to maintain their politics and way of life in spite of the negative consequences it may cause to other countries.

In conclusion, these texts demonstrate how children's literature has the power to influence young readers' perspectives, especially in a case such as this, in which there is a strong appeal to child readers that allows for little alternative reading. Moving through the story of a picture book involves connecting pieces of the story and weaving together the various narrative strands. Fiction and nonfiction books constitute an essential source to open young minds and to help understand how and why people live as they do. For this

reason, as Hollindale claims, "our priority in the world of children's books should not be to promote ideology but to understand it, and find ways of helping others to understand it, including children themselves" (1991, 10). Books therefore must enable young readers to critique what they read and not force meaning upon them. Nevertheless, the 9/11 corpus of picture books discussed in this article does not offer children the capacity to make their own choices. Young readers are led and induced to identify themselves with the figure of the Self and to adopt the writer's perspective.

As I have shown, the four books selected reassert American cultural values, national identity and beliefs in direct opposition to the notion of an ambiguous evil Other who is non-white and is directly related with terrorism, and implicitly with the Arab world. Although these books were written in the wake of the attacks and are in theory intended to help American children cope with their fears and bring hope to their lives, we can observe that strategic essentialism is instilled in their pages, as they convey more significance than is explicitly stated in their subtitles or back covers. These books constitute an essentialist discourse that reveals the endorsement of jingoistic and differentiating dynamics that foster the division between the Self and the Other, us and them, good and evil, right and wrong, superior and inferior, civilized and savage. This approach is highly controversial because, apart from establishing strong stereotypical impressions, it involves the reader emotionally, internalizing the idea that the United States is the center of the world. Such an ideology clashes with the principles of multicultural literature, which aims to reflect not just the portrayal of single ethnic groups or insight into distinct cultures, but people from multiple cultures and ethnicities interacting with one another in various capacities (Steiner 2008, 88). In fact, the discourse in these picture books presents the opposite scenario: there is no cultural interaction and no chance of developing the global understanding and humility needed for world cooperation instead of world conflict.

Andrea Patel, Nancy Carlson, Susan L. Roth and Nancy Poffenberger have written stories that inform the child of the authors' own concern with adult society at the very point where mainstream Americans' hegemonic views and reality come into conflict. This perspective is problematic because, as Americans, the authors believe their approach is the right one and they support the dominant position of the US in opposition to any force or culture that may threaten it. However, as Roberta Seelinger Trites (2001) explains and makes us reflect upon, the hijackers who perpetrated the extremist acts of terrorism on September 11 also believed themselves to be right. It was their prejudiced ideas and the singleness of their purpose that led to an act of inhumanity: "That these terrorists believed in the rightness of a single set of choices indicates that they have not been trained to respect [other cultures and other values]. And throughout the ages, that is one function literature has provided its readers" (2001, 114). Children's literature might not be the only tool available to raise young readers' consciousness, but it definitely plays a crucial part towards their understanding that to be fully engaged with a way of thinking and living is not to be fully opposed to other ways of thinking and living.

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Religious Belief in Recent Detective Fiction

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Detective fiction emerged as a result of the increasing secularisation of society. The certainties expounded by the Church are reenacted through the figure of the rational investigator whose perspicacity never fails to uncover the perpetrator and return the world to its pre-lapsarian tranquillity. Often the villain whose wicked deeds must be brought to book is the leader of an obscure mystical sect, but otherwise religion, particularly of the mainstream variety, is noticeably absent. This has, however, recently changed. The detective, once the acme of rational thought and deductive flair—incarnated in the figure of Sherlock Holmes, for example—has now been replaced, on occasions, by investigators with overt religious beliefs. The explanation for this apparently inconsistent development is tied to the evolution of crime fiction over recent decades, in which both the model of the traditional hard-boiled detective and the genre itself have been questioned and deconstructed by a new generation of crime writers.

Keywords: crime fiction; hard-boiled; religion; Christianity; postmodernism; genre

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La creencia religiosa en la ficción de detectives reciente

La ficción detectivesca apareció como resultado de la secularización de la sociedad. Las certezas antaño predicadas por la Iglesia se encarnaban ahora en la figura del investigador racional, cuya perspicacia conseguía sistemáticamente descubrir al criminal y devolver al mundo a su estado de paz prelapsario. A menudo, el villano cuyas maldades deben corregirse es el líder de alguna oscura secta, pero si este no es el caso, la religión, sobre todo las mayoritarias, permanece notablemente ausente de la narración. Sin embargo, esto ha cambiado en tiempos recientes. El detective, que se caracterizaba por su extrema racionalidad y capacidad de deducción, epitomizadas en la figura de Sherlock Holmes, por ejemplo, ha sido sustituido por investigadores que, en ocasiones, no esconden sus creencias religiosas. La explicación de este cambio, que puede parecer trivial, está relacionada con la evolución de la ficción criminal de las últimas décadas, donde tanto el modelo del detective tradicional como tipo duro, como el propio género, han sido cuestionados y deconstruidos por una nueva generación de escritores.

Palabras clave: ficción criminal; detective duro; religión; cristianismo; posmodernismo; género literario

Fictional detectives, particularly those of the hard-boiled kind, do not usually express religious convictions (obvious exceptions include detective stories with a historical setting such as Ellis Peters's Brother Cadfael series, or Umberto Eco's William of Baskerville in *The Name of the Rose*, in which a non-religious monk would simply be unconvincing). Over recent decades, however, both the genre of crime fiction and the tough-guy model of fictional detective which emerged in the United States in the 1920s have been challenged and deconstructed by a number of crime writers. This process has revealed that the hard-boiled detective, far from being, in Raymond Chandler's words, "the best man in his world and a good enough man for any world" (1964, 198), is instead plagued by vulnerabilities, failings and deep-seated prejudices. In other words, he has become as inadequate as the rest of society. This acceptance of the detective's fall from omnipotent self-sufficiency has led, in some cases, to recourse to religious faith, a development which implicitly recognises the detective's acceptance of his own limitations as agent of redemption.

The popularity of the fictional detective in Western literature coincides, argues Carole M. Cusack in "Scarlet and Black: Non-Mainstream Religion as 'Other' in Detective Fiction Authors," with the increasing secularisation of society: "As organized religion retreated, it became more difficult to believe the theologically-charged notion that good and evil do not go unpunished, and that human life is ultimately meaningful, even when random violence threatens to destabilize both individual and community" (2005, 161). The detective provides the rational replacement for the priest, a man capable of "ascribing meaning to the otherwise random *minutiae* of existence" (Cusack 2005, 161). Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes is archetypal: rational, scientific, calculating and infallible. This is a view shared by Auden, who wrote in his essay "The Guilty Vicarage" that "the job of detective is to restore the state of grace in which the aesthetic and the ethical are as one" (1962, 254). In other words, as Brian Diemert comments, in the context of Auden's essay, "the garden is polluted by the crime of murder and the detective's work is redemptive" (2005, 168). Not that religion completely disappears, as G.K. Chesterton's fictional detective Father Brown—a Catholic priest—demonstrates, but it is significant that Chesterton, an enthusiastic convert to Catholicism, must make a detective of his priest if he is to be of any earthly use.

Cusack argues that the genre's secular, yet conservative, nature "frequently results in the demonization and punishment" (2005, 159) of minority religions. This is a view shared by Diemert who, in reference to cults and sects, argues that "the hard-boiled detective often scorns religious belief, and is frequently correct in suspecting those who claim supernatural or divine awareness" (2005, 171). While this may be true, the position of mainstream religion within the genre is left unresolved. This is problematic in that the rational detective, with the occasional exception of such figures as Father Brown—Cusack also refers to "Harry Kemelman's Rabbi David Small, Ellis Peters' Brother Cadfael, and Peter Tremayne's Sister Fidelma" (2005, 161)—is assumed to be not merely secular, but in direct opposition, albeit an unarticulated opposition, to the whole notion of religious belief, mainstream or not. Yet the genre is deeply conservative, the exegesis of bourgeois

fantasies of certainty, security and stability, and such conservatism would normally be expected to provide a privileged place for mainstream Christianity.

There is, then, an absence of mainstream religion in the works of writers such as Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler, Ross MacDonald and Robert B. Parker, though they may well, like Kathy Reichs, the writer used by Cusack to exemplify her thesis, pit their heroes—or heroines—against insidious sects (see, for example, Hammett's *The Dain Curse* [1930] and Parker's *Valediction* [1984]). "Indeed," claims Diemert, "the manipulative cult, the faked séance, the bogus church (or, relatedly, the bogus clinic), and the like have become so clichéd within the genre that we immediately suspect the tarot reader, crystal gazer, or spiritualistic medium of criminal behaviour or worse" (2005, 171). Nevertheless, the far more widespread presence of conventional Christianity is largely ignored despite the enormous possibilities for crime and corruption, jealousy and hatred that a religious setting might offer (a rare exception is Sara Paretsky's *Killing Orders*, published in 1985, in which a corrupt archbishop attempts to buy an insurance business in order to launder money proceeding from the recently collapsed Banco Ambrosiano). This situation has, however, recently changed. Two of the best-selling detective novelists of the 1990s and early twenty-first century, the Scotsman Ian Rankin, and the American writer James Lee Burke, have created openly Christian detectives who attend church and on occasion discuss their beliefs, while Jack Taylor, the self-destructive protagonist of Ken Bruen's *noir* novels set in Galway, Ireland, maintains an ambivalent yet ineluctable relationship with his childhood faith.

Ian Rankin's first Inspector Rebus novel, *Knots and Crosses*, was published in 1987. Based in Edinburgh, Rebus is, as Gill Plain explains, the very model of the hard-boiled detective: "dress him in a trench coat and you would have a very familiar figure: the Private Investigator as embodied by Raymond Chandler's Philip Marlowe" (2003, 56). Except that Rebus, as Plain fails to notice, is religious. In *Knots and Crosses*—its very title makes reference to Christianity—Rebus thinks of church-going:

> He hated congregational religion. He hated the smiles and the manners of the Sunday-dressed Scottish Protestant, the emphasis on a communion not with God but with your neighbours. He had tried seven churches of varying denominations in Edinburgh, and had found none to be to his liking. He had tried sitting for two hours at home of a Sunday, reading the Bible and saying a prayer, but somehow that did not work either. He was caught; a believer outwith [*sic*] his belief. Was a personal faith good enough for God? Perhaps, but not *his* personal faith, which seemed to depend upon guilt and his feelings of hypocrisy whenever he sinned, a guilt assuaged only by public show. (2000, 71)

Rebus is caught, as Rankin observes, but not only in the nature of his belief. He is also caught, or entangled, in the conventions of the genre: as a detective, can he compromise the rationality of his profession by acknowledging allegiance to the irrational? But concealing his belief behind the walls of his home, away from the cynical eye of his

colleagues, is not a solution, he discovers, since his faith requires public expression, and he finds himself trapped and confused, both as a Scottish Christian and as a literary detective. Twice more, in *Knots and Crosses*, Rebus seeks refuge in the *Good News Bible* and achieves a kind of solace, becoming at last "passive to the will of his malevolent creator" (2000, 149), a reference, not to God, perhaps, but to Rankin himself, who has embarked on the eccentric course of creating a religious hard-boiled detective. Rankin, or at least the novels' narratorial voice, suggests that Rebus's Christianity is tied to his identity as a Scot, a theme central to the novels, yet, uncharacteristically for the sectarian Scots, Rebus refuses to decide between Catholicism and Protestantism: "He had nothing against Catholics. The Protestant community might call them 'left-footers,' but Rebus himself kicked a ball with his left foot. He did, however, mistrust the shrine mentality. It made him uneasy: statues which wept or bled or moved. Sudden visions of the Virgin Mary. A face imprinted on a shroud" (2002a, 88-89). Despite his aversion for the miraculous, a consequence, perhaps, of his rationalist professional instincts, he finds himself dropping into a Catholic church in order to confess in *The Black Book* simply because it was "the first church he came to" (2003, 225). The priest—whose identity as Father Conor Leary is not revealed until the subsequent Rebus novel, *Mortal Causes*—is portrayed in rather clichéd fashion as a compassionate, down to earth Irishman, who claims to welcome Protestants, exhorting Rebus to "come back and talk to me again [because] I like to know what madness you Prods are thinking" (2002b, 227). The madness of Protestants, or more specifically Calvinists, is explained earlier when the priest claims to "know what you Calvinists think. You think you're doomed from the start, so why not raise some hell before you get there?" (2002b, 226-27). Certainly this seems to be Rebus's attitude to life in his role as a policeman, forever rebelling against the corrupt and obstructive authorities; he is an individualist, unable to play as a team member, and "operates as a PI within the police force" (Plain 2003, 58), a situation not uncommon in police detective fiction (see, for example, James Lee Burke's Robicheaux novels, discussed below, Colin Dexter's Inspector Morse, or R.D. Wingfield's Jack Frost). In Rebus's case this rebellious individuality is mirrored by his heterodox religious observance. Impatient with both Protestant and Catholic liturgy; uncomfortable attending church, yet unfulfilled by private worship, his relationship, or lack of it, with the ecclesiastical authorities serves as a spiritual backdrop to his adversarial position within the Edinburgh police force. His problems, as Diemert notes, are as much metaphysical as professional, a state of affairs that lends the earlier novels a depth not always found in crime fiction.

In *Mortal Causes*, Father Conor Leary, now something of a friend and mentor of Rebus's, asks him for help on a troublesome housing estate, "the roughest scheme in the city, maybe the country" (2002b, 18). "We're not around long enough to make any difference" (2002b, 17), complains Rebus, and the priest, together with the reader, assumes he is referring to his job as a policeman. Here, Sherlock Holmes would surely disagree: with every case logically solved the detective makes the world a better place. The fact that Rebus's doubts arise in the company of Leary merely underlines the incompatibility

of science and religion, and of policemen and priests, as Rebus himself tacitly confesses when, just before his death in *Dead Souls*, Father Leary asks Rebus to pray for him. Rebus is unable to accede to the dying priest's wishes: "[He h]adn't the heart to admit he'd stopped praying long ago" (1999, 179). By the final novel in the series, *Exit Music*, Rebus's colleague DS Clarke tells a younger officer that Rebus "used to be" religious, "in that he went to church . . . actually, he went to dozens of them, a different one every week" (2008, 118), to which the younger man—himself a committed Christian, and, it later emerges, one of the villains of the story—surmises "looking for something he couldn't find" (2008, 118). Rebus's flirtation with religion is not sustained, perhaps is unsustainable. Already in *Mortal Causes* we are told that "lately, [Rebus] didn't enjoy Father Leary's conversations so much. There was something proselytising about them" (2002b, 17). The hard-boiled detective, if he is to retain anything of the genre's characteristics, must go his own way. He is, as Raymond Chandler put it, "a lonely man and his pride is that you will treat him as a proud man or be very sorry you ever saw him" (1950, 198); he is not the kind of man who takes sermonising kindly.

Brian Diemert's analysis of the Rebus novels, "Ian Rankin and the God of the Scots," although concentrating on their religiosity, tends towards the conclusion that they are as much gothic and gnostic as Christian—characteristics, he argues, which are particularly potent in the Scottish context. This is undoubtedly true, as indeed it is true of most detective novels to a greater or lesser extent. The dualities inherent to gnosticism are also shared by crime novels with their detectives and villains while Christianity itself is deeply indebted to neo-Platonist thought. This being the case, it hardly seems necessary for the detective himself to have religious beliefs: Rankin would surely be as free to demonstrate the gothic influences on his work, to display the depth of his philosophical learning, and its significance for Edinburgh in particular, and Scotland in general, without inflicting faith on his hero, especially as, towards the end of the series, Rebus's Christianity is explicitly abandoned. Indeed, as Brian Diemert demonstrates, an increasingly important theme in the series is the relationship between Rebus and Big Ger Cafferty, leader of Edinburgh's principal crime organisation. The antagonism and mutual attraction experienced by the two men replaces the detective's search for religious comfort in a complex psychological relationship drawing on Edinburgh's literary past, and specifically Robert Louis Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*.

To return to the earlier Rebus novels, I believe Rankin to be consciously using religion to interrogate the contradictions, weaknesses and inconsistencies in the hard-boiled model that the contemporary detective novel has revealed. By blatantly forcing Rebus to examine himself through the filter of Christanity—a round peg in a square hole—Rankin questions not only the shortcomings of Scottish Calvinism but also the redemptive powers of the traditional literary detective. If Raymond Chandler's Philip Marlowe is Rebus's literary progenitor and model, then he is also a God with feet of clay. Rebus, like Marlowe, drinks too much and leads a solitary life cooped up in a dingy flat. Virtually nothing of Marlowe's domestic life is known—Chandler probably assuming it to be of no interest. In

fact, the only time we know that he actually has a bed to sleep in is when he finds Carmen Sternwood tucked up in it in *The Big Sleep*.

Perhaps it is for this reason that Rebus sleeps, as often as not, in a chair, nursing a glass of whisky, and looking out of his window at the street, there being nothing inside either his home or himself that he cares, or dares, to examine or cultivate. The strong, silent certainty of Philip Marlowe's redemptive masculinity is a lie, as numerous crime writers have discovered, and as Rankin reveals through Rebus. His doomed attempts to grapple with religion, either personal or public, are on a par with his struggle with alcohol. Rebus, unlike Marlowe, is painfully self-aware. He knows that he drinks too much and at times makes attempts to give it up. Drinking is symptomatic of a deeper problem, the kind of weakness that the traditional hard-boiled detective could not acknowledge. The Church, or Chapel, or Bible are part of Rebus's recognition of his failings, and of his own flawed humanity, and they represent his ongoing efforts to save himself. That they fail is inevitable and would be utterly incompatible with Rebus's character: to have spent his career rebelling against hypocritical, self-serving authority is hardly an appropriate preparation for submission to the Church. More importantly, a novel in which a protagonist endowed with Rebus's cynical character converts wholeheartedly to Christianity (or any mainstream religion) would be absurd and quite possibly spell the end of its author's literary career for its very incongruity. Rebus's flirtation with religion is then, I believe, one of Rankin's techniques for undermining the conventional self-sufficiency and omnipotence of the fictional detective, as well as providing a useful context for his explorations of gnosticism and the gothic both in the detective fiction genre and in the city of Edinburgh.

In America, the situation is different. James Lee Burke's Louisiana detective Dave Robicheaux, who makes his first appearance in *The Neon Rain* in 1987, is more consistently religious than Rebus. Indeed, his faith is identified from the beginning as one of his virtues: "You're a good man, you've got courage, you've never been on a pad, you go to Mass on Sundays, you treat the street people decently, and you put away a lot of the bad guys" (2000, 84), declares a US treasury official, in an accurate, if incomplete, summation of Robicheaux's character. He fails to mention the detective's alcoholism, semi-successfully held in check by regular Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, or his enormous capacity for violence, which is rarely restrained, only fleetingly condemned, and swiftly forgiven.

Attendance at Mass, however, is regularly reported: "I went to Mass at the university chapel in Lafayette, then ate deep-fried crawfish at Foti's in St. Martinville" (2007a, 289), we are told in *Pegasus Descending*, the kind of comment that may be found scattered throughout any of the long series of Dave Robicheaux novels. Mass is clearly as much a part of Robicheaux's life as eating, and equally problem-free. Although Robicheaux's faith is taken as read throughout the series, it is rarely interrogated in the troubled manner favoured by Ian Rankin. Partly this is because Robicheaux's relationship with the church is presented as being as much political and social as specifically religious. Despite his visit to the university chapel in Lafayette, his preferred venues for worship are humbler, such

as the church in St. Mary Parish where, as we are told in *Crusader's Cross*, "most of the parishioners were people of color and desperately poor" (2006, 42). For Robicheaux, the church is about the marginalised, the dispossessed and the vulnerable (though to the European ear it also sounds patronising), and it is in *Crusader's Cross* that he meets the woman who is to become his third wife, the previous two having been violently murdered in earlier novels. Molly Boyle is a nun when Robicheaux meets her, and he says,

> her attitudes and manner reminded me of other nuns I had known over the years, particularly those who had gone to jail for their political beliefs or been exposed to the risk of martyrdom in Central America. They seem to have no fear, or at least none that I could see. As a consequence, they didn't argue or defend, and the church to which they belonged was one they carried silently inside themselves. (2006, 192)

Molly Boyle is a woman of action rather than contemplation. Her proselytism, if it exists, is furthered through example rather than debate, and her many undoubted good works (we assume) are surely of greater benefit to humanity than any number of hours anguishing over her relationship with the almighty and his representatives on Earth. This is precisely the kind of church, and religion, that Robicheaux claims to believe in: "I think you've done a lot for poor people in this area, Sister Molly. I think you and your friends are what the Church is all about" (2006, 95), he tells her. Few people, Christians in particular, would disagree, yet enormous inconsistencies pervade the novels, as they do in many apparently religious societies. Robicheaux, like Rebus, is representative of the country that gave birth to him. Both are countries with a tradition of religiosity, of science, of culture and a ferocious work ethic, but they are also countries bedevilled by inequality, injustice, poverty and hypocrisy. Burke does not shy away from this, indeed the contradictions inherent in Robicheaux's character are analysed, at times with uncomfortable honesty. In *The Tin Roof Blowdown*, a novel specifically written to condemn the US government's failure to help the people of New Orleans during and after the devastation wreaked by Hurricane Katrina, Robicheaux muses,

> Supposedly we are a Christian society, or at least one founded by Christians. According to our self-manufactured mythos, we revere Jesus and Mother Teresa and Saint Francis of Assisi. But I think the truth is otherwise. When we feel collectively threatened, or when we are collectively injured, we want the Earp brothers and Doc Holliday on the job and we want the bad guys smoked, fried, and plowed under with bulldozers.
>
> For that reason, I no longer feel guilt and shame over my own inclinations. (2007b, 245)

Robicheaux (or Burke), then, reconciles his religion to his flaws and remains untroubled by its failure to provide satisfactory answers: "I never figured out any of the great mysteries: why the innocent suffer, why wars and pestilence seem to be our lot, why evil men prosper and go unpunished while the poor and downtrodden are oppressed," he confesses in *The*

Glass Rainbow (2010, 514). Unlike Rankin, Burke is able, within the context of modern American society, to create and sustain a hero who is both rebellious and devout and who, although somewhat sentimental and melodramatic, is neither inconsistent nor intellectually dishonest. Perhaps this may be partly explained away by the difference between an inflexible and unforgiving Calvinism on the one hand and an accommodating and worldly Catholicism on the other; it certainly seems to represent a difference in how religion is perceived on either side of the Atlantic. Robicheaux, although unquestionably Catholic, is, as we have seen, religious on his own terms. He is happy to leave the finer points of doctrine to others; for him it is the people he chooses to share his worship with, and the good deeds rather than fine words of practising Christians such as Molly, that he values most. He is also, if necessary, prepared to abandon, at least temporarily, Christian ideas such as the turning of the other cheek, if this should prove expedient. He reflects, therefore, in the words of Greil and Davidman, "the tendency of people [in contemporary American society] to pick and choose what they will and will not practice and believe within a religious tradition" (2007, 557). Robicheaux enjoys an extraordinary flexibility in his religious beliefs that Rebus, ultimately, cannot reconcile himself to. If, as Greil and Davidman report, "contemporary Americans [are] religious seekers through which they enact their freely chosen religious commitments and identities" (2007, 557), then Robicheaux has sought, and to a large extent found, those elements of Catholicism that are congenial to him, while simply ignoring or rejecting those which are not. Ironically, Rebus consciously sets out on the same journey of discovery—that of seeking those elements of Christianity acceptable to him—but he does so without Robicheaux's doctrinal flexibility. For Rebus, his faith must be all or nothing, consistent, complete and unfailing, or it is not worth having. Interestingly, Greil and Davidman conclude their study of religion and identity with a comment on the reconciliation of incongruous identities, and their use of language is instructive. They speak of "struggle" and "attempts to balance" (2007, 560) incompatibilities without specifying how successful this might be. In Rebus's case it is not: his identity as a detective is incompatible with religion, however hard he might try to shoehorn the latter into place.

A third religious detective is Ken Bruen's Jack Taylor. Not, however, that he is officially a member of the profession, a characteristic shared by a number of fictional, private eyes of recent years such as James Sallis's Lew Griffin, Walter Mosley's Easy Rawlins and George Pelecanos's Nick Stefanos. Taylor began as a policeman, a member of the Irish *Garda Síochána*, but was dismissed for hitting a politician and, being obliged to change careers, goes private (as, indeed, does Dave Robicheaux for a while). His unofficial status is explained, perhaps with tongue in cheek, at the beginning of *The Guards*, the first novel in the series, where he explains that "there are no private eyes in Ireland. The Irish wouldn't wear it. The concept brushes perilously close to the hated 'informer.' You can get away with most anything except 'telling'" (2010, 11). Taylor's refusal to accept the title of detective, or private eye, contributes to Bruen's general policy of interrogating and subverting the traditional hard-boiled detective model, along with his chronic alcoholism and drug

abuse, his failure to maintain a relationship with friends and lovers, his lack of a code of chivalric behaviour and his inability to solve his cases.

Taylor's relationship with God and Catholicism is ambivalent, often contradictory and frequently confrontational. He has a particular dislike for priests who are representatives of an oppressive and authoritarian institution, while the Roman Catholic church is an object of scandal and international opprobrium, which Bruen deals with directly: *Priest* and *The Magdalen Murders*, for example, investigate, respectively, the sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests, and the real life scandal of the Church's exploitation and cruelty towards unmarried mothers in a Galway laundry.

Despite this, Taylor retains his faith in the almighty. Of churches, he explains in *The Guards* that "the ritual, the smell of incense, the Latin intonations are a comfort beyond articulation" (2010, 53). He frequently attends Mass, though, like Rebus, he has no regular place of worship and lights candles for the dead, the number of his family and friends who have died, like the number of candles he lights, steadily increasing as the series goes on. Candles, however, are not what they were, and Taylor complains on a number of occasions about the substitution of wax candles for automated electric ones which light up when a coin is dropped in a box. Bruen deliberately juxtaposes this disappointment in the Church—its obsession with money, its tawdriness, its dishonesty, its failure to provide comfort—with an unexpected meeting, on the steps of the church, with an old friend, Janet, who "uttered the closest thing to an Irish benediction. 'Let me have a look at you.' Centuries of care in that. And *look* they do, but with tenderness, concern." The friend, whose "face lit up, much like the top row of candles," is able to give Taylor precisely what the church fails to do. It is in his dealings with people that Taylor finds his God. It is, after all, Janet who provides "the closest thing to a benediction" (2007, 67).

In *Cross*, Taylor once again goes to church because "you're Catholic, you're reared to believe that there is sanctuary there" (2008b, 304). However, "with all the recent scandals, it was less a place of refuge than the belly of the beast" (2008b, 305). Why then, does Taylor remain a believer and continue going to church? In a number of the novels he finds himself reacting simply from childhood indoctrination, particularly with regard to blessing himself. In *The Guards* he tells us that "some rituals just surface without beckoning" (2010, 233), while in *The Dramatist*, "as the bus pulled off, from old habit, I blessed myself" (2008a, 128). Taylor's faith is not, then, either intellectual, or even particularly spiritual, it is ascriptional, a result of habit and upbringing. As he explains in *Priest*, "Priests and I hadn't exactly a good history, but you grow up Catholic, they have you. Deny all you like, they own your arse" (2007, 44). Taylor's relationship with his religion is one of conscious helplessness. He disapproves of almost all of its earthly manifestations, particularly its ministers, yet retains a childlike faith in the mystery of God from which he cannot, nor wishes to, escape.

Taylor and Robicheaux, unlike Rebus, do not for a moment consider changing to another denomination, and neither makes much attempt to justify or rationalise his beliefs—for the most part they are simply what they grew up with, although neither

hesitates to abandon or ignore those aspects of their faith that they find particularly incongenial. It is not, then, any coincidence that Bruen's and Burke's novels also include the devil as antagonist. Virtually all of Burke's books insist on the evil nature of criminals, particularly those who become the object of Robicheaux's investigations (this is also true of Burke's novels about Texas attorney, Billy Bob Holland). Typical are the villains of Burke's 2010 novel, *The Glass Rainbow*, on whose evil Robicheaux briefly, if dismissively ponders: "I didn't care to dwell on the psychological complexities of evil men. Whether their kind possesses the wingspread of a Lucifer or a moth is a question better left to theologians" (2010, 518). Evil, then, is taken for granted as existing, and neither the sociological nor the theological implications merit analysis. Earlier in the novel, and discussing the same men, Robicheaux refuses to accept that their malevolence should have been caused by childhood trauma, poverty or deprivation: "none of the aforementioned seems to offer an adequate explanation for their behaviour" (2010, 95), he insists, preferring to place the blame squarely on the devil. Ken Bruen, meanwhile, devotes an entire novel—*The Devil* (2010)—to Satan, in which Jack Taylor is pitted against Lucifer—or someone remarkably like him—finally seeing him off by sending him across the Irish Sea to England. Burke's treatment of evil is quite clearly intended to be taken seriously, while with Bruen there is room for scepticism, or even mockery. However, the use of concepts such as evil and the devil as explanations for criminal behaviour are significant; we have come full circle. If the infallible Sherlock Holmes's task was to reveal the often mundane motives for crime, Dave Robicheaux's response is to hold the supernatural responsible for events that he cannot comprehend, and in doing so he relinquishes his responsibility even to attempt to understand them. For Rankin this would be intellectually dishonest and, as has been observed, the emphasis in his novels slowly moves away from religion to concentrate instead on the troubled and troubling relationship between Rebus and crime kingpin Big Ger Cafferty. In other words, the contradictions and ambivalences of human behaviour take centre stage as the role of religion is written out of the play.

The representation of religion in some contemporary detective novels may, in the end, merely be a reflection of the heterogeneous and diverse nature of religious belief in Western society: President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were reported as having prayed together, although the latter denied it (*Guardian*, "Tony Blair Denies Praying with George Bush," 25 July, 2012), something unthinkable even between arch-conservative allies and fellow Christians Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who would have kept such things to themselves. There is, however, another explanation for this change in the hard-boiled model. The hard drinking, invincible, solitary detective favoured by authors such as Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler and Mickey Spillane has long been exposed as a sexist, racist, homophobic alcoholic, incapable of maintaining any kind of meaningful relationship with his fellow man or woman—indeed, in the case of Mickey Spillane's Mike Hammer, he might fairly be described as a psychopath. Authors such as Sara Paretsky, Joseph Hansen or James Sallis—whose detectives are, respectively,

women, gay, and black—have questioned the sexism, homophobia and racism of their literary predecessors, but in doing so they also question the model's invincibility. Sara Paretsky's detective, V.I. Warshawski, for example, is more frequently the victim, rather than the dispenser of violence. James Sallis's Lew Griffin is a hopeless alcoholic, as is George Pelecanos's detective Nick Stefanos. These detectives, together with Walter Mosley's Easy Rawlins and Sue Grafton's Kinsey Millhone, among others, depict a detective no longer sure of him, or herself, vulnerable, often the victims of violence and frequently unable to resolve their cases satisfactorily.

According to Auden, whose interest in detective fiction centred on the traditional English country house murder mystery, "the interest in the detective story is the dialectic of innocence and guilt" (1962, 147) and culminates in a restoration "to the Garden of Eden, to a state of innocence" (1962, 158). Such a world—the world also of P.G. Wodehouse's Bertie Wooster—never existed: as Auden acknowledges, it is a fantasy, but it was not so fantastic that the reader could not imagine him or herself soothed in its gentle embrace. But, just as the detective stories of the early twentieth century responded to a loss of religious faith by substituting God, Jesus or the priesthood for a temporal, redemptive equivalent, contemporary readers (and writers) have in turn lost faith in the upright, omniscient investigator. Innocence and guilt have become blurred and the existence of the Garden, either now or in the distant past, doubtful. This is not, however, to be lamented. The false, although comforting, illusion that truth and justice will prevail thanks to the sturdy efforts of a few incorruptible parsons and policemen is hardly the mark of a mature society. The imperfect, yet still sympathetic postmodern detective surely represents a step forward, and if he becomes religious, well this is simply a cry for help, an acknowledgement of his failure to be self-sufficient, as is his recourse to the bottle, to violence, and the occasional one night stand.

It is within this context that Rebus, Robicheaux and Taylor turn to religion, which both explains and mitigates their failings. For Rebus, the contradiction between what he is, and what he believes the church should be, is ultimately too great, but for Robicheaux, who comes from a religious tradition long practised in accommodating itself to, or forgiving of—whichever one prefers—violence, injustice and hypocrisy, there is no difficulty in reconciling his hard-boiled detective identity to his beliefs. His hard-drinking is recognised for what it is—alcoholism—and is pardoned. His violence, within the limitations imposed by a violent genre, is both celebrated and deplored, and then forgiven. Taylor, meanwhile, unlike Rebus, has no expectations that the church can save him, or even help him. Nor does he assume, as Robicheaux does, that his sins will be forgiven. Jack Taylor, even more than John Rebus and Dave Robicheaux, is particularly representative of much recent detective fiction. No longer rational nor infallible, the fictional detective turns to the Church without even really knowing why—perhaps out of instinct, sentiment, loyalty or hopelessness. He has no answers to offer, neither explanations nor solutions, and religion, with its emphasis on mystery, dependence, salvation—and the existence of evil—makes its return.

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REVIEWS

RESEÑAS

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Stephen Greenblatt. 2012. *The Swerve: How the World Became Modern*. New York and London: W. W. Norton. 356 pp. ISBN: 978-0-393-34340-3 (paperback).

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Stephen Greenblatt needs no introduction. If his academic reputation will probably stand or fall by his classic works *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980) and *Shakespearean Negotiations* (1989), his current international celebrity is the outcome of his best-selling biography of Shakespeare, *Will in the World* (2004), and now *The Swerve: How the World Became Modern*, winner in the United States of the National Book Award for Nonfiction (2011) and the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction (2012). Like *Will in the World*, it has had a mixed reception amongst specialist reviewers, whooped up or shot down depending (or so it seems at times) on which side of the Atlantic they are writing from. The putative father of New Historicism, Greenblatt has self-effacingly confessed to feeling mystified at his alleged paternity of a movement whose name is a "not particularly deeply thought-out term" (qtd. in Miller 2005). For some not very new (Tillyard's *Elizabethan World Picture* plus Theory), for others not very historical (the anecdote—"the touch of the real"—puffed up to the level of cultural norm), New Historicism also goes by the name of "cultural poetics," a stance towards literature which considers that the text is culturally produced and authorially created in equal measure and exists in a symbiotic relationship of mutual shaping with history or ideology (see Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000).

The Swerve is a work of cultural poetics in a different sense. Tracing as it does the genesis, loss and rediscovery of Lucretius' great philosophical epic *De rerum natura*, Greenblatt's book sets out to examine the part played by a particular literary work in the formation of the modern world. The chief facilitator of this allegedly epoch-making process was "unemployed papal secretary turned book hunter" (jacket blurb) Poggio Bracciolini who, we are told with relish halfway through the story, "was unleashing something that threatened his whole mental universe" (Greenblatt 2012, 182). Of course, Greenblatt knows that the discovery of a dusty manuscript in a German monastery almost 600 years ago did not change the world overnight: as he writes in the Preface, "One poem by itself was certainly not responsible for an entire intellectual, moral, and social transformation" (11). But this is a caveat soon dispelled from the reader's mind by the force of the book's rhetoric and the gusto of its narrative which together press home the message that Lucretius made modernity.

Chapter one introduces us to Poggio riding horseback through Southern Germany in the winter of 1417. And that is all that happens, or all we can surmise actually happened. Which is why, less than four lines into his tale, Greenblatt switches to subjunctive mode: "As must have been immediately apparent . . . he would probably have been . . . would have" (14). Here and throughout the book, the paucity of the historical record is made good by speculation, or by the sort of negative historiography Nicholas of Cusa might have indulged in:

> That [Poggio] was not country-bred was clear, and yet he did not resemble any of the city and court dwellers . . . . Unarmed and unprotected by a clanging suit of armor, he was certainly not a Teutonic knight—one stout blow from a raw-boned yokel's club would have easily felled him. Though he did not seem to be poor, he had none of the familiar signs of wealth and status: he was not a courtier, with gorgeous clothes and perfumed hair worn in long lovelocks, nor was he a nobleman out hunting and hawking. And, as was plain from his clothes and the cut of his hair, he was not a priest or a monk. (14)

Padding of this sort is rife in a work whose threadbare plot becomes an excuse for a series of lengthy excursions into various chapters of European cultural history from Ptolomaic Alexandria to Renaissance Florence, while Lucretius' poem and book-hunting Poggio can only stand by and watch from the sidelines. Unfortunately that history is an all too familiar landscape of cliché and stereotype: the Roman senatorial class spent every available moment of leisure reclining, nibbling grapes and discussing philosophy; the byways of early fifteenth-century Germany were traipsed by bands of "masterless men;" Renaissance courtiers, curial officials and popes were all irremediably venal and scurrilous.

When not hawking second-hand wares, by enshrining the scabrous and anecdotal—lowlights include the mortification practised by Henry Suso and Elsbeth of Oye, the imprisonment of Jan Hus and the bridling of Giordano Bruno (108, 168, 240-41)—Greenblatt's account of the past risks becoming the Horrible History Terry Deary and his imitators have so successfully served up to recent generations of British schoolchildren. Most alarmingly, the reduction of history to cliché leads to the glib formulation of untenable generalizations. Speaking, for instance, of the rise of monastic asceticism between the fourth and eleventh centuries CE and its pernicious spread through medieval Europe, Greenblatt writes, "In one of the great cultural transformations in the history of the West, the pursuit of pain triumphed over the pursuit of pleasure" (103). One wonders if the forebears of the footsore "masterless men" noticed any difference, and Poggio's own eyewitness account of fun-loving Baden (173-76) rather spoils Greenblatt's case; but the damage has been done and one is left either to pay obeisance at the feet of the Harvard *philosophe* or to lament the dumbing-down apparently required by addressing a non-specialist public.

But to return to the story: in chapter one, Poggio rides through southern Germany *en route*, most probably, to the monastery of Fulda; Greenblatt offers an excursus on

those "masterless men" and a brief summary of Poggio's biography to date. In chapter two, Poggio discovers the manuscript of Lucretius; excursus on monks as "principal readers, librarians, book preservers and book producers of the western world" (29) and on scribes and scriptoria. In chapter three, Poggio is abandoned in favour of a sketch of the lives and philosophy of Epicurus and Lucretius, the reception they may have enjoyed among Roman readers and an excursus on archaeological finds at Herculaneum, notably at the House of the Papyri, which, back in subjunctive mood, may have belonged to Epicurean Philodemus who may have possessed a codex of *De rerum natura.* Chapter four narrates the "Great Vanishing" (86) of the ancient world's written cultural capital due to the ravages of time, Christian philistinism and, above all, the destruction of the library of Alexandria; it is in this chapter that Greenblatt introduces the pain principle and institutionalised self-flagellation as a pious response to Epicurean pleasure. By providing a useful potted history of the Florentine renaissance, chapter five returns us to Poggio and the main plot; despite gestures at continuist views of the renaissance, Greenblatt's account is the traditional one, Petrarch the leading light. In chapter six Poggio attains the position of apostolic secretary to "the sinister, sly and ruthless Baldassare Cossa" (154), and we learn of his spats with Lorenzo Valla and of the Aretine smut that besmirched the Curia in Rome. In chapter seven Poggio is at the Council at Constance where the claims are to be settled of the three self-appointed popes, Cossa, Pedro de Luna and Angelo Correr; this permits Greenblatt to weave Hus into his tale and leaves Poggio only a horse-ride away from Fulda. Chapter eight is a digest of the philosophical ideas of *De rerum natura*, "almost every one of [whose] key principles was an abomination to right-thinking Christian orthodoxy" (202). Well, yes and no: as Greenblatt himself acknowledges earlier, "early Christians, Tertullian among them, found certain features in Epicureanism admirable," particularly its ethics (101) which, as Greenblatt demonstrates later, the fatefully orthodox Thomas More would implant in his *Utopia* (227-33); and the mantra of the ancient materialist philosophers, "ex nihilo nihil fit" was conveniently paralleled in Solomon's "there is nothing new under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1.9-10), as Giordano Bruno among others would point out. Chapter nine completes Poggio's biography: almost four years in the service of Henry Beaumont (bishop of Winchester and uncle of Henry V), late second marriage, Chancellor of Florence.

The last two chapters, ten and eleven, bring us to the material which should prove Greenblatt's thesis that, indeed, Lucretius' *De rerum natura* created the modern world. The influence of Lucretius is traced in Macchiavelli's view of religion as a means of repression through fear; in Valla's *On Pleasure* (*De voluptate*), written in the 1430s, not published until much later; in More's *Utopia*; in the works of Bruno; and, almost in passing, in the atomism of Thomas Hariot. Shakespeare is given short shrift (Mercutio's "atomi," *Romeo and Juliet* I.iv.58), Spenser and Donne none at all, though their Lucretianism is beyond doubt (Greenlaw 1920; Hirsch 1991; Passannante 2008); Montaigne is given pride of place; then a quick sprint through Pierre Gassendi, who reconciled atomism with Christianity in the 1640s, Lucy Hutchinson, Isaac Newton and Erasmus Darwin

leads us to Thomas Jefferson's 1820 confession that "I am an Epicurean" (263). Greenblatt is silent on Erasmus' *Epicureus* (1533) and on the important Spanish transmission of Epicurean ideas, through Juan Luis Vives among others, which found an outlet in *La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes* (1554?) (Colahan 2001). Above all, he ignores Francesco Zabarella's defence of Epicureanism (*De felicitate*, 1400), mentioned in the standard history of Italian philosophy (Garin 2008, 189), and thirteenth-century debates over the relative merits of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism, in which a leading figure was Siger of Brabant (c.1240-1280). The problem Zabarella and Siger pose for Greenblatt's thesis is, of course, that they had detailed knowledge of Epicureanism before Poggio's discovery of the manuscript at Fulda, which rather blows a hole in his thesis. So too did Isidore of Seville, Bede, Hrabanus Maurus, William of Conches and Vincent of Beauvais (Stones 1928; Bercovitch 1968). In fact, after Plotinus medieval philosophers devoted great energy to the vexed issue of whether the ancient materialists were merely "naturalist philosophers" or could be Platonised and made compatible with Christian doctrine. In short, despite Vesuvius and the destruction of the library of Alexandria, ancient materialist ideas and Epicureanism had survived and modernity might well have been possible without the kick-start provided by Poggio's discovery.

Except for Gillespie and Hardie (2007), Osler (2007) and Struever (1992), little has been published on the true and intricate history of the transmission of Epicureanism or "atomism" before Gassendi. Any approach to this tradition would need to take full stock of the references to Epicurus (and Empedocles, Leucippus and Democritus) not only in Diogenes Laertius, but also in Aristotle, Plato and Cicero, and to Epicurus and Lucretius in Seneca, Pliny the Elder and Plutarch's *Moralia*; it would need to be familiar with the Neoplatonists and the medieval transmission of Epicurean ideas; it would need to explore the many different ways in which ideas were exchanged between Italy and England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Greenblatt's book does none of this. Most disappointingly, in a work inspired by the writer's avowed love of Lucretius, precious little of the poetry actually gets in, apart from raunchier bits like the hymn to Venus and the celebration of human coupling. Lucretius is undoubtedly a poet for our non-foundational times, his a voice wiser, more humane and less shrill than the stridencies of Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. He deserves better representation than that afforded by Greenblatt's book.

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Two decades after its publication in 1993, Paul Gilroy's groundbreaking study *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* continues to inspire new approaches to the black diaspora across a range of academic disciplines. Gilroy's was one of the first books to seriously address the intricate web of cultural encounters generated by the shameful history of slavery and colonisation and, despite his claims that his concerns were "strictly provisional" (xi), the book has become one of the most profoundly influential, albeit deeply controversial, studies on the African diaspora and transnational black identities. Critiques of Gilroy have mainly come from those who consider his views somewhat restricted or biased, for instance, in his treatment of Africa as little more than a provider of raw materials (Piot 2001); his ahistorical and metaphoric use of slavery and his celebration of nomadism (Dayan 1996); his privileging of the Anglophone branch of the African diaspora (Zeleza 2005), or his masculinist paradigm that ignores the specific ways in which women have been constrained in the Black Atlantic (DeLoughrey 1998), to cite just a few examples. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that, as Evans points out in her exhaustive overview of the book's reception since the 1990s, "the apparent inconsistencies within Gilroy's theoretical framework have led to productive debates and significant shifts in methodology within literary and cultural studies" (2009, 257).

The volume under review—originating from a workshop held at the University of Huelva in 2007—is sound evidence of the ongoing debate over Gilroy's Black Atlantic. In their introduction, the editors of *New Perspectives on the Black Atlantic*, both prestigious scholars in the field, pay tribute to the enduring influence of Gilroy's paradigm, while also drawing attention to some of its limitations, which still require further "questioning and reassessing" (11). The collection declares its decentering orientation through its attempt "to go beyond Gilroy's mostly North American focus" (11) in order to include both Africa and Europe, but also non-Anglophone areas neglected by Gilroy's model. It is interdisciplinary in scope, although there is a predominance of literary studies, the area where Gilroy seems to have been most influential. And in an apt rhizomorphic turn, the volume displays constant crisscrossings between its four thematic sections ("Definitions," "Readings,"

"Practices," "Dialogues"), as the diverse articles engage, from various angles and locations, with concerns that rework some of Gilroy's "provisional" conclusions or theoretical limitations, discussing issues such as the role of Africa in the Black Atlantic paradigm, the potential of the nation as a source of cohesion and identity, the decentering of the Black Atlantic through the incorporation of non-Atlantic black diasporic constituencies, or the need to historicise and politicise the Black Atlantic in contemporary global culture.

The five articles included in part one, "Definitions," all acknowledge the huge impact of the Black Atlantic in contemporary theory while simultaneously discussing some of the shortcomings of Gilroy's model. Laura Chrisman's essay maps out the theoretical terrain of the Black Atlantic by reviewing the evolution of transnational blackness in literary, cultural and historical studies in the last twenty years within the US academe, much indebted to Gilroy's formulations. Chrisman criticises what she considers a generalised "myopia, even blindness, towards the continent of Africa" (24) and towards the contribution of Africans to the creation of black transnational cultures, in contrast to the keen integration of Caribbean thinkers, activists and artists into American studies, in a US-centric paradigm that rules out other geographical locations of the black diaspora in the American continent. Chrisman suggests that the adoption of a postcolonial perspective may foster a critique of this almost imperialistic approach to black transnational studies while also allowing for an analysis of black America in terms of internal colonialism within the global capitalist system.

Both Kathleen Gyssels' and Christabelle Peters' chapters lament that the mapping of the Black Atlantic remains largely Anglophone and fails to accommodate non-Anglophone black identities. Gyssels considers that this parochialism unfortunately forecloses a more fruitful dialogue between similar notions and concepts across linguistic borders and she argues for a comparative analysis of Gilroy and Glissant, since their formulations about black diaspora, black music or hybridity and métissage present obvious convergences, and potentially enriching divergences, despite them being rarely compared. Similarly, Peters argues that Gilroy's focus on "routes" renders his Black Atlantic theory less useful in understanding the significance and implications of *africanía* in certain locations of the African diaspora, like Cuba, where the concept of Africanness transcended ethnicity to become a metaphorical principle with a strong bearing on national identity. In her analysis, this helps to explain the success of Cuba's Operation Carlota in Angola in 1975 as a re-enactment of the return-to-Africa myth.

Daria Tunca explores the applicability of Gilroy's Black Atlantic to contemporary African literature, in spite of the limitations deriving from Gilroy's dismissal of the national model, which in Africa cannot be sidelined completely, even though African literature is becoming increasingly diasporic and shaped by "a web of cultural influences" (109). Tunca argues that no definitive categorisation of African literature(s) can be provided, as the definition is complicated by issues pertaining to nationality, diasporic experience, subject matter or language. Nevertheless, she proposes the label "African literature" as convenient shorthand to accommodate the complexity and wealth of the field.

Finally, Gary Younge's essay argues for expanding the notion of the Black Atlantic by incorporating the current shift from race to religion and culture in the conceptualisation of Europe's "Other," a pattern that has been accelerating since 9/11. The article exposes Europe's (and specifically Britain's) hypocrisy in its repositioning of whiteness as "the defender of Enlightenment values" (131) of tolerance, democracy and freedom, while being involved in persecution, genocide and torture, both within and outside national borders.

The four essays in part two, "Readings," focus on literary and artistic texts from diverse Black Atlantic constituencies, to explore how they unveil the limitations of Gilroy's theory while suggesting alternative approaches to contemporary black identities. Both John McLeod and Imen Najar consider, as Tunca did, that the prescriptively transnational focus of Gilroy's theory makes him reject potentially agentive cultural forms on the grounds of their sedentary or essentialist nature. McLeod's analysis of Jackie Kay's novel *Trumpet*, whose focus on adoption foregrounds affiliative bonds that preclude reductive biological notions of identity, suggests that other more sedentary positions, such as invoking a sense of racial or national belonging, should not be dismissed as strategic elements of cohesion and identity. In an entirely different cultural context, Imen Najar shows how Trinidadian Robert Antoni's novel *Carnival* foregrounds the importance of national creativity and cultural formation in the development of communal cohesion through the use of Caribbean carnival, "an archetypal home-rooted form of creativity" (156) and a transgressive, fluid and hybrid form, as an element of communal linkage that may allow to transcend the racial and historical divisions plaguing the ethnically-diverse Trinidadian society.

Wumi Raji's essay, like Chrisman's before, critiques Gilroy's neglect of Africa which, he argues, remains important for diasporic blacks as an inspirational rather than a literal homeland. He then analyses Nigerian Bode Sowande's play *Tornadoes Full of Dreams*, showing how it exposes the ironies underlying Western ideals of modernity, rationality and equality and emphasises the painful material conditions of slavery (obscured by Gilroy's celebration of travel and displacement), as well as the need for both Africa and Europe to acknowledge their specific responsibility before a call for black solidarity across the Atlantic can be made.

Eva Ulrike Pirker's approach is rather more positive in her analysis of Caryl Phillips's *The Atlantic Sound* and Isaac Julien's *Paradise Omeros*. These artists, she argues, embody Gilroy's model in their multiperspectivistic and formally fragmented representation of the multiple constituencies of the Black Atlantic, which through cross-references and connecting elements build into rhizomorphic, fractal structures that question the fixity of both spaces and subjects. Nonetheless, Pirker underlines that their work also calls for a focus on political awareness and the need for the Black Atlantic to adapt to the changing political conditions in the black diaspora.

Part three, "Practices," brings together four articles that explore the influence of Gilroy's model on academic disciplines, research and teaching practices. Kathleen Chater's essay shows how her work as a genealogist has challenged the traditional approach to historical

research on black people in England by changing the focus from the newsworthy exceptions to ordinary people's lives. This has resulted in the creation of the first database of black people in Britain, which, she believes, might be helpful for writers fictionalising the Black Atlantic experience.

Mar Gallego and Judith Misrahi-Barak map out Gilroy's impact on teaching practices in Spain and France, respectively. Gallego provides exhaustive data showing how Gilroy's approach, together with the current European convergence process, has been deeply influential in the development of interdisciplinary studies, although she points out that the Black Atlantic remains basically circumscribed to departments of English and French, and has been less successful in Spanish departments. Similarly, Misrahi-Barak connects the lack of French academic enthusiasm towards Gilroy's theory with the French republican discourse's obliteration of racism, nationalism and colonialism from the public space. She also considers that the rigid compartmentalisation of French academe often hinders interdisciplinary work, a point also made by Gallego about Spain. Still in the field of teaching, Emad Mirmotahari's chapter focuses on his experience of teaching African literatures to undergraduate students as a way to highlight cosmopolitanisms other than that described by Gilroy. Mirmotahari decenters the Atlantic by setting up a dialogue between Gilroy's theory and Abdulrazak Gurnah's novels on the African immigration routes in the Indian Ocean basin in order to expand Gilroy's notion of diaspora to one that is not mediated through Europe and does not involve the Americas.

Finally, part four, "Dialogues," brings the focus onto two Black Atlantic writers, Caryl Phillips and Lawrence Hill, who discuss their respective work as well as wider issues about literature and identity. John McLeod's interview with Caryl Phillips, considered by many as *the* Black Atlantic writer, engages with issues discussed in earlier chapters, like the role of Africa in the Black Atlantic or the need to shift the focus in transatlantic studies from race to class or religion. Much of the interview discusses Phillips's work *Foreigners*, which explores the diverse ways that notions of foreignness, otherness and Englishness are played out in different English locations and temporal settings. In conversation with Pilar Cuder, African-Canadian Lawrence Hill, a self-defined "person of many places," foregrounds his concern with black history, in particular with the story of the Black Loyalists sailing from Halifax, Canada, to Sierra Leone in the first back-to-Africa movement, a historical episode he fictionalises in his novel *The Book of Negroes*, which explores the complexities of the slave trade and traces the multiple locations and discontinuous identities of the black diasporic subjects it generated.

On the whole, this is a stimulating collection of engaging and well-researched essays that fulfill the editors' stated aim of "expand[ing] the notion of the 'Black Atlantic' beyond its original racial, geographical, linguistic and cultural borders" (12), thus bearing witness to the thriving state of Black Atlantic studies. The volume brings together an array of theoretically sophisticated perspectives that update some of Gilroy's "provisional" formulations from diverse academic and cultural constituencies, in an encompassing and well-grounded contribution to the growing body of critical work on black diaspora.

The editorial work should be praised for assembling such a diversity of approaches and methodologies into a coherent and unredundant volume, which will be an essential reference for any researcher interested in Black Atlantic studies.

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Manuela Palacios, ed. 2012. *Forked Tongues. Galician, Basque and Catalan Women's Poetry in Translations by Irish Writers*. Bristol: Shearsman. 20 + 164pp. ISBN: 978-1-84861-241-9.

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Associate Professor of English Literature at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Manuela Palacios is no stranger to anthologising. In 2010, together with writer and lecturer in creative writing Mary O'Donnell, she edited *To the Winds Our Sails. Irish Writers Translate Galician Poetry*, a bilingual (galego [Galician]- English / Irish) volume, published by Salmon Poetry in Ireland and which, as Palacios states in her introduction, "served as a guide" (2012, 13) in producing *Forked Tongues*. Moreover, in 2003 her own translations of Irish women poets into Galician and those of colleague and poet Arturo Casas had appeared in the bilingual volume *Pluriversos: Seis poetas irlandesas de hoxe* [Pluriversos: Six Irish Women Poets of Today].[1] The present anthology is her most ambitious project to date in terms of range since she has moved beyond the Celtic connection (Galicia-Ireland / Ireland-Galicia), although Galician women poets command a significant presence in the volume, to embrace women writers in the other two autonomous communities in the Spanish state whose tongues may also be envisaged as "forked," i.e., those whose origins lie in Euskadi—The Basque Country—and Catalunya—Catalonia. The image adopted for the main title of the volume draws on Eavan Boland's "The Mother Tongue" and Marilar Aleixandre's "nun coitelo de sal" [On a Knife of Salt]. The pertinent lines from the two poems are reproduced as epigraph and, as Palacios explains in the opening paragraph of her introduction, the image is intended here to evoke both the relationship between the Galician, Basque, Catalan languages and English, as well as the bilingual condition of the writers and the communities they hail from, where the languages in question possess a co-official status with Castilian Spanish.

The volume includes fifty-two poems by thirteen poets: five Galicians are followed by four Basques and, finally, four Catalans; the eldest were born in the 1950s and the youngest of all in 1980. Therefore, in chronological terms with regard to the more senior among the contributors, the text harks back to the time of the Franco regime, though all have

[1] All the Irish women poets included in the 2003 anthology write in English save Nuala Ní Dhomhnaill, who writes exclusively in Irish. For information on Palacios's further publications in 2008, 2009 and 2010, fruits of research projects on contemporary Irish and Galician writers, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, see Palacios 2012, 182.

published as poets in the wake of the dictator's demise. The Irish writers responsible for rendering their work into English range from those who write in Irish and English, or exclusively in English, some are members of *Aosdána*, Ireland's academy of the arts, and some are academics as well as practising writers. It may be said, then, that the creative cluster is rich and promising and, indeed, the names and production listed under "Authors and Translators" (Palacios 2012, 171-81) confirm that it is in no way negligible.

The selection of poetry from the thirteen poets included in *Forked Tongues* reveals a focus on subjects which are familiar to a reader of poetry in the Western tradition, thus, birth, love, death, time and transience, loss, longing, memory. However, the poems are distinct in the attention awarded women's existence and experience in their particular environments, both geographical and domestic, as well as original in registering cultural referents beyond the immediate contexts out of which they have grown. They also connect with theoretical discourses which have challenged the established in the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, from feminisms to Queer, passing through the question of woman and nationhood.[2]

Pilar Pallarés is the first of the Galicians, a poet whose work initially appeared in the 1980s and for this reason has been placed before that of her compatriots. Her first poem, "Matéria porosa na mañá..." [Sieved substance of morning...] is an instance of the crossing of geographical boundaries referred to above. Situated in the large Roman necropolis, the Alyscamps in Arles, the text strikes a meditative note whilst also registering an existential angst. This angst is also manifest in "asi é e asi sexa" [that is how it is and so be it], suffused with the weight of existence. The load of living is lifted in "O desexo era un lóstrego" ["Desire, a lightning strike..."], although the passionate encounter affords short-lived relief within the "abyss" (Palacios 2012, 31).

Chus Pato is Pallarés's contemporary though her first volume of poetry didn't appear until 1991. Rodríguez García has referred to this radical writer as "one of the most exciting feminist voices in contemporary Galician literature," although he also observes that the "experimental freedom" found in her poetry "often takes [the reader] to uncomfortable extremes" (2011, 106). Pato herself has spoken of her writing as "a literature of resistance" (Casas 2011, 135), a resistance which has also manifested itself through her militancy in the *Frente Popular Galega* in the struggle for an independent Galicia. Of the four poems included in *Forked Tongues*, the first might be said to be the most unhinging, and fascinating. The title is already transgressive, highlighting seven concepts, the majority of which bear no mention in the text that follows. The text initially evokes the narrative of a children's book before moving into a consideration of death, of what may be achieved if the heart so believes it, of forms and life in the universe and of a world without the desire for, or memory of, Christianity.

The three Galician poets who follow were all born in the 1970s. The two poems that introduce the selection from Lupe Gómez Arto's work reflect on women's existence.

[2] On this latter connection, see González Fernández 2005.

"Road Movie" (entitled thus in the original Galician) reflects the impact on her generation of American culture, an impact which is also manifest in the anthology in the poetry of the Basque poets Itxaro Borda (see her "Be My Woman") and Miren Agur Meabe ("Patti Smith Rimbaudekin ametsetan" [Patti Smith Dreams of Rimbaud]).[3] Part of a collage of texts constructed in Gómez Arto's "Road Movie" rewrites familiar words from the New Testament Sermon on the Mount, and we shall see fellow Galician Yolanda Castaño also reworking Biblical discourse, feminising the Word made flesh and echoing the Gospels according to John and Matthew in "Historia da Transformación" [History of the Transformation].

Rodríguez García has referred to Castaño's poetry as "notoriously difficult" (2011, 102) and this can already be appreciated in "Pero eu, filla das miñas fillas..." [But I, Daughter of my Daughters...],[4] where the flamboyant poet's taste for playing with multiple identities, "ventriloquised alter egos" (Rodríguez García 2011, 112), is made manifest, together with a determination to disrupt an established order, to shock. In the shorter "Corrupción" [Corruption], the speaker is weighed down by androgynous clothing (a diving suit and boots) before being suddenly projected into an unmapped territory which reduces the subject to a position of vulnerability. Like Pato, Castaño is set on unhinging; yet, in the case of the younger poet, the intention is not politically driven.

Do Cebreiro's "Poesía Erótica" [Erotic Poetry] dwells on the creation of poetry as an erotic experience whilst "Eran follas pequechas..." [They were little leaves...] becomes an exploration of how to write in order to release new vitality. In "Europa (Cuarto Reich)" [Europe (Fourth Reich)], a so-called Fourth Reich in Europe, evocative of the devastating Third, becomes a means of approaching the suffering of women waiting for their men folk to surface from the coalmine.[5] The poem alludes to this "era" (Palacios 2012, 71) in which women meditated on their own hands, wanting to question their purpose. The "I" speaker who surfaces in the final lines of the poem expresses the desire that "the work of the hands [that] thrives in our minds," writing, might reach "the heart of the world" (73) since consciousness is only temporal.[6]

Basque poet Itxaro Borda's texts show her rewriting the fifteenth-century dirge *Milia Lasturkoren eresia* [Milia of Lastur Revisited], foregrounding here, as in "Be My Woman" and "Kartz" [Quartz], love between women. Her use of the Dave Peverett song in "Be My Woman" reveals her familiarity with 1970s American pop music whilst the allusions to Janis Joplin and Judith Butler take the poem beyond passion into the realm of radical practice and theory. Borda renders homage to the Catalan poet Maria-Mercè Marçal in

[3] See also the reference to Malcolm Lowry's *Under the Volcano* in Do Cebreiro's "Europa (Cuarto Reich)."

[4] Originally published in *Yo es otro: Autorretratos de la nueva poesía* as "Poema a Yolanda." See Josep M. Rodríguez (2001, 57-59).

[5] In connection with this, see Rábade Villar's comment on "the emotional experience of struggle and corporeal vulnerability" (2011, 113).

[6] O'Donnell reads the Galician "conciencia" as English "conscience" (Palacios 2012, 73), which it may be, though I wonder if "consciousness" is not the case here, also "conciencia" in Galician.

"Maria Merceren (B)egia" [The Eye of Maria Mercè Marçal], and in the English-entitled "Outside," she reinforces the outsidedness of the speaker, "the voice of a nomad" (Palacios 2012, 87), by punctuating the text with English. The climax of the poem expresses defiance of fame or canon and constitutes a prayer, a tribute evocative of the feminist re-cognitions in the latter part of the twentieth century of the struggle of mothers and grandmothers.

Miren Agur Meabe's "Patti Smith Rimbaudeken" [Patti Smith Dreams of Rimbaud], "La Jolie Fille-ren automitologia" [Self-Mythology of La Jolie Fille] and "Salmoa" [Psalm] are plagued by memories, clearly those of an adult woman with regard to sexual surrender in the first poem and in relation to her childhood in the second, a story of abuse which moves beyond the personal experience to connect with that experienced by "girls . . . today in Burundi . . . in Darfur" or by "[an] Afghan child" (Palacios 2012, 99). In "Salmoa" [Psalm], sacred lexicon is appropriated to speak of the profane: desire and passion. "Zisnearan kantua" [Swan Song], developed in clipped couplets, conveys a melancholic mood, moved by menopause and plunged in disillusionment.

The selection from the work of Castillo Suárez is far from heartening in terms of subject matter, since her poems deal relentlessly with death, sorrow, torture and suffering. This said, the poetry is highly original, and unforgettable. The reader of Suárez's painful and disturbing verse will find some relief in the first two poems by Leire Bilbao, "1977ko urriko gau bat" [October Night, 1977] and "Terra Nova," which celebrate the intimacy shared by the speaker's parents and register the joy of their parenthood, respectively. However, the darker mood of "Kaleko zakurra" [Stray Dog] and "Belarra" [Grass] strongly contrast with the earlier two.

The Catalan contingent in *Forked Tongues* is led by five poems authored by Vinyet Panyella, two of which take us to the painting of Cézanne and the artist's studio in Aix-en-Provence. "Autoretrat en nu" [Nude Self-portrait] registers rebellion towards the male gaze whilst "Taller Cézanne" [Cézanne's Studio] uses the careful layout of the artist's studio, the maintaining of a delicate balance, to make a plea for securing the no-less fragile equilibrium of love. Loneliness, disillusionment and a severe stoicism are expressed in "Cerca'm, si vols" [Look for me, if you like], "Una estona abans..." [A while before...] and "Vaig viure..." [I lived...].

The poems of Susanna Rafart, Gemma Gorga and Mireia Calafell are quite distinct from one another. Rafart's deal with the determination not to be overwhelmed by adversity ("La veu" [The Voice]), with vulnerability ("Con tardo vuelo" [With Sluggish Flight]) and with fear ("Senyor, no m'abandonis a l'amor" [O Lord, do not abandon me to love]). Those of Gemma Gorga possess great poise. They are philosophical in their questioning and zen-like in their pace, whilst the selection from Mireia Calafell's work deals with loss, longing and loneliness. Her "Talls" [Cuts] reveals a preoccupation with life's transience, also a feature in Gorga's "El barquer" [The Ferryman], evocative of Virginia Woolf's depiction of the passing of time in the "Time Passes" section of *To the Lighthouse*. Calafell's "Diumenge" [Sunday] foregrounds woman's susceptibility to the myth of romantic love, whilst Gorga illustrates her agency in "I aleshores ella" ["And Then She"].

The above provides some sense of the riches contained in *Forked Tongues*. Undoubtedly, the anthology merits the epithet of ground-breaking. It has broken ground in bringing poets alongside their colleagues who might otherwise have continued to remain unknown beyond their communities of origin or the Spanish state;[7] in facilitating access to a public who read English; in revealing the talent, courage and power of women poets in Galicia, Euskadi and Catalunya and in the re-fashioning provided by Irish poets, in the language appropriated from the coloniser, to boot. It might be argued that translation into Irish would have further enhanced the volume but, as it stands, the anthology is already a *tour de force*. The task of coordinating the twenty-eight writers and translators involved in the project is certainly no mean achievement.[8] The editor deserves hearty congratulations, as do all those who contributed and laboured in bringing the volume about.

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[7] Chus Pato, for instance, has been translated into English by Galician-Canadian Erín Moure (Rodríguez García 2011, 124; n9), but hers is a case of exception rather than rule.

[8] See the notes on the "Authors and Translators" (Palacios 2012, 171-81) referred to above.

in the 1990s. More recently, she has contributed to five volumes in the Reception of British and Irish Authors in Europe series. Her biography *Walter Starkie. An Odyssey* was published in 2013.

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Judie Newman. 2013. *Utopia and Terror in Contemporary American Fiction*. Transnational Perspectives on American Literature Series. London and New York: Routledge. XII + 182 pp. ISBN: 978-0-415-89912-3.

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Utopia and Terror in Contemporary American Fiction offers a series of thought-provoking readings on contemporary fiction, brought together on the basis of their utopian potential. As in her previous collection of essays, *Fictions of America* (2007), which was organized around the key tension between global and local, Newman uses here the terms utopia, terror and globalization both as thematic *topoi* in the fictional works under scrutiny and as conceptual micro-foci around which her theoretical framework is organized.

The theoretical premise of the book is the identification of the tension between the notions of utopia and terror: the intrinsic dystopian seed at the core of every utopian outlook, the risk of the quest for freedom turning into coercion, and of any utopian project turning into terror when realized or completed. Associated with the assertion of the paradoxical nature of utopia—"an 'achieved' Utopia . . . is a contradiction in terms," Jameson claims in *Archaeologies of the Future* (2005, 294)—are a series of sociological considerations about the aesthetic, emotional and ideological roles that utopian thought plays in the contemporary world. The horizons of utopian articulation in the narratives analyzed in this book are diverse (environmental, political, sexual, racial, national, scientific), thus evincing the overarching potential of utopianism.

All the texts selected for analysis in this monograph were written in the last two decades. The corpus of authors is relatively heterogeneous, combining writers from several literary generations and different degrees of "canonicity." In the acknowledgments section of the book, Newman mentions "the absence of almost any secondary criticism on most of the authors discussed" (xi), indirectly pointing to the novelty of this contribution to the field of American literary studies. Indeed, her main focus is on a group of writers (Kim Edwards, André Dubus III, Chitra Divakaruni, Susan Choi, Bernardine Evaristo, Amy Waldman) who have been in the spotlight for a while, but who have hardly received any academic critical attention (20). Well-known canonical writers like Margaret Atwood or John Updike constitute a second group of authors included in her corpus.

The book opens and closes with brief sketches focused on explicitly utopian texts, which could actually have been included as separate chapters, had they been expanded.

The Introduction begins with a short analysis of Amy Waldman's short story "Freedom" (2010), a political dystopia about a country created in the Solomon Islands by the US Government to take in a group of political detainees from Guantánamo. The story dramatizes the intersection between the notions of utopia and terror in two senses: on the one hand, Newman claims, it is a tale about the possibility of utopia *after* terror, regarding the US Government's "good intentions" as an attempt to reconcile the "war on terror" with the myth of America as a land of freedom from persecution. On the other, Waldman's story explores the apparently dystopian potential inherent in every realized utopia. The book closes with a brief reading of Margaret Atwood's *Oryx and Crake* (2003), which aims to counteract the somber thesis sketched in the Introduction by re-stating the redemptive power of utopian narratives.

Newman sets out the basis of her theoretical articulation in the next few pages of her introduction, offering a diachronic revision of the concept of utopia beginning with Oscar Wilde's dictum from *The Soul of Man Under Socialism* (1891) about how utopia equals what Ernst Bloch would call "the principle of hope," inherent to humanity. That she does not venture beyond the late nineteenth century and into the history of political thought, however, indicates the extent to which her approach tries to stretch the traditional meaning of the term beyond the revolutionary impulse that fed the Modern utopias (Claeys 2011, 99), into a holistic understanding of "utopian energies" (6). In order for the introduction to be truly informative, it would have been necessary to expand this overview beyond the first decades of the twentieth century, in order to trace the crucial transformations that the notion of utopia suffered against the backdrop of historical events. As it stands, the theoretical articulation sketched in the introduction seems slightly mismatched with the intellectual *milieu* from which the texts under analysis have emerged.

The second chapter of the book, entitled "Rotten with Perfection," is devoted to Kim Edwards' collection of short stories *The Secrets of a Fire King* (1997). Newman analyzes several stories included in the book through a recurrent leitmotiv: the quest for perfection, and its tragic consequences. The consideration of eugenics as a form of utopianism has been a constant topic in the history of the genre, from Huxley's *Brave New World* to Atwood's *Oryx and Crake*. In Edwards' book, only the story entitled "Aristotle's Lantern" seems to conform to the generic conventions in its depiction of a scientific utopia. However, as Newman convincingly argues throughout the chapter, most of the stories in the volume work as cautionary tales against the dangers of a realized utopian impulse and invite us "to aim for imperfection, counter order and a perception of our own comic foolishness" (36).

In the third chapter, "Fiction and the Unabomber," Newman shifts her attention to the risks of utopian thought in the political realm. Her reading of Susan Choi's *A Person of Interest* (2008) takes as its departure point the celebrated statement from Don DeLillo's *Mao II* about the narrative quality of terrorist action. Newman draws parallels between the fictional terrorist in Choi's novel and the historical Theodore Kaczynski (Unabomber),

highlighting the utopian nature of their shared Luddite nostalgia for a pre-technological past. The chapter, however, never expresses this utopian dimension explicitly, and it seems to take for granted the troubling nature of a primitivist, anti-social strand in American culture that Newman traces back to Henry David Thoreau (44-45).

Chapter four, devoted to André Dubus III's *House of Sand and Fog* (1999), introduces the notion of "blowback" to discuss the relativism and interconnectedness of utopian impulses in a globalized world. What appears to be a rescue mission on behalf of the abused may be perceived as a ruthless attack on national sovereignty from a different perspective, hence producing apparently paradoxical concepts such as "human rights imperialism." Newman's reading grounds its main argument on the dilemma posited in this novel as a question: who is more legitimated to seize the American dream, Colonel Behrani, refugee and former member of the Iranian Shah's guard, or the underclass, drug-addicted Italian American Kathy? Newman focuses on Dubus' inversion of the American discourse on Otherness and human rights, but in doing so she re-enacts the tendency, noted by M. Keith Booker in connection with American literature and criticism, to refigure class conflicts as racial ones (2002, 19).

The next chapter of the book is devoted to another novel by André Dubus III, *The Garden of Last Days* (2008), and it explores gender politics in American and Islamic political discourses featuring the rescue of victimized women as a legitimating mechanism. The novel reconstructs the life of one of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks, in the time leading up to his embarking on the attack, which he spent in a strip club. As in *House of Sand and Fog*, Dubus subverts readers' expectations as to the roles played by the construction worker AJ and the terrorist Bassam, inverting the roles of rescuer and abductor that the post-9/11 context would invite readers to assign on the basis of prejudice against Islam. The chapter explores a further enactment of utopia in the strip club itself, depicted as a male fantasy space where femininity becomes a commodity, complicating the justification, in American politics, of the war in Afghanistan as a rescue mission for victimized women under the Taliban regime.

Chapter six, "Pictures from a Revolution," sets out to explore utopian visions in Islam, as represented in Dalia Sofer's novel *The Septembers of Shiraz* (2007). The chapter's premise stands in opposition to a common view that utopian thought is predominantly a Western phenomenon (Kumar 1987, 19). Sofer's novel establishes a series of confronted figurations of a Golden Age for different communities (secular, Islamic, Hassidic) in the course of Iranian history. Newman's reading of the novel takes its cue from a crucial aspect of utopian thought: the tendency to articulate utopian projections in terms of the recovery of a lost Golden Age, whose purity needs to be retained at all costs (Claeys 2011, 13). The novel, Newman suggests, endorses the regressive logic of these utopian impulses by presenting religious communities whose group identity is based on some Golden Age myth as successful articulations in the face of the fragmented secular group.

The next chapter is devoted to John Updike's *Toward the End of Time* (1997), an explicitly dystopian text depicting a futuristic America at war with China. This is only the

first of a chain of scenarios portrayed in the novel, including ancient Egypt, the Roman Empire, monastic Ireland and 1944 Poland. Updike uses the many worlds theory (an interpretation of quantum mechanics formulated by Hugh Everett and popularized by Bryce Seligman DeWitt) as an excuse for the narrative juxtaposition of textual fragments in which local forms of life triumph over global strategies. Empires appear on the verge of collapse in each of the "universes" visited by the main character. Newman's interpretation of Updike's strategy sanctions the defense of the local and marginal against centralized imperialism, but it fails to comment on the Pynchonesque irony of the novel's end, in which FedEx postal workers take centralized control over a fragmented America, re-establishing national communications and assuming governmental functions.

In chapter eight, "The Black Atlantic as Dystopia," the author returns to the slave narrative, a genre she has written about at length in her previous work.[1] Her reading of Bernardine Evaristo's *Blonde Roots* (2009) begins with a fascinating discussion of the utopian dimension of Paul Gilroy's conceptualization of the Black Atlantic. She understands Evaristo's novel as complicating Gilroy's theoretical model by highlighting class and gender as further dimensions of the Black Atlantic, and pointing to the way in which the text overcomes the stereotyped views about utopian slave communities.

The final chapter of the book, "Disaster Utopias," contests the dystopian outlook of Naomi Klein's extremely popular *The Shock Doctrine* by claiming that disaster situations tend to trigger the questioning required for social change, hence favoring utopian energies. This is the theoretical framework for the discussion of Chitra Divakaruni's *One Amazing Thing* (2009), in which nine characters trapped in the basement of an Indian consulate's visa department following an earthquake exchange stories as a distraction while they wait to be rescued. The narrative premise echoes that of Boccaccio's *Decameron*, which Newman claims was, after all, another disaster utopia. Newman's reading concentrates on the reparative function of narrative, fully assuming Ernst Bloch's contention that all literature is to some extent utopian. This idea, which is discussed in the Introduction but only fleetingly mentioned in earlier chapters, receives here full attention, thus providing a sense of closure to the book.

The eight chapters, more than the introduction itself, which suffers from some theoretical vagueness, illustrate in a convincing and engaging way the multifaceted nature of utopia. Thus, Newman opens the category to texts in which she perceives a sensibility for the all-encompassing utopian impulse that Ernst Bloch considered intrinsic to human nature. The book, together with very recent contributions like Patrick Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili's *Globalization and Utopia* (2009) and Robert T. Tally Jr.'s *Utopia in the Age of Globalization* (2013), bears witness to the renewal of utopianism in response to the challenges of globalization.

[1] See "Black Atlantic or Black Athena? Globalising the African-American Story," in *Fictions of America* (2007, 74-98), or "*The Bondwoman's Narrative*: Text, Paratext, Intertext and Hypertext" (2000, 147-65), co-authored with Celeste-Marie Bernier.

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Jorge Sacido, ed. 2012. *Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Short Story in English*. Amsterdam and New York: Peter Lang. 269 pp. ISBN: 978-90-420-3557-7.

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In her essay collection *On Histories and Stories* (2000), A.S. Byatt claims that "storytelling is intrinsic to biological time, which we cannot escape . . . . Stories are like genes, they keep part of us alive after the ending of our story" (166). This statement could be transferred to the domain of literary history, as the short story genre emerges as a privileged site for the staging of the (hi)story of literary creativity and criticism, and in particular of the transition from modernism to postmodernism. Enacting the move from modernist autonomy and subjectivity to the postmodernist emphasis on literary artifice, the short story becomes an apt tool for the reassessment of modernism, postmodernism and their interrelationship, as *Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Short Story in English*, edited by Jorge Sacido, demonstrates. This study offers a collection of critical essays by internationally renowned scholars who examine the modernist and postmodernist dimensions of the short story from the perspective of both critical theory and textual analysis.

In the context of contemporary literature and criticism, Sacido's edited volume proves to be an enlightening and timely contribution because, apart from addressing the always controversial issue of the relationship between modernism and postmodernism, it also approaches the current debate on the prevalence of the postmodern paradigm in the twenty-first century. At a moment when critics like Pelagia Goulimari (2007, 1) are asking questions such as "do we still live in postmodern times? What is the moment—the time, but also the force and significance—of postmodernism?," the opening chapter of *Modernism* convincingly argues for a continuation of postmodernism in the short story nowadays.

This chapter, by the editor of the volume, is followed by four main parts, chronologically arranged and with a mainly (though not exclusively) British-oriented approach in terms of the writers and texts considered. In his theoretical chapter, before part one, Sacido examines the defining features of modernist and postmodernist short fiction, exploring the role of the short story in the rise of modernism in terms of autonomy and subjectivity, and analysing how in postmodernism "interpretation is blocked and representation becomes impossible" (14). Significantly, Sacido's interest in the interrelationship between modernism and postmodernism is mirrored in part two and the first two chapters of part three, which all approach the short story genre from the point of view of the relationship

existing between both movements. This signals the balance in contents and structure of the book, since the other chapters in the volume are devoted to each paradigm separately: the two chapters in part one ("Refocusing 'Modernism' through the Short Story") focus on modernism, while the final chapter of part three, together with part four, is devoted to contemporary short fiction.

The attention paid to the interplay between the modernist and the postmodernist short story is already announced in the title of part two, "The Subject Vanishes: Modernist Contraction, Postmodernist Effacement and the Short Story Genre," with contributions by three international experts on the short story: Tim Armstong, Fred Botting and Paul March-Russell. These essays share a similar interest in the related ideas of incompleteness, fragmentation and spectrality. The notion of incompleteness figures prominently in Armstrong's chapter, which aims at showing how the incompletion of desire works as a marker of the relation between totality and fragmentation in the short story. Comparing two classic modernist stories—Joyce's "The Dead" and Mansfield's "The Stranger"—with postmodernist short fiction by David Mitchell and David Forster Wallace, Armstrong analyses how the partial and limited self in the modernist short story enters into a traumatised relation with the other in contemporary fiction, as "the madness which briefly assaults Joyce and Mansfield's [*sic*] characters . . . has become a full-blown narrative mode–a ghost-writing" (95). This element of trauma and mourning recurs in the following chapter, where Botting finds in spectrality a useful tool to prove the existence of a continuity between modernism and postmodernism through the ghost story subgenre. As he examines stories by Angela Carter, Virginia Woolf and May Sinclair, Botting identifies a process of un-familiarisation associated with the uncanny, discovering the presence of "spectral screens" that foreground the similarities existing between the modernist short story and the ghost story, as well as the playful dimension of postmodernist short fiction.

While Botting takes the ghost story as a central point in his chapter, the following contribution, by March-Russell, focuses attention on the relationship of the short story with science fiction. March-Russell reassesses his working hypothesis in the influential study *The Short Story: An Introduction* (2009) with the goal of exploring the distinctions between modern and postmodern short story theory in terms of the influence of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of "minor literature." Through the analysis of J.G. Ballard's short fiction, which "offers a distillation of the strengths within both science fiction and the short story" (134), March-Russell revises the Deleuzian image of writing as a machine, coming to the conclusion that Deleuze and Guattari's postmodern critical approach fails to capture the essence of Ballard's writings or of the short story in general.

This concept of "minor literature" recurs again in part three, "The Subject Reappears: Postcolonial Conflict and the Other's Stories," in whose second chapter J. Manuel Barbeito and María Lozano propose a modernistic reading of Salman Rushdie's collection of short stories *East, West* (1994). By focusing on the figure of the migrant subject, this chapter convincingly demonstrates that, although paradigmatically postmodernist, Rushdie's stories allow for a close reading from the perspective of modernist poetics,

considering that the short story "is arguably the genre that encompasses the fragility, ellipsis and fragmentation called for by modernist practice" (186). Such a reading reveals how Rushdie's work juxtaposes the positions of the citizen and of the diasporic subject, and so the author comes to terms with the discontinuity inherent in the experience of the world and of language.

The subject in transit, this time not in the form of the migrant but of the *flâneur*, plays a central role in the other chapter of part three that focuses on the interrelationship between modernism and postmodernism: Esther Sánchez-Pardo's "Postmodernist Tales from the Couch." This chapter offers a comparative study of Samuel R. Delany's postmodernist short story "Atlantis: Model 1924" (1995) and Hart Crane's modernist poetic sequence *The Bridge* (1930), providing an original approach to these works. Like Botting, Sánchez-Pardo argues for a continuity between modernism and postmodernism, stating that postmodernism is a product or revision of modernist literary practice and theory. By resorting to the concept of "betweenness," Sánchez-Pardo shows how Delany's story enters into an enriching dialogue with Crane's work not only from the intertextual perspective, but also from the point of view of how both texts share a similar attempt to challenge borders, "celebrating multiplicities of identity, race, sexuality, language and history" (152). As she combines twentieth-century Anglo-American texts with contemporary (literary and psychoanalytical) theory, Sánchez-Pardo convincingly demonstrates that "modernist texts offer ground-breaking insights to the postmodernist enterprise" (154).

While this "postmodernist enterprise" emerges as the object of analysis of the last two chapters chapters of *Modernism*, its first two chapters, which make up part one of the volume ("Refocusing 'Modernism'") are devoted to the study of "modernist texts." In "The Short Story and the Difficulty of Modernism," Adrian Hunter explores the pre-history of the modernist short story by providing an archaeological insight into the concept of "difficulty" and its amenability to modernist aesthetics. As he argues that this "difficulty" of the short story—under the guise of plotlessness, incompleteness, openness and allusiveness—made it a favourite genre in modernism, Hunter traces the debates about the challenges of the short story back to the Edwardian period, identifying "how to" guide books and critical studies in the early twentieth century as forerunners of modernist short fiction.

Linked with this idea of difficulty, the next chapter of part one, José María Díaz's "Allegory and Fragmentation in Wyndham Lewis's *The Wild Body* and Djuna Barnes's *A Book*," considers the concept of fragmentation as a central notion. Here, Díaz distinguishes two strands of fragmentation: that of modernism, which is associated with symbolism, and that of the *avant-garde*, related with allegory. From this perspective, he examines works by Lewis and Barnes to contend that in their practice, "modernist short fiction cannot be fixed as a homogeneous genre with a common underlying discourse" (51). As he argues that these texts are closer to the allegorical fragmentation of the *avant-garde*, Díaz explores short fiction that developed alongside the hegemonic modernist movement, thus providing an original approach to the modernist short story in the line of Hunter's analysis of the pre-history of modernist short fiction.

The originality of Hunter's and Díaz's approaches has an echo in the last two chapters of *Modernism*, where Manuela Palacios and José Francisco Fernández analyse the postmodernist short story from the point of view of, respectively, otherness in contemporary Irish short fiction and innovation in recent British short stories. On the one hand, Palacios's contribution, which shares with the other chapters in part three an interest in race, ethnicity and nationality, examines Irish short fiction written by women, from both Northern Ireland and the Republic, between the late 1970s and 2010. Taking feminist and postcolonial criticism as its theoretical framework, this chapter convincingly argues that stories by Fiona Barr, Anne Devlin and Mary O'Donnell portray Britain as an inspiring Other by bringing the encounter with otherness to the domestic sphere, as "the private, domestic space, which is also the realm of emotional life, becomes a site where the genuine encounter with the Other can be achieved" (222).

On the other hand, Fernández's chapter ("Short Notes from the Contemporary Underground'), the only essay in part four of the volume, addresses the phenomenon of the remarkable development of the short story in Britain since the end of the twentieth century in the light of "its energy, its variety and its ambition to innovate" (232). The chapter pays attention to different anthologies of recent short fiction, particularly to *All Hail the New Puritans* (2000), in order to identify the daring qualities of these new narratives by young writers who are described as provocative, irreverent and disrespectful of tradition. As Fernández clearly explains, these collections show the energy of youth subcultures, being characterised by their commitment to current times in their unashamed portrayal of fragments of young people's lives in contemporary England.

With their subversive quality, these collections aim at a re-evaluation of the short story genre, which as Fernández conclusively proves, is alive and flourishing at the turn of the new millennium. Indeed, Fernández argues, "there is always something inescapable in the genre that allows it to transcend particular interests and fashions," while, as Sacido puts it (viii), "stories go on being told." This inescapability of the short story not only reflects the biological need for storytelling mentioned by A.S. Byatt, but also accounts for the centrality of the genre for the development of modernist and postmodernist aesthetics. In this context, and at a time when the current validity of postmodernism is being questioned, *Modernism* emerges as a useful and timely contribution to the fields of critical theory and literary history. What is more, Sacido's essay collection offers an original and ground-breaking approach to the role of the short story in modernist and postmodernist aesthetics that neither specialists in the short story genre nor those interested in twentieth-century literature or criticism should miss.

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The story of the critical reception in the United States of Kate Chopin's *The Awakening* (1899) has all the characteristics of the bias and shortsightedness inherent in most literary criticism written on women authors of the nineteenth century. While her first novel *At Fault* (1890) and the two collections of short stories published during her lifetime (*Bayou Folk* 1894; *A Night in Acadia* 1897) were relatively well accepted as examples of the type of fiction easily classified both by the critics and public as belonging to what literary history manuals call *local southern color*, *The Awakening*, published in 1899, provoked, but for some notable exceptions, a long tirade of negative reactions among the press at the time of its publication and throughout most of the twentieth century. Joyce Dyer (1993) appropriately uses the term "critical schizophrenia" when referring to this recurrent pattern. She quotes the author of a contemporary review in the *St. Louis Mirror*, who, although finding no fault in the style of the text, called Edna Pontellier, the protagonist of the novel, "an ugly, cruel, loathsome monster" (1993, 18-19). The novel's critical acceptance had to wait until the nineteen-fifties, when American critics began to pay serious attention to the story of Edna Pontellier's tribulations. This sudden change of opinion was mainly caused by Cyrille Arnavon, the French critic who published an article about the novel in 1946 in which the protagonist is compared to Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*—a parallel first established, Dyer recalls (1993, 21), by Willa Cather in 1899. Arnavon's subsequent translation of the novel into French (1953) drew further attention to the novel in Europe; but it was not until the sixties and seventies, with the emergence of feminism and women's studies, and thanks to pioneering academic works by scholars like Per Seyesterd (1969) and Emily Toth (1999), that *The Awakening*, and the entire corpus of Chopin's fiction, became, in the words of Barbara H. Solomon, "a classic of American literature as well as a classic of women's studies" (2009, 64).

In Spain, research on Kate Chopin and translations of her works are a relatively new phenomenon, and mostly due to the interest in recent decades of academics concerned with the study of nineteenth-century Anglo-American women writers. The majority of this—still rather limited—body of translations and studies have been devoted to her shorter fiction (Olivia de Miguel 1986; Ibarrola 1998; Alberola Crespo and Manuel Cuenca 2003; Marta Salís 2008; Venegas, Guijarro and Porcel 2009). Focusing on the

novel itself, María Socorro Suárez Lafuente (1989) published an intertextual approach between Clarín's *La Regenta* and *The Awakening*. However, Spanish translations of *The Awakening* itself are scarcer still: Olivia de Miguel published the first one in Spain in 1986; this volume, and her new 2011 edition of the novel, included a short prologue addressed to a mainstream audience. In his 1997 edition of the novel, Constante González Groba also included a bibliography and a longer didactic introduction useful for students and the general reading public alike. With her recent translation of Kate Chopin's *The Awakening* (2012), Eulalia Piñero Gil has made an excellent contribution to Spanish speaking readers' knowledge and appreciation of this fundamental woman novelist.

Piñero Gil's work includes the most extensive (9-123) and informative introduction to date and a comprehensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources in English and Spanish. The introductory text makes use of a clarifying corpus of notes relevant to both the specialist and the general reading public. Taking into consideration a variety of approaches, Piñero Gil, following the pioneering studies of Per Seyersted (1969), Nancy A. Walker (2001) and Emily Toth (1990, 1999), unfolds the literary and biographical development of this canonical woman writer. In the section entitled "La conexión francesa" (30-34), Piñero Gil underlines the importance of Chopin's readings and translations of Guy de Maupassant's short stories, and acknowledges the influence on the writer of the sincerity and realism of the characters in the fiction of Gustave Flaubert and Émile Zola—as well as her admiration for the life and work of independent French women authors like Madame de Staël and George Sand. In this respect, Piñero Gil asserts, "Kate Chopin es la primera escritora norteamericana que se formó fuera de la trama ideológica protestante anglo-escocesa y de los parámetros de la historia cultural calvinista" (31). She points out (35-40) the impact of the progressive social and literary movement of the New Woman on Chopin's life and work, as well as narratives by female novelists like Edith Wharton, Alice James or Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and the kind of raw realism used by these writers when dealing with the status of educated white middle-class women within the patriarchal confinement of married life and traditional motherhood. Quoting recent research (Bonnie James Shaker 2003; Susan Castillo 2008), Piñero Gil analyzes the crucial topics of race and ethnicity as lived by the different creole, Cajuns and black women protagonists within the specific socio-economic background of the post-bellum South.

In her study of the influences impacting on the making of the novel, Piñero Gil (67-70) shows a clear didactic capacity for taxonomy and concision. From a literary point of view, Kate Chopin, she states (67), must be placed between two generations of American women writers: the novelists born at the beginning of the century, whose work is published before the Civil War (Harriett Beecher Stowe, Susan Warner, E.D.E.N Southworth) and those like Louisa May Alcott and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, who began to publish in the years after the civil conflict. Piñero Gil recalls how female characters in popular novels of the time were still confined within domestic boundaries as opposed to the outside world in which important male authors, such as Washington Irving, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Melville or even Mark Twain, place the main protagonists of

their novels. At this point in her argumentation, Piñero Gil underlines the influence, in the early stages of Chopin's career, of the works of Sarah Orne Jewett and Mary Wilkins Freeman, whose female protagonists clearly showed the frustration and discontent that an imposed domesticity caused in the lives of most married women. The exotic component of these narratives—as well as in those written by Kate Chopin—and their portrayal of the idiomatic, cultural and natural peculiarities of the Deep South serves as a way of balancing the dramatic effect of such controversial topics as divorce, adultery and female sexuality.

The final sections (71-118) of the introduction are dedicated to the use of symbolism and imagery in the novel, as well as to an extensive study of Edna Pontellier's quest for emancipation within the confinement of the marital institution and her relationship with other important characters. Piñero once again makes good use of notes from other academics in order to support her thesis, as when she mentions the erotic and mythical relevance of the image of Edna emerging, Aphrodite-like (73), from the waters, as described by Sandra Gilbert (1983). Likewise, the importance of music and art as a liberating force is widely discussed by Piñero when she points out the influence on Edna's artistic and personal awakening of the free and enigmatic Mademoiselle Reisz (94-99), as referred to by Doris Davis (2004). Following Dyer (1988), a brief analysis of certain interpretations of the end of the novel given by feminist literary critics (Elaine Showalter 1988; Lynda S. Boren 1992; Suzanne Wolkenfeld 1994) is provided in the final chapter (107-15). In spite of her acceptance (87) of certain similarities established by Seyersted (1969) between the plight and tragic end of Edna Pontellier and the protagonist of Flaubert's novel, Piñero Gil considers that, unlike Madame Bovary's dark suicide, Edna Pontellier's walk into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico is a scene "increíblemente hermosa cargada de simbolismo transcendentalista de lucha y no de rendición, como así sucede en la novela de Flaubert" (114).

The goal stated by the translator (117) of preserving the ambiguity and symbolism of the original English in the Spanish text is, on the whole, achieved. The verbal complications and cumulative syntactical density (Treichler 1980) that Chopin uses throughout the novel are well rendered in this edition by means of a fluent and natural sounding Spanish prose. In the cases where there is relevant semantic ambivalence in an English lexical item, pertinent explicatory notes are provided (as in the double meaning of the verb *to arouse*, 284). Likewise, helpful translations of French terms or creole patois from the Mississippi Delta or the Bayou country abound. However, while most of the explanations of cultural, geographical or botanical terms are necessary for a reader not familiar with southern Louisiana or the city of New Orleans (like *griffe* [280]; *Barataria Island* [181]; *Esplanade Street* [196]; *musgo español* [174]), others, pertaining mostly to world famous writers or musicians, could have been omitted (*Dante* [231]; *Beethoven* [237]).

Eulalia Piñero Gil's new critical edition of *El despertar* is arguably the most comprehensive and informative translation in Spanish to date, making the reading of this extraordinary novel accessible to the general public in an informative and scholarly edition.

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Isabel Verdaguer, Natalia Judith Laso and Danica Salazar. 2013. *Biomedical English. A Corpus-based Approach*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. xiv + 214 pp. ISBN: 9-789027-203625.

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This volume by Verdaguer, Laso and Salazar is one of the first attempts in contemporary Spain at combining the study of a highly specialised language and the corpus-based approach. The authors aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the work carried out by the research team GRELIC (Grup de Recerca en Lexicologia i Lingüística de Corpus / Lexicology and Corpus Linguistics Research Group). In fact, this is a compilation of different pieces of research conducted by the editors and other members of the team, with the collaboration of Carlos Subirats. The collection is framed within a corpus linguistics approach exploring theoretical, methodological, lexicographic and pedagogical issues of biomedical English lexicology.

The book opens with an introduction where the editors offer the rationale for the publication. They clarify the use of the term biomedicine, which encompasses "the related life sciences of biology, medicine and biochemistry" (ix), and state that the original aim of the research group was to provide non-native speakers of English with a lexicographic tool that includes information on biomedical English. In order to do so, the *Health Science Corpus* was compiled and a lexical database designed. Their main focus of study is discourse and phraseological conventions. There have been other attempts at characterising biomedical English, some of which include the use of a small sample corpus of biomedical English (Vázquez del Árbol 2006), but, in general, the characterisation of this language for specific purposes has had a different aim, for example: Gutiérrez Rodilla (1997) and Alcaraz Ariza (2000) both concentrated on the influence of the English language on medical Spanish, whereas Montalt and González (2007) were mainly concerned with the translation of medical English terms and constructions into Spanish.

In addition to the introduction, there are ten essays. The three editors contribute generously, co-authoring seven chapters, with the other three being written by other specialists in the field of corpus linguistics.

In the first chapter, "Collocations, Lexical Bundles and *SciE-Lex*: A Review of Corpus Research on Multiword Units of Meaning," Laso and Salazar begin by reviewing the notions of collocation since Sinclair first defined the term up to the present (1991, 170), and establish the differences between collocations and other related concepts, such as lexical bundles

and idioms, as well as the various approaches in trying to classify multiword expressions. The latter are identified through automatic extraction from a given corpus; they must be dispersed in multiple texts within a register; there is correlation between the length of the bundle and its frequency, that is, the longer the bundle, the lower its frequency. Other features are also highlighted, such as their fixedness, the fact that lexical bundles are not necessarily idiomatic and their strong structural component. Finally, the authors present several functional classifications of lexical bundles. All these aspects were taken into consideration to create the database *SciE-Lex*. The chapter is well documented and helps to understand the studies carried out by the group and reported in the sections that follow.

The next chapter, "*SciE-Lex*: A Lexical Database," by Verdaguer, Laso, Guzmán, Salazar, Comelles, Castaño and Hilferty, must also be read as a kind of introduction; it is devoted to the methodological issues underlying the design and implementation of the database, *SciE-Lex*. This is a lexicographic database developed at the Universities of Barcelona, Illes Balears and León that intends to cater for the needs of Spanish-speaking researchers and scientists in the field of biomedicine when writing academic articles in English. The innovation lies in the fact that the research team was not interested in specialised terminology that can be found in specialised lexicographic works, but in "high-frequency non-specialised lexical items and phraseology" (22).

The authors continue to explain details about the compilation of the corpus. We learn that it consists of a total of 718 "scientific research articles from prestige high-impact online journals that cover different disciplines such as medicine, biology, biochemistry and biomedicine" (22), and that the total amount of words is four million approximately. However, even though some details have been described thoroughly, such as the procedure followed to process the texts, other relevant information is missing. When researchers make use of a new corpus, they need to know its characteristics before initiating any linguistic analysis. Thus, if this database is intended for use of other researchers, further specific data about the sources is required: the titles of the publication, the number of articles or words belonging to each publication and the variety of English the texts may represent. It is true that the compilers presented the database elsewhere (Verdaguer et al. 2005 and 2008), but such important information should be present here as well.

In chapter three, "Formal and Functional Variation of Lexical Bundles in Biomedical English," Salazar, Verdaguer, Laso, Commelles, Castaño and Hilferty explore the morphosyntactic, lexical and functional variation of lexical bundles and address the methodological difficulties this variability may entail. They aim to demonstrate that lexical bundles are subject to formal and functional variation. This piece of work is intended to be a qualitative analysis of the topic, hence there is no reference to quantitative data. However, it would also have been enriching to learn about the frequency of these lexical bundles, in order to establish their true presence in biomedical discourse.

Chapter four by Laso in collaboration with Suganthi, "A Corpus-based Analysis of the Collocational Patterning of Adjectives with Abstract Nouns in Medical English," has a twofold purpose: to analyse the use of abstract nouns in combination with adjectives

on the part of native speakers and to exemplify how these specific patterns function in biomedical discourse. In doing so, Laso and Sunganthi wish to help authors whose native language is other than English to master the discourse conventions of this scientific genre. The findings reveal interesting issues regarding the position and the typology of the adjectives found. Evaluative adjectives are often associated to abstract nouns like *conclusion*, *agreement*, *comparison* and *decision*. The chapter highlights the value of a database like *SciE-Lex*, where not only can collocations be retrieved, but also where their real frequency is available, an element which is absent in specialised dictionaries.

Chapter five, "*As described below*: A Corpus-based Approach to the verb *describe* in Scientific English," by Ventura, is devoted to the exploration of the complementation patterns of the verb *describe*, as well as its uses. Like the previous essay, it is one of the few analyses that provide the reader with quantitative data in order to show the overall frequency of the verb as well as to answer other research questions established at the beginning of the study; among them, whether there is any difference between the general pattern and other patterns related to the verb *describe*. The use of the database adds extra value to the research of complementation patterns of the verb, as it allows the author to claim that the use of the verb *describe* is preferred to other alternatives, such as the verbs *receive* and *give* followed by the noun *description*. Again, the data retrieved from the lexical database help to validate the intuitive predictions the author may have before carrying out the research. Apart from the references mentioned in the body of the text, in the final section an extensive list of articles taken from the *Health Science Corpus* is included.

In chapter six, "Negation in Biomedical English," Laso, Comelles and Verdaguer are concerned with negative polarity. Several indicators are analysed: *not* is selected as a clausal negation, while the use of *no* and *un-* as negation exponents is also discussed. As expected, *not* was found to be the most frequent. Some other items expressing polarity, such as the adjectives *clear*, *likely*, and *able*, as well as their opposites, are examined according to the data retrieved from *SciE-Lex*. The corpus data demonstrate that some patterns are likely to appear with the negative polarity conveyed by the adjectives mentioned above. For instance, the authors claim that a proven correlation between negative bundles, such as *unable to detect*, *it is unclear* or *it seems unlikely*, and clauses of cause can be established. This finding can help researchers to organise their discourse in a more coherent and cohesive way.

In chapter seven, "A Cross-disciplinary Analysis of Personal and Impersonal Features in English and Spanish Scientific Writing," Salazar, Ventura and Verdaguer deal with personal and impersonal features in English and Spanish scientific writing from a cross-linguistic and cross-disciplinary perspective in both a qualitative and quantitative manner. Spanish and English research articles in Medicine and Mathematics are searched in order to identify language and discipline preferences. Thus, issues such as the overall frequency of personal and impersonal constructions, the most frequently used verbs and the functions performed by these personal and impersonal constructions are explored. From the conclusions gathered from the data, the authors claim that personal constructions are preferred in Mathematics, contrary to what is common belief.

The next chapter, "Gender Assignment in Present-day Scientific English: A Case Study in the Field of Zoology Journals," provides one of the few cases in the book where detailed information on the amount of words of the subcorpus of zoology and the number of articles retrieved from each journal is given. Guzmán examines the frequencies of the pronouns *it*, *he* and *she*, when applied to nouns referring to animals and sometimes to species. The obvious conclusion is the use of *it* as the default gender, although the percentage of *he* and *she* is also relevant. According to the author, the presence of the masculine and feminine genders in Units of Anaphoric Reference cannot be considered exceptional. Guzmán defines Units of Anaphoric Reference as "fragments of texts containing an idea concerning, a description of, an event about or an action performed by the referent of a pronoun or pronouns constituting an individual *piece of communication*, a pragmatic unit which may reach one or various lines in a text and may have different structures depending on the text type" (149). The high percentage of *he* and *she* to refer to animal nouns is reinforced by the fact that they appear in scientific specialised texts. The referents are not always high-rank animals, but its use is also prevalent when sex-specific activities and states are involved (*become pregnant*).

In chapter nine, "The Metaphorical Basis of Discourse Structure," Castaño, Hilferty and Verdaguer present fundamental considerations for the metaphorical mappings occurring in discourse, particularly on the organisation of research abstracts from the field of Biology. After a qualitative assessment of research abstracts in Biology, where the authors argue that conceptual metaphors play an important role in structuring and sequencing the ideas in the text, they conclude that the discourse in this field is based on the metaphor "Discourse is a form of motion along a path influenced by force dynamics."

The book ends with an essay on "Frames, Constructions, and Metaphors in Spanish FrameNet." In this final chapter, Subirats, director of Spanish FrameNet, outlines the fundamental issues concerning the application of the frame semantics to the lexical analysis of FrameNet. To this end, the process of semantic annotation is described, as well as the software tools used. Furthermore, the analysis of metaphors as mappings between semantic frames is also explored. The volume concludes with these new approaches to the study of scientific discourse based on the tenets of Cognitive Linguistics. In this specific case, the application of FrameNet to the cross-linguistic study of scientific language may open new lines of research in the study of specialised languages.

This volume is a welcome contribution to the field of biomedical language in Spain since it provides empirical data extracted from a textual corpus. This is one of the strengths of the book: all chapters are based on the extraction of data from the *Health Science Corpus* (HSC). Another positive aspect is that the publication also relies on the *SciE-Lex*, "a lexical data-base of general English terms employed in biomedical discourse" (ix). By contrast, some of the criteria used for the compilation of the corpus, as well as the design and implementation of the database need further clarification. No reference is made to the usual criteria for the compilation of the corpus; that is, representativity, balance and sampling. The reader may imagine that the corpus has been marked up and annotated as

well, but little information is provided. It is true that these details were given elsewhere (Verdaguer 2005), but the volume would have benefited from its inclusion here.

To conclude, this book opens up a whole new line of research in the Spanish academic community because the findings cited are based on textual evidence retrieved from a corpus of research articles in biomedicine, a field where more studies using corpus linguistics were needed. The contributions in this collection also address a wide variety of issues related to biomedical language, such as lexicogrammatical patterns, lexicography, discourse analysis and its pedagogical applications. The volume is as readable and enlightening as it is well documented and informative, written by experts in the tool they are describing which was implemented from the purpose-built corpus. It would be highly advisable that the database were at the disposal of researchers and scientists interested in biomedicine in English.

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Lucía Fernández Amaya, María de la O Hernández López, Reyes Gómez Morón, Manuel Padilla Cruz, Manuel Mejías Borrero and Mariana Relinque Barranca, eds. 2012. *New Perspectives on (Im)Politeness and Interpersonal Communication.* Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars. i-vii + 278. ISBN: (10): 1-4438-4171-4, ISBN: (13): 978-1-4438-4171-9.

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The title of this volume promises the reader "New Perspectives on (Im)Politeness and Interpersonal Communication." Indeed, in the introduction it is clear that the editors favour the relatively recent "discursive approach" initiated by Eelen (2001) and championed by, among others, Locher and Watts (2005), Watts (2005) and Mills (2011). However, only three chapters could be said to implement either a postmodern perspective (chapter one) or more recent methods of analysing (im)politeness (chapters three and eleven). The rest either take a traditional approach (Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987) or make no overt mention of the theoretical framework adopted.

The volume is divided into four parts: Part one, "State of the Art of (Im)politeness Studies," is made up of one chapter; part two, "(Im)politeness in the Media," comprises chapters two to four; part three, "Impoliteness, Speech Acts and Language Teaching," chapters five to seven; and part four, "In Other Specific Contexts," chapters eight to eleven.

Chapter one, by Miriam Locher, is a useful overview of research into politeness, from foundational studies to the author's own "relational work" approach. It finishes with a series of "points of criticism and questions" on various topics in politeness studies (51) and the identification of avenues still to be explored in this field.

With regard to Locher's own approach, her rationale for coining the term "relational work" instead of "facework" is that the latter is often associated with Brown and Levinson's theories (1987) on politeness and that since then facework has "been reduced to referring to mitigating behaviour only," whereas relational work "refers to the entire gamut of interpersonal effects" (45). However, this ignores the fact that many associate facework just as strongly with Goffman (1967) and that there are researchers who, like Penman (1990), employ the term to cover protective, threatening or even aggressive facework.

Locher sees both identity and face as being constructed during interaction ("*in situ*") rather than being pre-constituted (46). This radical interactional approach appears to imply, counter-intuitively, that people's identity can change depending on the context. Furthermore, Locher's concepts of face and identity are both dynamic and negotiated during interaction, making it difficult to see where one ends and the other begins.

Chapter two opens with an analysis of the comments on a YouTube video that centre on an incident in which congressman Joe Wilson shouted "You lie" at Obama during the latter's speech at a joint session of Congress. The author, Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, hypothesises that Wilson's behaviour will be deemed inappropriate by the YouTubers who comment on it. Given the split in American society between right and left, this assumption seems somewhat naïve and, unsurprisingly, turns out to be unfounded. She further relates impoliteness with "uncontrollable emotions and lack of restraint" (76) but the examples she provides do not offfer convincing evidence of this (77).

Garcés-Conejos Blitvich puts forward the idea that a genre approach is better suited to the analysis of (im)politeness than that offered by the communities of practice (CofP) approach because members of a CofP "tend to use multiple genres when communicating" (69). She goes on to say that each genre "may call for different types of interaction generally associated with certain sets of norms" and that "those generic norms are the ones the analyst needs to assess vis-à-vis assessments of im / politeness." However, norms of any type do not exist in a vacuum and depend on actual participants to be instantiated. In other words, genre norms alone are not enough to assess (im) politeness in interaction; an approach that takes the actual participants into account, like CofP, is also needed.

It is clear that genre has a place in many analyses but, as one can see in some of the chapters in this volume, a specific genre-based approach is not needed—a short description of the genre under study is normally enough. Once the theoretical preliminaries are over, what we are offered in this chapter is actually a well-executed but standard discourse-analytical study.

In chapter three, Mancera Rueda analyses impoliteness in the comments on articles in digital versions of Spanish newspapers. Her study shows that FTAs are especially common in the comment sections of conservative publications. While the corpus covers four years, only fifty comments from each publication are included. The selection seems to have depended on the content of the comments and their length (108) but we are not told how it was carried out. Citing Fuentes Rodríguez and Alcaide Lara (2008), it is stated that the image of the author of derogatory remarks suffers greater damage (than the addressee) "because through his or her words he or she is seen as capable of descending into a direct confrontation using the language of the gutter." Personally, I find it difficult to see how the image of the author or the recipient of an insult could be damaged when they are protected by anonymity.

In the next chapter, Laura Mariottini examines (im)politeness in the translation of four Almadóvar films into Italian. Unfortunately, there are several cases in which poor proof reading is evident—"labial sync" (112) instead of "lip sync" being just one. With regard to content, the section on swear words (128-31), in which pragmatic equivalence is sidelined completely, clearly points to the fact that the article, although interesting as an analysis of translation equivalents in Spanish and Italian, hardly scratches the surface of (im)politeness in the dubbing of films. Another problem is that the analysis of *figlia mía*

for *hija mía*, for instance, seems to be based on intuition, as empirical data is not used to back up the author's claims, nor are other authors cited. This also applies to the author's assertion that *dai* should be used when translating a Spanish vocative. Her analysis would be more credible if it was based on contrastive linguistic evidence of the type found in House (1998).

Chapter five contains Jeremy King's study of optional internal and external request modifications as politeness strategies in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spanish. He analyses two theatrical genres: *pasos* and *comedias* and a collection of "familiar letters." Given the obvious unavailability of oral texts, these genres were deemed to be the closest to oral language available. I found King's conclusion that familial letters are not characteristic of spoken discourse (149) unsurprising as it is written-to-be-read discourse unlike the theatrical corpora. The author implements Blum-Kulka et al.'s (1989) methodology to analyse his corpora, which he compares with findings from Modern spoken Spanish. His results show that Early Modern Spanish and Modern Spanish "are remarkably similar" with regard to internal and external request modifications, which is especially interesting given that several studies have shown that this is not true regarding the requests themselves (151).

In chapter six, Maíz Arévalo offers some interesting results in her study of responses to compliments. Nonetheless, as in other chapters in this volume, more details about prosodic information and how the corpus was gathered would have been enlightening. The author's description of the Spanish corpus reads thus: "a corpus of fifty Peninsular Spanish compliments—together with their responses—has been collected as field-work notes" (158). We are not told where or when, nor are we given details about the relationship between the interactants. One her most interesting findings is that Spanish males evade accepting compliments while females tend to overtly reject them (163-65). This contrasts with their English counterparts in which rates of acceptance, rejection, and evasion of compliments are equal for the genders. The results for the effect of the complimenter's gender on the complimentee's response are also worth noting.

Barón Parés, in chapter seven, offers some interesting findings on politeness in an EFL context. One is the overuse of "please" at early stages (189), while another provides evidence that pragmatic competence improves without overt pragmatic instruction in later levels when the students have a greater command of the foreign language (190). She also finds that lack of proficiency in the L2 among children can also lead them to "produce very impolite pragmatic sequences" (191). Her most important discovery is that pragmatic development is linked to a great extent not only to grammatical competence in the L2 but also to previous knowledge of L1 pragmatics.

The main thesis of chapter eight, which opens part four of this volume, is Mugford Fowler's contention that Anglicisms in phatic exchanges in Mexican Spanish are used pragmalinguistically as boosters or face threateners (198). He defines phatic language following Malinowski (1923, 315) as words that fulfil a "social function" where "the actual words do not matter" (198). However, in the very next sentence he says that "phatic

anglicisms" fulfill "very specific pragmatic solidary functions" (204). The fact that Anglicisms are selected by speakers instead of native words seems like a deliberate stylistic choice so one is left wondering exactly what is meant by the term "phatic."

The actual examples of Anglicisms that are collected, such as "loser" and "hello" (205-06) and the use of the Spanish prefix "re-" with English words—"re-happy"—are interesting in their own right. The corpus was gathered using "observers," who collected "opportunity samples." Rather than recording the overheard dialogues, they reconstructed them and committed them to writing. This produced a corpus of 238 phatic utterances and 47 impolite samples. This method has its drawbacks, as many instances of Anglicisms were omitted because they "were too numerous to be written down using this data collection technique" (205) and no prosodic information was collected to help disambiguate between the possible meanings of the utterances.

Chapter nine, by Ruth Breeze, is made up of a detailed and insightful analysis of the mitigation of FTAs within the context of arbitration procedures at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Questioning an arbitral decision constitutes a serious challenge to the authority of the other members of the tribunal and is also a risk to the challenger—the perfect scenario for a study on (im)politeness. Breeze, who uses Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theories in her qualitative and quantitative study of five cases, finds that the vast majority of disagreements are mitigated in several ways. An interesting finding is the use of feigned surprise as an off-record strategy. She supplies several excellent examples that illustrate the scope and inventiveness of politeness strategies (228) and also includes instances of mitigation that may be constrained by the rules of legal rhetoric such as substituting affirmative statements with conditionals (230).

In chapter ten, Mejías Borrero focuses on the use of "like" as a pragmatic marker in American English. He includes in his corpus the comedy series *Seinfeld* and three American films of the "chick-flick" genre. The rest of the corpus is made up of the author's own recordings during lunch breaks and casual conversations with friends and classmates, interaction with the author's own students in class and conversations heard on buses or on the metro. The corpus is perhaps too heterogeneous as it includes written-to-be-spoken discourse as well as naturally occurring speech. Moreover, we are not given information on the recorded informants' ages, gender or social class. With regard to the substance of the article some of the instances of "like" which are classified as mitigators could just as easily be seen as fillers: "Did you spend more than, *like*, 30 dollars for them?" Especially problematic are cases where "like" is used to talk about third persons: "Wasn't she dressing *like*, very casual?" The author puts forward that this is to "compensate the hearer's loss of face" (246), but if said third person or persons cannot hear the conversation, it is difficult to see why any compensation is needed. Finally, in a paper focusing on "like" in speech, one would expect prosodic evidence.

In the eleventh and final chapter, Romero Trillo and Lenn analyse discourse markers in English, Spanish and also the acquisition of English discourse markers by non-native

Spanish speakers—an ambitious aim for just one article. The chapter starts off with a definition of discourse markers (DMs) that could define almost any part of speech: "elements that fill the discoursal and cognitive slots that spoken language needs in order to weave the net of interaction" (259). Because of this, the subsequent analysis of DMs is disappointing and unconvincing. I found this chapter rather difficult to read as it is taken for granted that the reader will understand certain concepts such as "biunivocal addressor-message relationship" (261), a "principled process" or a "cognitive standardised process" (260). Finally, I find it surprising that only four of the sixteen cited works are not (co-) written by one of the authors of this paper and that none of the most influential papers on DMs are mentioned at all.

This volume includes some interesting contributions but due to their heterogeneity—both in quality and subject matter—most readers would probably only find one or two of interest. A more rigorous selection of articles would have made this publication a more rewarding experience for those who are eager to encounter research that really makes a difference in what is a fascinating field.

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María del Pilar García-Mayo, María Junkal Gutiérrez Mangado and María Martínez Adrián, eds. 2013. *Contemporary Approaches to Second Language Acquisition*. AILA Applied Linguistics Series 9. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 265 pp. ISBN: 9789027205254 (hardback); ISBN: 9789027205285 (paperback); ISBN: 9789027272225 (eBook).

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Edited by García-Mayo, Gutiérrez Mangado and Martínez Adrián, this book offers an overview of current perspectives in SLA, from well-established to cutting-edge issues in the field. It is a comprehensive volume, reflecting both up-to-date studies in a number of paradigms and new insights into already established theoretical approaches. As such, the volume will be of use to newcomers in the field, providing a general picture of recent developments, and also to SLA researchers seeking to keep abreast of areas of work complementary to their own. The three words which most accurately define this volume are wide-ranging, contemporary and interdisciplinary. With a foreword by Florence Myles and an afterword by Jason Rothman and Bill VanPatten, the book consists of eleven chapters spanning a variety of different approaches. In the foreword, Myles underlines the wide scope of the volume and notes its focus on current work and the link between theories and their pedagogical implications. The foreword is followed by an introduction in which the editors mention that the origins of the book are in the seminar "Multiple Perspectives in SLA," organised by the Research Group Language and Speech.

The first linguistic tradition to be addressed is the generative perspective. In chapter one, Roumyana Slabakova outlines the Bottleneck Hypothesis, where functional morphology is argued to be more difficult to acquire than syntax and semantics. Although the author here focuses on explaining the cognitive processes of language acquisition, she also observes that this hypothesis challenges the precepts of communicative language teaching. Slabakova proposes that, contrary to what is generally believed about generative approaches, this hypothesis has something to offer language teaching, arguing that attention should be paid to practising functional morphology in the classroom. This willingness to forge links between a specific theory and its teaching implications is also evident in many other chapters of the book.

Systemic-functional approaches are addressed in chapter two. Ana Llinares García provides an overview of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and presents empirical studies to illustrate the uses of SFL in SLA. These include research into the language

used by young learners, the generic features of texts produced in writing by secondary education students, and content-based instruction. Llinares suggests that SFL can be a valuable model that contributes to the understanding of foreign language learning and that different educational levels and contexts can benefit from SFL studies, especially early young learning and content and language integrated learning (CLIL).

Interactionism forms the basis of chapter three. Teresa Pica, to whom the volume is dedicated, analyses in her posthumous article the contribution of interaction theory to the understanding of SLA processes. This state-of-the art paper, one of the broadest in scope in the book, includes empirical research going back to its earliest formulations from the 1960s. It also reviews aspects of input, interaction, feedback and output processes. Empirical perspectives on learner interaction, modified interaction and their contribution to SLA are explained. Pica goes on to address the relevance of readiness for learner interaction. Empirical perspectives on task-based interaction and a discussion of task-based interaction in the classroom complete the chapter. New research directions in the field are suggested, including lengthening the treatment and research time of studies, both in the case of individual and multi-study works. Finally, the chapter calls for more research in the area of computer-assisted language learning

In chapter four, Roy Lyster and Masatoshi Sato present an overview of Skill Acquisition Theory, which postulates that practice and feedback in context promote the acquisition of a second language. In this framework, skill acquisition is defined as the transition from an effortful use of the target language towards a more automatic use with the aim of obtaining faster and better processing. The theory distinguishes between declarative knowledge, which is stative, and procedural knowledge, which consists of the ability to do things. Practice is the key to the shift from declarative to procedural knowledge and together with feedback this promotes meaningful learning. Lyster and Sato's review of empirical research indicates that systematic practice contributes to L2 development. They believe that the interplay between declarative and procedural knowledge is bidirectional and relative to the context of teaching, further suggesting that it would be useful to analyse the most effective types of practice for the consolidation of early L2 knowledge in different educational contexts

The Input Processing Theory is discussed by Alessandro G. Benati in chapter five. Three main issues are dealt with: Van Patten's Input Processing Theory (IP), explaining its principles and sub-principles; empirical research on input processing principles, and the theoretical and pedagogical implications of the input processing framework. According to IP theory, L2 learners interpret the input they are exposed to and acquisition is subject to this interpretation. From a pedagogical point of view, IP offers guidelines for the development of instructional material.

Processability Theory and its developmental sequences are explained in chapter six. Gisela Håkansson outlines Pienemann's Processability Theory (PT), which posits that morphosyntactic structures emerge in an invariable order in the learner's production, which is universal and common across languages. PT focuses on the emergence stage of

a structure, that is, when processing operations can be undertaken. Empirical evidence from a series of studies in different languages is reviewed. Håkansson also discusses the role of transfer from the native language, arising from the fact that learners can only transfer what they can process, as formulated in the Developmentally Moderated Transfer Hypothesis. The chapter also includes profiling, which refers to the use of developmental stages to measure language acquisition; hence PT allows us to measure the development of both languages in bilinguals. Håkansson concludes that PT can predict and explain developmental stages of acquisition and states that future research should include data from new learner categories such as heritage learners.

Chapter seven considers SLA from the perspective of Sociocultural Theory (SCT). Gabriela Adela Gánem-Gutiérrez's chapter is divided into three main areas. First, she deals with the theoretical tenets of SCT, explaining the notions of mediation and praxis and providing an overview of the key issues of L2 knowledge. Second, she focuses on L2 learning and development, discussing the Zone of Proximal Development as established by Vygotsky, verbalisation, gesture, internalisation, and how to assess development. Finally, the author looks at the role of the linguistic environment, considering the empirical research here. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research such as the analysis of different mechanisms that are activated in dialogical activity.

From the different theoretical approaches to SLA of the preceding chapters, chapter eight turns to a usage-based perspective on L2 spoken syntax. After reviewing the nature and properties of spoken language, Regina Weinert, María Basterrechea and María del Pilar García-Mayo move on to an explanation of a usage-based approach to grammar. The importance of corpus-transcription in research in spoken language is underlined. The chapter then focuses on the study of subordination from a usage-based perspective using conversational extracts from 20 LOCNEC dialogues by British university students and L2 participants from the IkerSPEAK Corpus. It is argued that a usage-based perspective which includes not only linguistic but also social, psycholinguistic and developmental elements can prove useful for research on spoken language. Finally, the authors suggest that sociolinguistic issues should be addressed in further research.

The connectionist perspective is considered in chapter nine. Ping Li and Xiaowei Zhao start by reviewing connectionism and SLA, including connectionist models that have been designed for multiple language acquisition and bilingual learning. The authors then focus on the DevLex-II model, a connectionist model that can simulate realistic linguistic lexicon in more than one language, including bilingual language pairs such as Chinese and English. The model can simulate different stages of acquisition making it possible for the authors to compare early and late L2 learning. Findings indicate that the early learning of two languages makes it possible for the system to separate the two lexicons in the learning process. The authors argue that, unlike monolingual models, the development of models for bilingual language acquisition has been relatively slow and that this area requires much more research in order to face challenges such as integrating bilingual processing and second language learning models.

Chapter ten is devoted to Dynamic Systems theory (DST). Kees De Bot, Wander Lowie, Steven L. Thorne and Marjolijn Verspoor present DST as a comprehensive theory that unifies different theories on second language development. Socio-cultural theories of development are exemplified along with dynamic usage-based theories of languages to show how DST can connect different middle-level theories which deal with social, cognitive and contextual aspects in isolation in that these theories embrace different time scales and levels of granularity. DST focuses on the change of systems over time as they interact with the environment and are internally reorganised. Dynamic systems are adaptive and develop over time and research tends to focus on the transition from one phase to another. The authors here see development as a course of time in which cognition is not only present in the sociocultural level but is also an embodied process.

Event-related brain potential (ERP) is discussed in chapter eleven. This technique is used to investigate language processing in real time. Laura L. Sabourin, Christie Brien and Marie-Claude Tremblay review studies which use ERP in SLA, including speech perception, lexical processing and sentence processing. It is suggested that careful control of the factors involved in L2 processing might lead to a better understanding of the factors involved. Further research is necessary in assessing issues such as different levels of linguistic processing. The authors also note the need for correlational research.

Jason Rothman and Bill VanPatten close the volume, not with an evaluation of the different theories discussed as the reader might expect, but with four questions which address four main issues: the multiplicity of SLA theories, differences in how theories address the constructs of SLA, the influence of environmental contexts, and the competition between the different theories. Finally, the authors establish a distinction between acquisition, on the one hand, and the development of a mental representation and skill development, on the other, as a means of trying to clarify how theories fit into such schemes. This serves to underline the complexity of SLA and how different theories focus on different issues therein.

The volume is not construed around a single topic as is the case with most edited volumes but is designed to address a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives and thus is broad in its scope. As such, it is an ambitious undertaking but succeeds in fostering an understanding of a multiplicity of perspectives. The editors consciously avoid using the words "framework," "model" and "theory" favouring instead the term "approach" as a cover-term for different perspectives. Although some of these approaches are perhaps less accessible than others to newcomers to the field, most of the chapters manage to set out the issues in a way that can be accessed by the less experienced reader. The book is thus addressed to researchers, graduate and postgraduate students, teachers and any professionals interested in the field of SLA. The variety of approaches provides the reader with the most relevant approaches to SLA, not only from a theoretical perspective but also from the point of view of teaching implications and different applications of applied linguistics. The empirical evidence provided by the different approaches guides the reader through the various types of research carried out within the multiple views presented in

the volume. To sum up, the volume incorporates interdisciplinary viewpoints, is concerned with the links between theory and pedagogical applications, and offers a comprehensive overview of current work in the area. It is, then, a valuable addition to the literature and will no doubt promote further understanding of the multiple and varied paradigms within the field of SLA.

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